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Discussing my future with my boss, he asked me: “What would you like to 
do in the future, which kind of job would you like to do?” I thought about 
my job for a second, about the countless business cases I had calculated 
thus far, the endless list of component recommendations and product 
alternatives I had presented to management. Then I said: “I would like to 
be a decision maker; I would like to be the one who decides and not the 
one who recommends.” To which he replied: “Well, I don’t think you will 
ever decide more than you have in the last four years of your job.” 
 
 
Many studies have focused on the topic of product innovation. As a key element 
of how industrial organisations work, of how competition is shaped and how 
economic growth is realised, innovation provides an interesting research field, 
which will never be fully explored. Industrial organisations explore these grounds 
through strategic processes in which objectives should guide product development 
processes. Ideas, alternatives or decisions form these processes in which 
heterogeneous actors need to be aligned and coordinated towards the final product 
innovation. Heterogeneity is a key aspect here; different, new technologies, 
conflicting objectives, different opinions and different management practices for 
example, are part of this process. Although these elements have been studied 
extensively in extant research, I identify several gaps in the existing literature, 
which I in turn strive to fill with this thesis. First, a perspective of the interactions 
in innovation processes is needed with a focus on control mechanisms and the 
mobilisation of strategic objectives. Secondly, focusing on control, the way 
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calculative boundaries are created and explored and how these may be overcome 
needs more development and empirical insights. Thirdly, the interaction of control 
mechanisms and the coordination of product development networks through these 
interactions lack empirical insights and build an interesting research ground. I do 
not provide a holistic framework or a contingent perspective of how organisations 
should manage innovation. Rather I discuss the many ways in which product 
development networks become convergent through the interaction of control 
mechanisms, which may act as a vehicle or translator of strategic objectives. The 
research question to be investigated in this thesis is: 
 
How do management accounting and control mechanisms interact with 
strategic objectives and heterogeneous innovation networks within 
product development? 
 
I investigate this question by discussing two strategic issues in product 
development, namely product greening and aesthetical design. Both are important 
issues in product development processes and for industrial organisations for 
gaining competitive advantage and generating customer value. In a series of four 
research papers I analyse a mid-sized European car manufacturer and provide 
cases in which these issues have led to conflicts and controversies on the one 
hand, and to the generation of new product alternatives on the other. With an 
empirical basis of 71 interviews and numerous internal documents, notes, 
participant observations and a questionnaire, I display insights into the dynamics 
of control mechanisms and the mobilisation of strategic objectives in 
heterogeneous innovation networks. I follow an actor-network perspective (ANT), 
which is applied to get an in-depth perspective in the study of the phenomena of 
innovation. ANT explains here how things are formed, are held together or fall 
apart. The previously discussed elements, such as technologies, objectives or 
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management practices are defined as actors, which are not only intermediaries in 
the product development process. Through this perspective the papers develop 
insights into the dynamics of product development, specifically into the 
mobilisation of strategic objectives and into the interaction of control mechanisms. 
The four papers build the core of this thesis, which is framed by a cape that 
discusses the overall research question and generalises the findings and the 
contributions of the four papers. The overall conclusions of this PhD thesis are the 
following: 
 
 Calculative and non-calculative spaces are existent in product development 
networks. 
 Strategic objectives are mobilised through the creation and exploration of 
calculative spaces. 
 Within these calculative spaces, collectives are formed and heterogeneity 
among strategic objectives, calculations, performance measurements and 
organisational functions are aligned.  
 Calculations provide a common language. Although calculations do not 
represent everything they may align and coordinate heterogeneous actors. 
 Some objectives are incommensurable and mobilised by different means than 
calculations (such as prototypes) in non-calculative spaces. 
  Through competition, alternatives are created which form strategic 
objectives individually and influence the decision process. Objectives are 
pursued and emerge in this process.  
 Calculative and non-calculative control mechanisms interact in product 





 Balancing and compromising are mechanisms that form one collective, which 
is translated into the final product. Whether a calculative or a non-calculative 
device is able to concentrate the largest number of actors and is able to 
translate the product development network towards an innovation is, rather 
than being predictable, dependent on the actors on the stage. 
 Strategic objectives are neither static nor stable, and control mechanisms are 
active in the making of strategy. Strategising is not a process made only by 
social actors but by actors such as visualisations and calculations.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes specifically to the literature on product 
greening and aesthetical design. The papers analysed several cases which point to 
the following findings: 
 
 Product greening may be subject to calculations through the creation and 
exploration of calculative spaces.  
 Product greening may enter calculative processes as a strategic issue and may 
become an ‘ordinary thing’ rather than being a ‘charitable and altruistic 
demand’. 
 It thus becomes an integrated part of product development. 
 The developments of forms and of functions are important processes in 
product development; however, their integration seems to be a difficult one. 
 In aesthetical design, different control mechanisms such as competition and 
visualisation of physical material are in place. 
 The integration of the generation of forms into the generation of functions is 
pursued through balancing and compromising between the languages of 





These contributions and findings are abstracted from the papers and reflect a meta-
contribution, which is of a rather broader nature and reflects general answers to 
the overall research question. By providing these findings through deep insights 
into product development processes, this thesis contributes to the further 
exploration of the research grounds presented in the research field of product 
innovation and the complex processes of product development with its unlimited 
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Mange undersøgelser har fokuseret på emnet produktinnovation. Innovation er et 
centralt element i, hvordan industrielle organisationer arbejder, hvordan 
konkurrencen formes, og hvordan den økonomiske vækst realiseres, hvorfor 
innovation et interessant forskningsfelt. Industrielle organisationer bedriver 
innovation gennem strategiske processer, hvor mål skulle styre 
produktudviklingen, og Idéer, alternativer eller beslutninger former processerne, 
hvorigennem heterogene aktører skal afstemmes og koordineres mod det endelige 
produkt. Heterogenitet er et centralt aspekt her, anderledes, nye teknologier, 
modstridende målsætninger, forskellige perspektiver og forskellige 
ledelsespraksisser for eksempel, er en del af denne proces. Selv om disse 
elementer er blevet grundigt undersøgt i forskningen, har jeg identificeret flere 
huller i den eksisterende litteratur, som jeg tilstræber at fylde med denne 
afhandling. Forskningsspørgsmålet er: Hvordan interagerer økonomistyring og 
kontrolmekanismer med strategiske mål og heterogene innovationsnetværk 
indenfor produktudvikling? 
 
Jeg undersøger dette spørgsmål ved at diskutere og analysere strategiske 
problemstillinger i produktudvikling. I fire forskningsartikler analyserer jeg en 
mellemstor europæisk bilproducent, med et fokus på de tilfælde, hvor disse 
spørgsmål har ført til konflikter og kontroverser på den ene side og på den anden 
side til generation af nye produktalternativer. Jeg benytter et aktør-netværk 
perspektiv (ANT), til at få en dybdegående forståelse af innovationsprocesser. 
Gennem dette perspektiv udvikler papirerne indsigt i dynamikker i 
produktudvikling, og specifikt omkring mobiliseringen af strategiske mål og 
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samspillet med kontrolmekanismer. De fire papirer er kernen i afhandlingen, som 
er indrammet af en kappe, der diskuterer den overordnede problemstilling og 
generaliserer resultaterne og bidragene fra de fire papirer. De overordnede 
konklusioner af afhandlingen, er følgende: 
 
 Kalkulative og ikke-kalkulative rum eksisterer i produktudviklingsprocesser. 
 Strategiske mål mobiliseres gennem skabelse og udforskning af kalkulative 
rum. Inden for disse kalkulative rum, dannes kollektiver som tilpasser og 
koordinerer heterogenitet blandt strategiske mål, kalkulationer, 
resultatmålinger og organisatoriske funktioner. Kalkulationer giver et fælles 
sprog. Selv om kalkulationerne ikke repræsenterer alt, kan de tilpasse og 
koordinere heterogene aktører. 
 Nogle mål er inkommensurable og mobiliseres på andre måder end via 
kalkulationer (såsom prototyper) i ikke-kalkulative rum. Gennem 
konkurrence, dannes alternativer som påvirker strategiske målsætninger og 
som påvirker beslutningsprocessen. Målsætninger styrer og emergerer i 
denne proces. 
 Kalkulative og ikke-kalkulative kontrolmekanismer interagerer i 
produktudvikling og begge afstemmes og koordineres i 
produktudviklingsprocessen. Afbalancering og kompromisser, er 
mekanismer, der danner et kollektiv, som oversættes til det endelige produkt. 
Om en Kalkulative og ikke-kalkulative proces er i stand til at koncentrere det 
største antal aktører og er i stand til at oversætte produktudviklingsnetværket 





 Strategiske mål er hverken statiske eller stabile, og kontrolmekanismerne er 
aktive i skabelsen af strategien. Strategising er ikke en proces, der kun 
foretages af de sociale aktører, men også af aktører så som visualiseringer og 
kalkulationer. 
 
Disse bidrag og resultater er generaliseret fra papirerne og afspejler et meta-
bidrag, som er af en noget bredere karakter og afspejler det generelle svar på den 
overordnede problemstilling. Ved at udvikle disse resultater gennem dybdegående 
case arbejde, bidrager denne afhandling til den videre udforskning af 
forskningslitteraturen inden for produktinnovation samt af komplekse processer i 
produktudviklingen med disse processers ubegrænsede muligheder for at tilpasse 
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“Where can we start a study of science and technology?” (Latour, 1987 p. 2) 
Beginning by posing this question may be one way of introducing a thesis about 
control and innovation. What I am studying in my PhD are the ways in which a 
product is made durable through the means of control. But how should this be 
approached and moreover, how should this be studied, through what perspective, 
in what theoretical context and with which empirical data? Research is always 
subject to restrictions, to limitations, to personal taste (e.g. Fontana and Frey, 
1998) to time (e.g. curriculum of a PhD) and to space (e.g. empirical domain ‘at 
hand’). But do we already know the limitations to our studies when we begin a 
study of science and technology? Do we set clear boundaries with respect to time 
and space when we begin and is our starting point the one that sets the limitations? 
Yes and no. We have to start somewhere that’s for sure, as for having to end 
somewhere, that is less certain, but this thesis, at least the manuscript with its 
pages, has become real and is the end of a journey of studying science and 
technology. What happened between then and now is described in the following 





1.1 The problem of control in relation to strategy and innovation 
 
The process of innovation is mainly occupied with the realisation of ideas and 
inventions of new goods, new production or service methods, or markets 
(Schumpeter, 1942). In this process heterogeneous actors get in new, unexpected 
connections and controversies and uncertainties are settled. There are 
controversies and uncertainties about future markets, future customers, future 
technologies, and future inventions. What is so interesting in industrial 
organisations, are the mechanisms through which innovation is generated and 
controlled. Especially in industrial companies controversies and uncertainties are 
present due to their mature and competitive markets, technological volatility, high 
production volume and high investments. To study the process from invention to 
innovation, the settlement of controversies and uncertainties that increase a 
projects’ realisation are thus of interest. 
 
Product development processes that steer the process from invention to innovation 
are strategic processes in which strategic objectives need to be mobilised and 
given directions (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Davila, 2005), and in which 
heterogeneous views and interests need to be aligned (e.g. Davila, Foster and 
Oyon, 2009). Much literature focuses on the problem of control and innovation, 
which is still a problem that is not only interesting for practitioners and theorists 
alike, but where unexplored research ground still has to be discovered (e.g. Davila, 
Foster and Oyon, 2009; Davila, Foster and Li, 2009; Chapman, 2005).  
Controlling strategy (Chapman, 2005) and control in product development (e.g. 
Davila’s works1; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Bisbe and Malagueno, 2009; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1996; Jørgensen and Messner, 2010) are two primary issues of this 
research. 
                                                 
1 Davila, 2000, 2003, 2005; Davila and Wouters, 2004 
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The mobilisation of strategic objectives provides a challenging setting for research 
in the field of management accounting and control. This however, is especially 
valid when new strategic objectives come into play. Here, whether management 
mechanisms (e.g. stage-gate  processes, target costing, development teams and 
critical success factors, e.g. Davila and Wouters, 2004)  may provide guidance and 
steer organisational processes in uncertain environments or whether they may be 
damaging flexibility is discussed in several studies (e.g. Ahrens and Chapman, 
2002, 2004; Brownell, 1987; Chapman, 2005; Otley, 1999; Simons, 1995). 
However, to mobilise strategic objectives in product development processes, they 
have to influence decisions and generate alternatives. Literature discusses this 
issue from different perspectives.  
 
For example, calculations may coordinate decisions and activities to achieve a 
balanced set of strategic priorities (Lynch and Cross, 1992; Nanni et al., 1990) and 
thus support organisations to implement and describe strategic objectives and to 
guide decisions through influencing behaviour, and through providing a basis for 
rewards or punishments. Literature on the choice of calculative processes (e.g. 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Malina and Selto, 2004; Tuomela, 2005; 
Stringer, 2007) shares the view that organisations actively design control systems 
and performance measurements to link their strategic objectives and the means by 
which the objectives should be realised. Especially in product development 
environments, the role of calculations builds an interesting research area due to the 
complex and conflicting nature of product development. Management control over 
product development is struggling with focusing on conflicting strategic 
objectives, such as cost and value, at the same time. Specific strategic objectives 
such as profitability and efficiency may play an important role in industrial 
organisations. This means that systems such as activity based costing (ABC) or 
target costing play central roles in product development environments. Here, 
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literature on product development focuses on the conflicts of innovation and 
control as one particular issue (e.g. Davila, 2003; Davila and Wouters, 2004; 
Jørgensen and Messner, 2009; 2010; Mouritsen, 2009).  
 
Focusing on control, the mobilisation of strategic objectives and the process of 
innovation are two issues that are particularly interesting in product development 
networks. The study of the dynamics of control mechanisms (e.g. calculations) 
that mobilise strategic objectives and that coordinate and align product 
development networks is thus the focus of this thesis.  
 
Focusing less on calculations a strategy-as-practice perspective argues that 
individuals construct routines and practices, and that strategy is a process that is 
pursued by being driven through decision practices. (e.g. Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007; Whittington, 2003, 2006). This perspective sheds more light on the 
dynamics of control and strategy than, for example, contingency approaches (e.g. 
Jørgensen and Messner, 2010). In this process, existing links and networks need to 
be considered, because they may have significant impact on these processes.  
 
This thesis mainly explores two strategic issues in product development to discuss 
these problems. The first one is product greening, which is becoming more and 
more important in industrial environments, and the other is aesthetical product 
design, which is becoming more and more the focus in creating customer value 
and a means to generate price premiums. The investigation of both objectives 
should contribute first, to the discussed body of literature of management 
accounting, control and innovation, secondly to the literature of aesthetical design 
and product greening, and thirdly to specific and related issues in product 




I discuss the differing perspectives in this field of research, which reveals an 
interesting and still rather unexplored research ground (Chapman, 2005) in 
Chapter 2. The main gaps I discuss in the literature review are first, the lack of a 
more detailed perspective in order to understand the relationships within 
innovation processes focusing on control and the mobilisation of strategic 
objectives. Secondly, the creation and exploration of calculative boundaries in the 
product development process needs further insights and analyses; it is also 
important to analyse how these boundaries are overcome. Thirdly, strategic 
objectives, calculations and control mechanisms may cause conflicts; 
heterogeneity in product development networks must be aligned towards one final 
product. Fourthly, the discussed research context needs further research in relation 
to the two specific issues of product greening and aesthetical design. Both are 
relevant and rather unexplored fields. I approach these points by applying an 
actor-network perspective which I will introduce in the next chapter. This 
perspective helps to explain how things are made, how they are held together or 
how they fall apart. Strategic objectives or control mechanisms, for example, are 
not intermediaries but are actors; how controversies are settled between them, how 
they become translated, and how innovation is formed is thus to be studied by 
following these actors and by tracing their interactions. Rather than striving for a 
holistic framework of how to manage new strategic objectives (such as product 
greening or aesthetical design), I try to display the many ways in which control 
mechanisms may act as a vehicle or translator of strategic objectives in product 





The research question to be followed is thus: 
 
How do management accounting and control mechanisms interact with 





1.2 Short discussion of the theoretical perspective 
 
Originally trained as an engineer, I was focusing on scientific methods and 
rationalities. I was calculating costs of components and trying to rationally give 
recommendations to managers and engineers as to what to invest their money in. I 
saw how new technologies were developed and applied in cars and how machine-
like the product development apparatus worked. I had to take a step back and view 
the making of science and technology from the outside in. I wanted to open the 
black box “so that outsiders may have a glimpse at it.” (Latour, 1987, p. 15). A 
black box means that something must have been or may become durable; that 
there is something like a product. If so, then strategic objectives must somehow be 
inscribed into it, they must become part of it through development processes – and 
this is exactly the process I want to study. How do management accounting and 
control mechanisms interact with strategic objectives and heterogeneous 
innovation networks within product development? I will follow the approach of 
actor-network theory (ANT) to study how things are “in the making” (Latour, 
1987, p. 4). 
 
ANT is a relativistic sociology. Epistemology, ontology and reference frames, 
such as psychology or politics are mixed and not treated independently (Latour, 
1999). The reality of these terms is not a fact or a given, but needs to result from 
transformations. The real world is thus the consequence, the output of science, 
rather than its cause (Latour, 1987). This may be categorised as a constructivist 
perspective, but here the world is not constructed by human minds but by science 
– reality still exists, but through the construction of science. The many underlying 
suppositions of ANT are discussed in Chapter 3. The study of technology doesn’t 
begin with facts, but with fact making and we need to trace the actors’ ways of 
doing that. There is no asymmetry between humans and non-humans, but 
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asymmetry is to be defined in the making process and whether actors are 
intermediaries or mediators depends on this process. The way in which black 
boxes are created is a translation (Callon, 1986) and needs to be followed and 
analysed to open up the black box of product development and to trace processes 
in the making through actors and define asymmetries and mediators. It is 
following the actors, their heterogeneity and their contradictions and tracing how 
efforts are mediated that enrols humans and non-humans and analysing how 
controversies are settled (Latour, 1987, p. 144). 
 
ANT is the perspective of how this thesis contributes to science. It should help 
penetrate “from the outside the inner workings of science and technology” and 
then “to explain to the outsider how it all works.” (Latour, 1987, p. 15). In this 
thesis I studied the inner workings of a car manufacturer that is described in the 
next section. 
 
The above approach is applied in this thesis to gain a more detailed understanding 
to study the phenomena of strategic control and innovation. Current studies don’t 
provide detailed perspectives of the contexts that are created and developed 
through control mechanisms in product development. Contingency theory, for 
example, focuses on the fit between given circumstances in technology and 
environment and organisational action (and thus control) and argues that it is an 
effect to external factors. Furthermore, studies applying a sense-making 
perspective argue that individuals, such as managers, make sense and interpret 
information such as accounting information and strategic objectives and decide for 
themselves how to act on information (Weick, 1995). In structuration theory, 
social systems are underlying structural rules and social action is performed within 
the pre-given context that social structure provides. Structures and rules are, on the 
other hand, modified or maintained by social action (Giddens, 1984). 
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Discordantly, in practice theory, the practice of humans is the focus. Social 
practices are defined through social actions within space (the systems) and across 
time (routinised behaviour) (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny, 2001). The 
social perspective suggests that actors within an organisation construct the 
routines and intended practices and that any action is a proficiency that can be 
executed on the individual level, the organisational level or both (Denis, Langley, 
and Rouleau, 2007). Here structures or practices are concepts that are not part of 
actions and thus do not exist as objects. In ANT this makes them irrelevant for 
studying networks. 
 
Here ANT explains how things are formed, how they are held together or how 
they fall apart. Control actions, calculations, and the forming of strategic 
objectives are not only intermediaries in relation to the environment. They become 
actors and it becomes “possible to understand how the environment and the 
accounting inscriptions are constituted simultaneously” (Justesen and Mouritsen, 
2011, p. 180). ANT suggests instead social action symmetry between humans and 
non-humans and that action would not be considered as purely “social”. Study 
objects in these terms may therefore be items like calculations, strategic 
objectives, or innovations. 
 
Calculations and other control mechanisms may play a more active role than 
studied by, for example, contingency, practice, or sense-making theorists. As will 
be discussed in chapter 3,to get a more detailed perspective and focus on a more 
active role of control mechanisms one has to follow the actors, their heterogeneity 
and their contradictions and should trace how efforts are mediated that enrol 





1.3 Empirical field, outline and findings of papers and thesis 
1.3.1 Empirical field 
 
As empirical basis for this thesis, I conducted a longitudinal study of a car 
manufacturer (Automotive Company). The company is a mid-sized, European 
company that produces and delivers cars in the premium sector. I have studied the 
company for a period of three years during which time I, together with a co-
author, conducted 71 interviews (Appendix 1) and questionnaires, gathered 
empirical material, and observed participants in relevant meetings. I studied the 
product development network in the course of the car development process and 
focused on calculations and their impact on product decisions. I focused therefore 
first of all on the mechanisms and processes within the product development 
networks and on actors that were relevant in this process. Furthermore, I followed 
episodes, in which new strategic objectives were mediated and decided upon in the 
product development network. These episodes are discussed in the Papers. In 
Paper 1 I focus on the issue of the generation of product complexity in product 
development. In Paper 2, I (together with a co-author) focus on the issue of weight 
reduction, the introduction of a new headlight technology as an innovation and on 
the issue of aerodynamics and the connected reduction of CO2. In Paper 3, I am 
focusing on certain car projects and the way in which aesthetical product design is 
conducted. In Paper 4, (together with a co-author) I focus on different mechanisms 
in technological innovation and aesthetical design discussing cases in which both 
mechanisms interact and converge towards a final state of innovation. The specific 






1.3.2 Positioning and relation of papers 
 
All four papers are positioned in the early concept development stage of product 
development. This has several reasons. First, most of the strategic decisions on the 
development project are taken at that stage, secondly and consequently, these 
decisions make up 70-80% of the life cycle cost and this is when the 
environmental impact is determined (e.g. Leech & Turner, 1985; Ehrlenspiel et al., 
2007, p. 11). Thirdly, most controversies are discussed and weighed up against 
each other when these decisions are made. I will briefly position the papers and 
their theoretical research question (see Table 1) and relate them to each other. 
Paper 1 analyses how a specific strategic objective (reduction of product 
complexity) is mobilised and how the configuration of control and performance 
measurements influence mobilisation. Focusing on the choice of performance 
measurements and calculations, it investigates how strategic objectives may be 
mobilised through performance measurements and calculations, and which 
barriers and controversies may occur in this process and how they may be 
overcome. 
 
In Paper 2, different modes of calculation are defined through which certain 
objectives (e.g. product greening) are mobilised in product development. Certain 
strategic objectives may lead to conflicts and controversies in product 
development decisions. The paper argues for the alignment of these controversies 
through calculations. It discusses six modes of calculations that may create 
alignment when conflicts occur and thereby addresses the issue of project 
coordination and alignment of product development networks. 
 
Paper 3 focuses on the processes of aesthetical concept design. It discusses how 
strategic objectives emerge in the process of aesthetical design and how these 
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objectives interact with forms and visualisations. Aesthetical concept design may 
have its own mere mental2 interpretation of strategic objectives.  
 
Paper 4 discusses the need for a separation of technological innovation and 
aesthetical design and the need for the integration of both. Investigating control 
mechanisms at Automotive Company defines the control mechanisms and the 
processes and mechanisms through which both create convergence and align the 





                                                 
2 see Mouritsen et al. (2009) 
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Paper 1 Mobilisation of strategic 
objectives – The role of 
performance measurements 
in their design and choice 
process 
How are new strategic 
objectives (such as reducing 
product complexity) 
translated into the new 
product development process 
and which role do existing 
performance measurements 




 Mobilisation of strategic 
objectives 
 Implementation of 
performance measurements 
 Barriers and conflicts in the 
process of mobilisation of 
strategic objectives 
Paper 2 Calculating green 
innovation: Creating and 
exploring calculative spaces 
for innovation and the 
environment in the 
automotive industry. 
How is greening calculated 
in heterogeneous product 
development networks? 
Focus: 
 Conflicts and controversies 
between strategic objectives 
and calculations 
 Means and modes of 
mobilisation 
 Means and modes of creating 
alignment of heterogeneous 
views 
Paper 3 The mobilisation of strategic 
objectives in the process of 
aesthetical design. 
How are strategic objectives 
translated in the process of 
aesthetical design? 
Focus: 
 Generation of aesthetical 
concept design 
 Mobilisation of strategic 
objectives 
 Role of calculations within 
this process 
Paper 4 Controlling, separating and 
converging design and 
product development 
How is design and 
technological innovation 
controlled, when both 
separation and integration of 
design and product 
development is demanded? 
Focus: 
 Generation of aesthetical 
design and technological 
innovation 
 Mechanisms of control in 
both events 
 Convergence of technological 
innovation and aesthetical 
design 
 





All four papers thus address the research question whilst focusing on their own 
particular issues. Together, all the papers contribute to the issue of product 
development in relation to management control and the mobilisation of strategic 
objectives. 
 
1.3.3 Structure of this thesis 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature to 
which it contributes, focusing on the strategic nature of MCS, on the role of 
management control in product development and in stage-gate  processes, and 
discusses the literature on aesthetical design and product greening. The chapter 
develops both the relevant gaps in the literature and the research question.  These 
are then addressed in the papers and are further developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 
discusses the perspective and methodology of the thesis. First, the actor-network 
perspective is discussed; secondly, the ANT approach of following the particular 
research question of this thesis is discussed and elaborated. In Chapter 4, the 
research methods that are applied in this thesis are presented, discussing the 
selection of cases and papers and data collection methods. In Chapter 5, the papers 
are presented. Chapter 6 discusses and concludes the papers and ties their 
arguments together. Chapter 7 finalises the thesis with a discussion of limitations 
and the implications for future research. 
 
Thorough literature reviews are presented within the papers relating to the specific 
issues of each paper. Furthermore, discussions and conclusions are specifically 
developed within the papers. The chapters of this thesis reflect a cape, a meta-
contribution and a discussion of the single papers. Due to the paper-based thesis, 
the topic and the contribution of this thesis is of a rather broad nature. The 
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combining of specific issues (discussed in the papers) into a thesis gives the 
advantage of providing a general view of the topic of control and innovation. The 
discussion of certain (and several) cases and episodes is inherent to the perspective 
of actor-network theory and provides the literature with clear and structured 
insights into the problems of the interaction of control mechanisms with strategic 









2 Theoretical discussion of relevant literature 
 
Schumpeter (1942) emphasised that innovation is paramount for economic 
growth3. An innovation consists of the invention of, e.g. new goods, methods, or 
markets and its successive implementation.4 Schumpeter stressed the role of large 
industrial companies that have the resources for the successful implementation and 
commercialisation of inventions. Besides investment capital, buying power and 
distribution channels, research and development functions and task division in 
large industrial organisations are responsible for advancing technology and 
science and are a key part of gaining a competitive advantage (Hauschildt, 1993). 
Product development becomes more and more important to mature and global 
industries. The successive implementation of an invention through product 
development is an ambiguous task for industrial organisations. Industrial 
organisations with high production volumes and mature and competitive markets 
(such as the automotive industry) in particular are considerably driven by critical 
success factors such as economic targets, time-to-market or quality. Globalisation 
leads to more competition, which places industries under time and cost pressure to 
compete on time and margin requirements. Furthermore, customers place high 
demands on quality, individualistic products and on the social and environmental 
performance of both production processes and the product. These exogenous 
factors make product development an ambiguous and complex task for industrial 
organisations (e.g. Shepherd and Ahmed, 2000; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997; 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).  
 
                                                 
3 „The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new 
methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organisation that capitalist enterprise 
creates.“ (Schumpeter, 1942, p.83) 
4 Amabile et al. (1996, p. 1155) define innovation “as the successful implementation of creative ideas within an organization. In 
this view, creativity by individuals and teams is a starting point for innovation; the first is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the second. Successful innovation depends on other factors as well, and it can stem not only from creative ideas 
that originate within an organization but also from ideas that originate elsewhere (as in technology transfer).”  
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From the perspective of strategy and control, control mechanisms mobilise and 
shape strategic objectives through exogenous and endogenous assessment, which 
should steer organisational action (e.g. Chapman, 2005). Product development 
becomes a strategic process in which strategic objectives are mobilised to define 
directions for future products (e.g. Davila, 2005; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). 
Strategic objectives, however, are conflicting in nature. Cost leadership, for 
example, and high customer value may conflict in the development of components 
in which costs should be kept low and value should be kept high through materials 
and functions resulting in higher costs. Hence, managing conflicting objectives is 
a central problem for industrial organisations.  
 
The scope of the product has furthermore emerged to allow for high value and 
higher margins through customer value. Organisations strive for product 
differentiation and leadership in product language (e.g. design, product greening). 
This leads to products consisting of more and more technologies. On the one hand, 
a deeper knowledge is needed within organisations to cope with the scope of 
technologies; on the other hand, expertise and greater knowledge of the 
technologies are required in order to handle these technologies. This creates a need 
on the one hand for more expertise in disciplines but on the other for more 
interdisciplinary work as it causes more interdependencies between constituents of 
the new product development network. The coordination and control of innovation 
and the heterogeneity in product development networks create another central 
dilemma for industrial organisations. Furthermore, the issue of coordinating and 
controlling strategy of an emerging research field becomes a factor. 
 
Heterogeneous functions and views within organisations and strategic objectives 
thereby cause ambiguity and uncertainty in product development. Although 
innovations are associated with uncertainty, unexpected outcomes and new 
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relationships of heterogeneous forms (e.g. Davila, Foster and Oyon, 2009, p. 282), 
it is the process of convergence that turns an invention into an innovation. To 
achieve a balanced set of strategic objectives and activities organisations strive for 
a more standardised and coordinated set of activities and towards more control 
efforts (e.g. Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan, 1999; Lynch and Cross, 1992; Nanni 
et al., 1990; Stringer, 2000). Management control should coordinate sets of 
innovation activities and the implementation of strategic objectives within 
different functions of organisations. Recent literature points to control and 
management accounting being productive in innovation. In their discussion, 
Davila, Foster and Li (2009, p. 327) summarise that management control systems 
“are viewed as flexible and dynamic frames adapting and evolving to the 
unpredictability of innovation, but stable to frame cognitive models, 
communication patterns, and actions.” 
 
In this thesis I will not argue for control and innovation as being either in a 
positive or negative relationship. Instead, I will elaborate on how conflicting 
strategic objectives and heterogeneous actors interact in innovative product 
development networks. Here, rather than focusing on how things fall apart, I focus 
on how things are constructed because this thesis is about product development: 
the generation of innovation. Two overlapping fields of research have been 
concerned with the coordination and control of product development: the literature 
on the relationship between management control and strategy, and the literature on 
control and innovation. As I elaborate in the coming sections, most of the studies 
in these fields are based on contingency theory, focusing on types of control, 
strategies, and e.g. product development structures and their fit (e.g. Chapman, 
1997; Chenhall, 2003; Davila, 2000, 2005; Ittner and Larcker, 2005). Although 
some studies, such as practice-theory (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2010) or actor 
network-theory (Christiansen and Varnes, 2007; Mouritsen et al., 2009), have 
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taken a different approach there is still a gap in the understanding of the dynamics 
in product development networks in relation to control and the mobilisation of 
strategic objectives.  
 
In the next two sub-chapters I will elaborate on the extant literature and its 
contributions in an effort to develop the gaps this thesis strives to fill. As this is an 
article-based PhD, the literature review provides a rather broad overview of the 
literature and its gaps and point to the overall contribution of the thesis through the 
four papers. A more detailed and more specific review is provided in the papers in 
relation to the underlying problem to be investigated in the relevant paper. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 2.3 the literature on aesthetical design and product 
greening is briefly reviewed as they both present specific problems in product 






2.1 The strategic nature of management control 
2.1.1 Control and strategy – a generic issue 
 
Management control systems (MCS) were initially defined as a means to 
transform strategy into action by providing information relevant for coordination 
and control (e.g. Anthony, 1965). Management control, strategic planning and 
operational control were distinguished from that perspective. Exactly this 
challenging task, the implementation of strategic objectives into practice, has 
provided an interesting setting for research in the field of management accounting 
and control. The discussions about management control systems and strategy have 
gained momentum after the call for more comprehensive systems that measure 
performance beyond the financial dimensions5 and still provide interesting and 
unexplored grounds for research (e.g. Chapman, 2005).  
 
On the one hand, MCS were often criticised as damaging flexibility and thus being 
incompatible with uncertain environments (e.g. Brownell, 1987; as discussed in 
Chapman, 2005), on the other hand, they are important for maintaining or altering 
patterns in organisational activities (Otley, 1999; Simons, 1995). Especially in 
recent research however, MCS are seen as enabling steering for strategic change in 
unstable environments (Chapman, 2005; Ahrens and Chapman, 2002, 2004; 
Simons, 1995). From the viewpoint of the simple implementation of strategy 
towards the viewpoint of a daily routine of making strategy (as discussed in 
Chapman, 2005), MCS may take on a more active role in strategy making.  
 
The ways in which new strategic objectives are mobilised in MCS have been the 
                                                 
5 Models such as the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), the Performance Pyramid (Lynch and Cross, 1991), or the 
Action-Profit-Linkage (APL) model (Epstein, Kumar and Westbroek, 2000) try to address the limitations of financial 
management control and to create a shift away from the financial dimension into other relevant dimensions that reflect the 
strategic objectives of an organisation. 
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focus of quite a considerable number of studies and have been discussed from 
different perspectives. In the discussion about strategy and management control 
the focus has mainly been set on the constellation and implementation of control 
systems and on the internal and external environment that have an impact on them. 
 
Literature drawing on contingency theory, for example, focuses on the match 
between the kind of strategy and the form of management control in relation to 
organisational performance. Contingency theory has a long history in the study of 
management control and strategy: attempting to examine the most effective 
organisational design in relation to environmental factors, technology, 
organisational structure, culture and strategy (see Chenhall, 2003). In recent works 
(e.g. Burgelman, 2002; Davila, 2000, 2005; Ittner and Larcker, 2005; Bisbe and 
Malagueno, 2009) MCS are defined as tools that provide context for strategic 
change through the interaction and analysis with the strategic environment6. 
 
In the course of MCS and strategy studies, Ferreira and Otley (2009) provided a 
holistic approach in the form of a descriptive tool for the analysis of MCS (see 
also Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009). Their definition includes strategic 
formulation as well as strategic implementation7. They see the complete 
organisational network as relevant in analysing MCS. Strategic changes are thus to 
                                                 
6 The configuration of the MCS plays a vital role to the integration of strategic objectives. Referring to Burgelman (2002), 
Davila (2005) who argue that MCS rather than dictating actions, enable actions within the defined strategic context. MCS may 
“provide the framework that people within the organisation refer to when acting” (Davila, 2005, p.45). Especially, as will be 
discussed later, MCS may shape and develop innovations in organisational contexts, interacting with (refining or replacing) 
strategy (e.g. Davila, 2005). Furthermore, Ittner and Larcker (2005) discuss strategic data analysis (e.g. strategic value drivers, 
target setting) and the role it may play in strategic implementation and redefinition. They argue that companies should put more 
emphasis on the analysis for selecting those control constellations that fit with the indicated strategic performance. Bisbe and 
Malagueno (2009) drawing on Simons’ levers of control framework (Simons, 1995) investigated the relationship between 
management mode and innovation strategy and MCS. They found that the level of product innovation output depends on the 
way management control and strategy formation are configured. 
7 They view MCS as “the evolving formal and informal mechanisms, processes, systems, and networks used by organizations 
for conveying the key objectives and goals elicited by management, for assisting the strategic process and ongoing management 
through analysis, planning, measurement, control, rewarding, and broadly managing performance, and for supporting and 
facilitating organizational learning and change”. (Ferreira and Otley , 2009, p. 264) 
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be discussed with regard to the management control systems’ configuration and 
the complete organisational environment. 
 
Conventionally, in contingency theory studies focus on collecting “aggregate 
information about organisation and their subsystems” (Ahrens and Chapman, 
2007, p. 3). Thus, contingency approaches focus on rather static relationships 
between context, strategy and management accounting and control. They lack the 
examination of relationships and interactions between strategic objectives and 
management accounting (Chapman, 2005; Simons, 19908 ). One approach that 
addresses this issue is practice theory. Studies of strategy and management control 
drawing on practice theory seek to understand strategy in action at the more 
detailed level of subsystems. Moreover, they seek to explore the relationships 
between human action and a global entity or system (Ortner, 1984). Social 
practices are defined through the social actions within space (the systems) and 
across time (routinised behaviour). In further process approaches to strategy, 
strategy is developed as strategising or strategy-as-practice (e.g. Jarzabkowski et 
al. 2007; Whittington, 2003, 2006). The social perspective suggests that actors 
within the organisation construct routines and intended practices, and that 
strategising is a proficiency that can be executed on the individual or the 
organisational level or both (Denis, Langley, and Rouleau, 2007). 
 
In their work about accounting and strategising, Jørgensen and Messner (2010) 
argue that a practice perspective sheds light on how management accounting is 
“weaved into strategic considerations and debates” (ibid., p. 184) and how it is 
mobilised in the making of a strategy. In their study they find that managers may 
                                                 
8 “The research underscores the importance of the dynamic relationship between formal process and strategy: competitive 
strategic positioning, management control and the process of strategy-making play one upon the other as the firm evolves and 
adapts over time. The analysis shows that interactive management control processes can be used to manage emergent strategy: 
rather than focusing on what the organization already understands and does well, these systems direct organizational attention to 
emerging threats and opportunities.” (Simons, 1990, p.140) 
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mobilise strategic objectives with accounting information, which may act as 
“general understanding” and contribute to product development practices.  Ahrens 
and Chapman (2004, 2005, 2007) discussed that MCS, rather than being an 
instrument of power at a distance, are functioning as an interactive bridge between 
diverse operational and strategic resources. Drawing on practice theory they argue 
that the usefulness of MCS depends on managers’ experiences and whether they 
have the time to model the interdependencies between organisational processes, 
strategic priorities, and financial outcomes (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007, p. 121). 
They argue that the linkages between strategy and operational action “cannot rely 
on mechanical cause and effect relationships” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007, p. 
122). Control and management accounting should be used as a “framing device” 
rather than an “answer machine” (ibid.). In their case study of a restaurant chain, 
operational activities, management accounting and strategic messages were 
discussed at the same time as which strategising was executed through accounting 
and vice versa.  
 
Although studies in strategy and control drawing on practice theory address the 
lack of dynamic interactions and relationships between strategy (and strategising 
respectively) and management control, there is further understanding needed of 
how strategic objectives may be mobilised by management accounting 
information. Management accounting information (calculations) may act on the 
process of strategising in that they may be a pre-condition or develop the context 
for existing or upcoming strategic objectives: displacing strategic objectives. 
Furthermore, there may be competition between non-calculative devices and 
management accounting information. Practices are thus not just shaped by “social” 
actors, such as managers (e.g. Whittington, 2003, 2006; Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007), but also by actors such as management accounting information. As I 
discuss in Chapter 3, human actors may be only one of the many actors in 
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strategising. From the actor-network perspective, strategising is not a purely social 
process but rather a process of mobilisation of and through different actors. 
 
Discussing the issue of competition between calculative and non-calculative 
devices, Mouritsen et al. (2009) apply an actor-network perspective in their study 
of short and long translations. They study how competing calculations create 
context for innovation strategies (long translations) in that they mobilise 
alternative propositions about relevant entities, such as technologies. Their 
argument is that calculations, rather than reflecting the total of the organisation are 
just partial representations of the organisation. However, “the management 
accounting calculation is strong because it helps to develop context.” (Mouritsen 
et al., 2009, p. 752). Here it would be interesting to investigate contexts which are 
not developed by calculations and how these contexts interact. 
 
However, the research of management control and strategy is still interesting and 
only a few studies have focused on the interaction of strategy and control 
(Chapman, 2005 addresses this issue with contributions of several studies). 
Management control may not be an obstacle in undertaking strategic changes and 
operational innovations. Besides, as discussed, by providing a basis for strategic 
change, they may as well be vehicles of change. Here, management accounting 
information can examine the implementation of strategic objectives and it can be 
used to communicate the intentions and goals of the organisation (Chenhall, 
2005). Thus it acts as a vehicle between action and strategy.  
 
A deeper look into the interactions of strategy and management accounting is 





2.1.2 Performance measurements and calculations - a particular issue with 
control and strategy 
 
One particular stream of research concerns the study of performance 
measurements as calculations. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, 
strategic objectives may be ambiguous in nature. Besides competition of 
calculations, there may be problems of commensurability. 
 
As discussed, studies discuss changes in strategic objectives in relation to the 
configuration of control systems. These changes are managed by creating 
transparency of strategic priorities and of connections of activities across the value 
chain (Nanni et al., 1992; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993). Here, transparency is 
created through the use of performance measurements; they “model performance 
relations among key value-chain activities and outcomes” (Malina and Selto, 
2004, p. 442).9 Performance measurements can be of a financial nature (such as 
internal rate of return ‘IRR’) or be more comprehensive: describing links between 
action and outcomes, providing feedback, supporting strategy development and 
implementation, such as models that include financial and non-financial 
measurements of operational and strategic performance (e.g. Epstein et al., 2000; 
Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Ittner and Larcker, 2001).  
 
                                                 
9 Here, I want to shortly define the definition of the verb to “model” and the noun “measurement”. I see performance 
measurements clearly as calculated, as measuring means here, counting something and relating it to a reference point. I see this 
process as an equation, and thus a calculation. Furthermore, steering through measurements means nothing less than calculating 
how to get to a deserved level, and thus, how to bring the equation into a deserved state. However, clearly, not every calculation 
is a performance measurement. A calculation becomes a performance measurement when it is related to a reference point. For 
example, a calculation can tell the weight of a particular car, e.g. 2.000kg. As long as we do not know whether this is heavy or 
not, it stays just a calculation. When broad into relation with something (let’s say the weight of a competitor car) we start to 
know whether we are performing better or worse as the related something; the calculation becomes then a performance 
measurement. It starts to act on decisions through being related to something. I will elaborate on that through the ANT 
perspective in chapter 3.2.2.1/p. 87-89. 
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The role and interdependencies of performance measurements provide an 
interesting research setting and is widely discussed in the studies of management 
accounting. Studies in management accounting that are dealing with the choice of 
performance measurements mainly focus on the characteristics of performance 
measurements and on how these may be influenced by organisational parts. 
Combining different theoretical perspectives (resource-based, systems-based and 
contingency-based strategy theories) Malina and Selto (2004), for example, focus 
on the importance of attributes that are influencing the consideration of 
performance measurements and argue that organisations have enough flexibility to 
choose the portfolio of performance measurements. They have to be continually 
reassessed to manage altering strategic objectives. It is the question of what 
influences this process. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998) use a systems 
approach that shows how and to what extent management control strategies 
contribute to the development of performance measurements in organisations in a 
changing environment. Their study is a step towards describing the interactions 
within MCS in strategic change and of the factors that pervade the MCS. It gives 
an insight into the influences of accounting and addresses thus the question of 
which constellation best supports the operation of the MCS (see Ferreira and 
Otley, 2009, p. 273-274). Further studies on performance measurements and their 
choice focus mainly on the appropriateness of fit and the role of measurements 
(see Stringer, 2007). Rather than focusing on the overall organisational network 
(as suggested by Ferreira and Otley, 2009) they focus on the direct contingent link 
between organisational strategy and the use of performance measures within MCS 
(e.g. Tuomela, 2005).  
 
Studying the attributes and appropriateness of performance measurements in 
relation to strategic and operational demands is of significant importance. 
However, as in the general studies of strategy and control, I see a perspective as 
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relevant when it focuses on investigating and understanding the interdependencies 
and interrelations between performance measurements and strategic objectives and 
among performance measurements respectively. Measuring, for example, does not 
imply action, but the mobilisation of measurements are of importance10 (Catasús et 
al., 2007).  Although studying the process of measurement choice, current studies 
lack a more detailed perspective of the underlying influences through which 
measurements are created and under which they find application.  
 
The discussed literature shares the view that organisations actively choose 
performance measurements to build a link between strategic objectives and the 
means by which the objectives should be realised. However, it needs to be 
considered that the links of the MCS in place may have a significant impact on 
these processes. Existing measurements, for example, may cause conflict or be in 
contradiction, which may have implications on the choice of new measurements in 
strategic change. Representational limits of accounting are of additional interest 
here as they influence the mobilisation of strategic objectives and calculations 
(this will be further elaborated on in Chapter 3). Consequently, the calculation 
processes of performance measurements and their interdependencies within the 
MCS are still an unexplored issue that is important because it defines the 




                                                 
10  “Organizations should be aware that the acts of producing measurements are not enough to fuel the organization into acting” 
(Catasús et al., 2007, p.516) 
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2.1.3 A perspective on the relationships of strategy and control 
 
“As Chapman (2005) points out, formal accounting and management controls can 
have   ‘valuable strategic roles’. At present, we do not have a strong sense of what 
those roles might be nor of how the specificity and contingency of time and place 
might influence the doing of accounting, the making up of strategy and the 
definition of ‘value creation’. We might know, in general, on average, how firms 
said to be pursuing a particular strategy might budget in the face of assumed 
levels of certainty. But firms do not seek to be ‘average’, deviations from the norm 
may be normal and models of the past may be poor predictors of the future. 
Perhaps, greater engagement with the messiness of practice will enable us to 
understand it better and therefore teach more credibly. We would add much 
needed situated detail to current research in accounting that seeks to match 
accounting controls with abstract strategic archetypes. Such research would also 
complement recent research in accounting that is grounded in the actor-network 
theory of Latour and Callon. It would encourage us to devise new concepts that 
did away with distinctions between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of analysis; 
between action and structure/institutions.” (Chua, 2007, p. 492) 
 
With the ANT perspective of accounting as a technology, and calculation as an 
actor, a different perspective is chosen to discuss the topic of strategy and control. 
I will apply an actor-network perspective (discussed in Chapter 3) which helps to 
examine the dynamic interactions and relationships between strategic objectives 
and management control, and open the black box of the concept of strategy (Chua, 
2007, p. 488). In these dynamic relationships, the making of strategy is not only 
being shaped by “social” actors such as managers (e.g. Whittington, 2003, 2006; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2007), but also by actors such as management accounting 
information. This information creates context for strategic objectives. 
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In this thesis (and in the four papers respectively) I seek to provide an 
understanding of the mobilisation of strategic objectives through calculations and 
to contribute to the literature on strategy and control, and strategising. Especially 
concerning the heterogeneity among actors, such as strategic objectives, general 
calculations and performance measurements are of interest as controversies and 
conflicts occur that need to be settled throughout the strategising process. The role 
of calculations and performance measurements is an interesting research object, 
especially in product development environments, due to the complex and 
conflicting nature of product development. Product development finds itself in a 
dilemma, as it has to address conflicting strategic objectives such as increasing 
value and decreasing costs. Control systems that focus on cost (e.g. target costing, 
activity-based costing) may put pressure on development processes.  
 
The issue between development and innovation, on the one hand, and management 





2.2 Management control in product development 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, innovation through product 
development is an ambiguous task for mature industrial organisations. Especially 
in product development networks, MCS build an interesting research site as 
product development is an uncertain and complex process. Environments with 
“pluralistic demands and high uncertainty” (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2010) 
place a challenge for organisations and lead to more product complexity 
(Nooteboom, 2000) and more criteria that need to be managed while uncertainty 
increases the need for flexibility. Fuzzy criteria in the early stages make this 
process even more demanding. Diverse and sometimes divergent strategic 
objectives, such as economic targets, time-to-market or quality are addressed in 
product development. In product development it is not about the articulation of 
these objectives itself nor their measurement, nor is the technical feasibility a 
problem in itself; it is about the orchestration of all relevant entities within the 
product development network through which an idea or an invention materialises 
(e.g. Ayers et al. 2001; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Conflicts and contradictions 
arise out of the heterogeneity of actors (e.g. functions, disciplines, targets, 
strategic objectives, managers), which are mobilised to form the innovation and 
thus the final product.  
 
The coordination and control of heterogeneity in product development build a 
central dilemma for organisations and provide an interesting research setting. Cost 
control in and of innovation, for example, is increasingly seen as important by 
practitioners and academics alike because key decisions about product design, 
manufacturing, sourcing and distribution may determine 70-80% of a product’s 
lifecycle cost (e.g. Leech and Turner, 1985). Literature has been investigating the 
relationship between control and innovation for quite some time. Different 
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perspectives have been applied to investigate positive and negative relationships 
and the contexts that management control provide for innovation. 
 
Earlier literature on innovation management, and on control and innovation, points 
to limits and a rather constraining nature of control in product innovation (e.g. 
Damanpour, 1991; Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Miles and Snow, 1978; Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1997). Miles and Snow (1987), for example, argue that control 
builds an obstacle for creativity, and Tushman and O’Reilly (1997) point to 
motivational and cultural issues in control mechanisms. Bonner et al. (2002) point 
to reduced project performance and to less successful innovation outputs through 
formal control mechanisms in product development.  
 
In more recent studies however, control is argued to be supportive in product 
development and innovation. Davila and co-authors, for example, contributed to 
the conceptualisation of the relationship between control and innovation (such as 
Davila, 2000, 2003, 2005; Davila & Wouters, 2004; Davila, Foster, and Oyon, 
2009). He investigated the relationship from a contingency theory perspective and 
focused mainly on the issue of cost control and innovation. Financial 
measurements especially may play an important role in product development. 
Davila (2000) found that uncertainty and product strategy are related to the design 
of management control systems and that the design cannot be restricted to 
financial measurements but needs to incorporate non-financial measurements. 
Additionally, Davila (2003) found a positive relationship between the use of short 
term economic incentives and project performance in situations where the project 
group faces low levels of uncertainty, and a negative relationship between 
performance and short term economic incentives when uncertainty is high. Davila 
and Wouters (2004) discussed problems in relation to cost management and stated 
that cost may shift attention from other factors.  
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In this field, target costing is one of the most discussed financial instruments 
regarding control and innovation (Ansari, Bell & Okano, 2007; Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 1999; Ellram, 2006)11. They argue that target costing may lead to 
longer development time, that cost models reflect the present and not the future, 
and that cost shifts attention from (other) critical success factors. Furthermore, 
Davila (2005) proposes a framework in which MCS may respond to changes when 
they are used flexibly and dynamically while framing actions and communication 
patterns within product development.  
 
Davila’s studies thus point to both possible conflicts and consistencies between 
management control and innovation in specific settings and argue that “innovation 
requires formal tools that structure the execution process without becoming rigid 
mechanisms; these tools are flexible enough to take advantage of unexpected 
opportunities but strong enough to keep the direction” (Davila, Foster and Oyon, 
2009, p. 287). Although being of immense value for theorists and practitioners 
alike, Davila’s works are much focused on the effectiveness of management 
control of innovation using a broad empirical base. A more detailed perspective 
that focuses on the processes of control in interrelation with innovation would 
provide a greater insight into the interaction between both.  
 
Other studies on control and innovation point to similar connections between 
innovation and control. Bisbe and Otley (2004) state, by discussing Simons’ 
framework of levers of control (Simons, 1995), that interactive use of control 
systems may favour innovation in low innovating firms through the provision of 
guidance and legitimacy. Their study argues for the importance of formal MCS in 
innovation settings through a moderating effect. Bisbe and Malagueno (2009) add 
to that by arguing that the choice of interactively used MCS is associated with the 
                                                 
11 For a comprehensive literature review on target costing see Paper 2 – Calculating a Greener Future 
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organisation’s innovation management mode and that the innovation output relates 
to the correspondence between information needs of the innovation management 
mode and the information provided by the MCS. Both studies make important 
contributions to the levers of control literature by applying a contingency 
perspective. However, neither study provides an understanding of the process of 
interaction between control mechanisms and innovation management, and product 
development respectively. Mouritsen et al. (2009) study here, for example, the 
dynamic interaction between control and innovation from an actor-network 
perspective. They propose that management accounting calculations are, rather 
than just describing or representing innovation activities, linking them to 
organisational concerns and creating contexts for innovation activities. Their study 
provides a deeper insight into the interrelation between management accounting 
and control and innovation as it sheds light on innovation and accounting 
processes rather than on effectiveness of static organisational contexts. 
 
Another perspective provides the research on coordination and structural 
approaches of innovation management. Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1996) argue 
that stage-gate  processes may be the main pillars for success. Literature has come 
up with several “prototypes” or “blueprints” of stage-gate  models (e.g. Cooper, 
1990; Murphy and Kumar, 1995; Kuczmarski, 2000; Song & Montoya-Weiss, 
1998). In these models, early stages are formed more by fuzziness (e.g. fuzzy 
front-end) and creativity, whereas the later development stages are more 
coordinated and controlled by criteria such as time, cost and quality constraints. 
However, these models are rather idealistic and may not reflect the complex issues 
that an industrial organisation (such as a car manufacturer) is facing in terms of 




Christiansen and Varnes (2007; 2009) focus on decision-making and rules of 
innovation, arguing that the work and relationships of actors prior to decisions are 
key elements in innovation (Christiansen and Varnes, 2007). Instead of applying a 
sequential perspective they apply a network perspective drawing on actor-network 
literature. Through this perspective it becomes relevant how innovations are 
generated prior to decisions and which role strategic objectives and their 
representations play. Furthermore, they argue that rules and means that steer 
innovation processes “in everyday practices are not the same as those that the 
companies officially declare and describe” (Christiansen and Varnes, 2009, p. 
516). 
 
Jørgensen and Messner (2010) studied product development activities in stage-
gate  processes and argue that formal structures may remind product development 
of the importance of profitability and thus help to mobilise accounting information 
together with strategic objectives in decisions as “rules and a general 
understanding” (Jørgensen & Messner, 2010, p. 185). Their practice theory 
approach provides a detailed perspective on the interrelations of innovation and 
control. However, their study does not provide insights into situations in which 
strategic objectives and management accounting are conflicting. Innovation 
activities may be affected by conflicts. In their case they found that the limits of 
accounting were not contested “because strategic objectives were not translated 
into numbers” (ibid., p. 201). Yet, this may be the case in specific settings in 
which, for example, accounting calculations are strong actors. Furthermore, they 
focus on two different product lines. In multi-project organisations many product 
lines may be at different stages at the same time and be affected by different 




The literature on innovation and control thus points to the important and 
interesting issue of control being related to both, enabling and constraining 
innovation. Yet, a deeper understanding of how organisations approach this issue 
and which actors are important in this process is needed. Studies focus on 
problems and conflicts between control and innovation in relation to effectiveness. 
Still, there is a lack of understanding of how organisations specifically deal with 
these conflicts. An in depth study of these conflicts can reveal important details 
about the interplay of elements in innovation and control settings.  
 
“Management control systems are important for the performance of the 
project, but the research does not reveal why, nor provides the detail on 
how these systems are designed. […] Additional empirical evidence and 
theoretical concepts are required to fully understand the implications of 
this research.” (Davila, 2000, p. 405) 
 
The interplay of these elements may thus not be regarded as sequential or static 
due to their influencing nature on each other (e.g. Christiansen and Varnes, 2007). 
Management accounting calculations, for example, may play an important role 
here as they may be boundaries that set a limit on the “usability” of accounting in 
product development and decision making. The literature argues that there may be 
limits to the use of accounting in innovation especially in cases of great 
uncertainty. So far we lack knowledge of how these limits are pursued, 
encountered, created and explored, how they may be overcome and whether 
calculations in this process form collectives or more ambiguity among actors in 
product development. Calculations and strategic documents may not only be part 
of the decision process but also may accompany and interact with the generation 
of alternatives in product development (Jørgensen and Messner, 2010). A more 
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detailed understanding is needed of how calculations and the generation of product 
alternatives interact. 
In the next two chapters I will touch on the issues of product design and creativity, 
and product greening as key success factors that strategically emerge in 





2.3 Aesthetical design and greening in product development 
 
Two issues are of high relevance in product development: Aesthetical design and 
product greening. Both build issues of strategic importance for organisations as 
both may create customer value leading to price premiums in the market. New 
strategic objectives may emerge or be developed through aesthetical design and 
product greening, and both may trigger new innovations. Heterogeneity, limits of 
measurability and uncertainty may be aspects that cause control problems in the 
integration of both. In the following sections I will briefly elaborate on the 
particular relevance of both in product development. A more specific review is 
provided in the four papers. 
 
2.3.1 Design control in product development 
 
I discussed the literature on innovation and control in Chapter 2.2. One specific 
aspect in product innovation is aesthetical design and creativity. The control of 
innovation literature focuses mostly on technological innovation in product 
development. Aesthetical design, however, is a rarely studied object in relation to 
control and product development, and is argued rather to be a “creative 
endeavour” of individuals (e.g. Verganti, 1999) than a controlled process of 
collectives. Aesthetical design from that perspective focuses on ergonomics, 
materials and surfaces, and aims to interpret and create societal trends. Aesthetics 
can be understood as visualisations of “semantic” or “sociocultural” innovations 
defined by materials or surfaces (e.g. Dell’Era & Verganti, 2009; Van Onck, 
2000). Technological innovation, however, is described as the development of 
functions that are shaped more by control and coordination concerns. Design is 
argued to be an unmanageable and emotional process that is not “possible to 
reduce to a set of algorithmic steps” (Love, 2000, p. 311). This is specifically due 
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to the limitations of measuring and accounting for design. The selection of and 
decision on alternative designs and concepts is therefore a complex task, which 
differs from technological innovation, and empirical insights and a deeper 
understanding of the processes of design are missing. 
 
Abstract ideas of strategic objectives are interpreted and visualised in concept 
designs and anticipations of trends, forms and functions: all parts of this process 
(Verganti, 1999). The creation of concepts, however, is not a task performed by 
just creating one final concept; it is more of a finding process and involves the 
generation of alternative concepts. During the early stages many alternatives may 
be created to discuss the most suitable option, which may provide a major 
challenge for designers (Ayag, 2005). This is as well due to uncertainty and to 
difficulties in anticipating the future. In the literature on product development, 
there are lots of concepts discussed in which the “best combination of 
harmoniously conforming subsystems is selected in terms of highest performance 
and lowest cost” (Ayag, 2005, p. 693). This literature argues that (especially 
within the fuzzy front-end) different methodologies of screening and developing 
different alternatives take place (e.g. Smith and Herbein, 1999; Ayag, 2005; 
Reinertsen, 1999; Khurana and Rosenthal, 1998; Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss, 
2001). In these studies various criteria and methods for generating these 
alternatives are discussed and they aim at providing comprehensive and successful 
toolkits. As discussed earlier, criteria are often fuzzy in the early stages and design 
interpretations may vary. Besides cost, the value of aesthetical and technological 
innovation is often not graspable. That, what is often defined as “highest 
performance” is often vaguely anticipated in critical success factors and crucial 





Thus, decisions may often be made based on “softer” targets or through 
discussions on strategic representations, such as physical visualisations or 
prototypes (e.g. Wouters and Roijmans, 2011). On the other hand and especially in 
technological innovation, calculations may be a critical part, in some cases, of 
making decisions “rational”. Calculations may be needed to prove a point in 
decisions on alternatives. As Mouritsen et al. (2009, p. 751) stated: 
 
“Mere cognitive interpretation of innovation is not collectively 
actionable; innovation has to be inscribed and made a calculation before 
it can be acted on. This is the context that the calculation develops and 
makes possible.” 
 
It is thus crucial to analyse the tension between a “mere cognitive interpretation” 
and calculations within creativity in product development, and focus on the 
contexts that calculations develop. If a “calculation is stronger” than “mere mental 
interpretation” (Mouritsen et al., 2009, p. 751), the analysis of the effects of the 
“strength” of calculations on the creative processes of alternative generation and 
decision (in technological and sociocultural innovation) becomes an interesting 
research ground.12 
The process of creativity within new product development projects thus faces, in 
the early concept stage, the following problem: different control mechanisms may 
be in place for design and technological innovation which may seek to control and 
integrate different strategic objectives. Furthermore, the mobilisation of strategic 
                                                 
12 “Even if control systems are an important element in shaping the organization, its impact on creativity has been virtually 
ignored. The literature has not even answered how budgets – the traditional management control tool – impact creativity. 
Financial plans and budgets are often used as a diagnostic control systems setting financial and non-financial reference points 
that managers need to meet. However, in some organizations, financial plans are not used to control but to encourage people to 
project themselves in the near and far future, to identify new trends, to see new opportunities and threats, to adopt new strategic 
postures. Therefore, it is worth studying how financial plans can trigger creativity, how are financial plans designed and used to 
encourage people to come up with new radical ideas, is it possible to use financial plans simultaneously to think differently and 
to define the direction to follow?” (Davila, Foster and Oyon, 2009, p.296) 
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objectives may be different and decisions may be done differently due to the 
limitations of measuring and accounting for design. The ambivalence of creativity 
(in technological and sociocultural innovation) and the strength of calculations are 
important factors in the development process and in the mobilisation of strategic 
objectives. So far, these issues have not been subjected to research and more 
understanding through empirical insight is needed to fill this gap. 
 
2.3.2 Product greening and calculations 
2.3.2.1 Strategic opportunities of product greening 
 
Debates about Corporate Sustainability and its implementation into corporate 
strategy and governance are becoming more and more the focus of organisational 
research (e.g. Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Gladwin et al., 1995; Hart, 1995; Hoffman, 
2001; Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Shrivastava, 1995; Starik & Rands, 1995). In 
practice, corporate sustainability has gained serious attention among organisations 
during the last decade (see Bansal & Roth, 2000; Henriques & Sardosrsky, 1996; 
Sharma & Henriques, 2005; GRI Reporting13). Especially environmental 
sustainability should become a more and more important aspect in product 
development. A growing world population, scarcity of raw materials, 
governmental regulations, changing customer behaviour, sustainability reporting 
guidelines and indexes have become important drivers in this process. Competitive 
advantage through reducing cost, minimising risk and creating customer value 
may be enhanced through addressing these issues: 
 
  
                                                 
13 (GRI = Global Reporting Initiative) The number of released sustainability reports based on the GRI guidelines increased from 
50 in 2000 to 750 in 2005. In 2010 more than 1300 multinational companies released their reports based on the GRI Guidelines. 
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“Managers must start to recognise environmental improvement as an 
economic and competitive opportunity, not as an annoying cost or an 
inevitable threat… the early movers – the companies that can see the 
opportunity first and embrace innovation based solutions – will reap 
major competitive benefits.” (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995, p. 130).   
 
The issue of managing product greening14 can be related to the discussion of 
strategic issues in terms of the controversies of innovation and control (see 
Chapter 2.2). Strategic objectives move beyond regulatory compliance towards 
new strategic opportunities in achieving competitive advantage through greening 
(e.g. Banerjee, 2001; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Biondi, Frey, & Iraldo, 2000; Hart, 
1995; Hoffman, 2001; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & van der Linde 1995; 
Prakash, 2001; Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Shrivastava, 1995; Smith, 2003). 
Organisations need to develop relations between greening, innovation and cost if 
they wish to compare alternatives and optimise cost and value. 
 
This means that in the early stages of product development, the improvement of 
ecological concerns needs to take place to go beyond “end-of-pipe” approaches 
and create green products. When organisations want to follow this strategy, 
strategic objectives need to be integrated and translated early in the development 
stages and thus be integrated with other strategic objectives such as cost control, 
profitability, quality, or time-to market (e.g. Dixon & Duffy, 1990). Interactions 
and interrelations of calculations and performance measurements play an 
important role (see Chapters 2.1 and 2.2) and need to be taken into account. 
                                                 
14 The implementation of the environmental perspective is often referred to as “corporate greening”. Though the word “green” or 
“greening” cannot be precisely defined in practice or theory we refer to the term as the ecological aspect of sustainability and the 
relationship of a company’s process and product activities to the natural environment (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Halme, 2002; 
Shrivastava, 1995; Winn & Angell, 2000). 
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Greening therefore becomes another value and function that needs to be 
incorporated into product development networks. 
 
2.3.2.2 Barriers to making product greening operational 
 
As discussed, greening is a new strategic objective: a value that companies need to 
account for. In studies about accounting and product greening, the focus is mostly 
set on determinants or on outcomes of environmental accounting and 
management15. Few studies investigate organisational practices and the relation 
between accounting and product greening.  However, this relation may be 
important as management accounting shapes decisions on product substance and 
thus on the greening of products.  
 
In this process, several barriers and drawbacks may occur for organisations. First, 
if organisations implement measurements for product greening, they may not be 
well developed due to a lack of experience and creativity (Porter & van der Linde, 
1995) and due to the “rules of the game” such as management accounting 
processes that build barriers for their integration or invention (Perego, 2005, p. 
235). Secondly, there is an issue with the assessment of cost and value. 
“Environmental and human resources are not assigned financial values, and as a 
result, their intrinsic values are not fully accounted for.” (Bansal, 2002, p. 127).  
The value of greening may be hard to assess and grasp: such as with the 
customers’ willingness to pay (e.g. Pedersen and Neergaard, 2006). Thirdly, the 
existence of strategic objectives concerning product greening does not 
automatically provide greener products (Perego, 2005). The links between 
                                                 
15 For a comprehensive literature review see Paper 2. 
64 
 
environmental strategy, performance measurements and product development may 
be difficult to trace. Hence, organisations face problems with the integration of 
green strategic objectives into their product development network. They face the 
issue of incorporating environmental aspects while at the same time managing 
towards different strategic objectives and targets. 
 
Further studies that look into the interaction of management accounting and 
environmental management, in organisations with functions in which financial 
calculations play an important role, find that, environmental projects may face 
difficulties in achieving acceptance (Fryxell and Vryza, 1999), professional beliefs 
may be potential obstacles as they conflict with dominant green values and 
activities (Harris and Crane, 2002), and single environmental projects are rather 
the outcome of environmental accounting practices than a comprehensive 
management of environmental aspects (Bartolomeo et al., 2000).  Furthermore, 
control of environmental issues might have rather an indirect effect on economic 
performance through enhanced environmental performance (e.g. Henri and 
Journeault, 2008).  
 
The literature thus points to limits of the translation of product greening through 
management accounting functions: pointing towards cultures and beliefs, 
functions, measurability and forms of measurements as likely barriers. 
“Management accounting may restrict green innovation or be sidetracked from 
decision making, due to organisational resistance and uncertainties related to 
greening of innovation” (Paper 2). If so, then accounting functions may be simply 
overcome through direct strategic decisions on product substance rather than 
through the use of MCS. I still see a lack of insights into how greening is 
translated in product development networks and how and through which means 
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decisions are made in industrial organisations. Here, the focus should be more set 







Based on the discussion in this chapter, which reflects on the issues of control in 
relation to strategy and innovation and briefly highlights the two important issues 
of product greening and aesthetical design the following implications for this 
thesis can be summarised. 
 
A considerable number of studies analyse static relationships between strategic 
objectives, organisational contexts and innovation in relation to control: arguing 
for best fit and effectiveness. These studies draw mostly on contingency theory 
and do not take a dynamic perspective into account. Moreover, further 
understanding is needed of the mobilisation of strategic objectives by management 
accounting and control, and of the contexts that are created for innovation. Still the 
ground of strategy and control is not fully explored (Chapman, 2005) and current 
studies lack a detailed perspective of the contexts that are developed and created 
through management accounting and control. Competition among and between 
incommensable strategic objectives and accounting calculations for example may 
both destruct and construct contexts for strategy and innovation. Although 
management control may act as “rules and a general understanding” (Jørgensen & 
Messner, 2010, p. 185) for overcoming complexity and uncertainty, it may 
however, limit larger strategic changes (e.g. Jørgensen & Messner, 2010). On the 
other hand, strategic changes may be initiated by control systems and create 
contexts for innovation (Mouritsen et al., 2009). Calculations may thus be defined 
as actors in organisations rather than just as intermediaries. I will clarify this 





One aspect is the limits of accounting, which are argued to be barriers for 
innovation activities and strategic change. We lack knowledge and empirical 
insight of how these are created, how they are explored and how they may be 
overcome in the course of strategic change and product development. Issues such 
as product greening and aesthetical design are main issues and key success factors 
that emerge in contemporary product development. For example, product 
greening, as a strategic objective, may face different barriers in management 
accounting and control to be implemented and aesthetical design may be subject to 
different control mechanisms than used in technological innovation because of its 
limits to accountability. 
 
I seek to discuss these problems from a theoretical perspective on the different 
characteristics of product development and innovation, focusing on the role of 
strategic objectives and calculations. In this thesis, I investigate the use of 
calculations and control mechanisms in product development and focus on 
strategic issues (such as product greening) and development issues (such as 
aesthetical design). I aim to discuss the means by which a product development 
network is held together and by which product development converges into a final 
product. The overall research question of this thesis is therefore: 
 
How do management accounting and control mechanisms interact with 
strategic objectives and heterogeneous innovation networks within 
product development? 
 
In summary, the research question addresses the following gaps. First, a 
perspective is needed that provides in depth details to understand the 
interdependencies in product development and innovation between control and 
strategic objectives. Calculations are here to be defined as actors in organisations 
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rather than just as intermediaries. Secondly, barriers and boundaries for 
calculations and the ways they are created, explored and overcome need further 
investigation. Thirdly, heterogeneity especially among strategic objectives, 
calculations, performance measurements and organisational functions builds an 
interesting research ground in the complex and conflicting field of product 
development. Fourthly, the two specific issues of product greening and aesthetical 
design are two rather unexplored fields that are relevant in the context of the 
research question. 
 
I will elaborate on the theoretical perspective of the overall research question of 
this PhD in Chapter 3: focusing on the actor-network perspective of the discussed 
and relevant literature. Furthermore, I will relate the papers through this 





3 The theoretical perspective of the thesis 
 
In this chapter I introduce the theoretical perspective of the thesis and of the 
papers respectively. Chapter 3.1 is an introduction to ANT. The chapter explains 
the foundations and main concepts of ANT from a Latourian perspective and 
serves more as guidance towards chapter 3.2 and the papers. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 3.2 I relate this perspective to the concepts to be studied 
in the thesis. In Chapter 3.3 I develop the coherence between the papers and the 
overall research question. 
 
3.1 The ANT perspective of sociology 
 
The focus of this chapter is how we may perceive, choose and study research 
objects. Here, we have to go from stable and robust objects to unstable objects. 
We have to unfold what is behind the object, going from “ready-made science” 
towards “science in the making” (Latour, 1987, p. 4), and thus from the fabricated 
into the fabrication of things. 
 
3.1.1 The sociology of ANT 
 
The motivation for choosing actor-network theory in the study of technology and 
management accounting lies exactly in this point; not studying the fabricated and 
already made objects, but studying how things are in the making: are in 
fabrication. Thus, how does it happen that a machine (like a car) goes “from a 
paper world to a messy, greasy, concrete world” (Latour, 1987, p. 253)16? Actor-
                                                 
16 “Machines for instance, are drawn, written, argued and calculated, before being built. Going from ‘science’ to ‘technology’ is 
not going from a paper world to a messy, greasy, concrete world. It is going from paperwork to still more paperwork, from one 
centre of calculation to another which gathers and handles more calculations of still more heterogeneous origins. The more 
modern and complex they are, the more paper forms machines need so as to come into existence. There is a simple reason for 
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network theory is a theory of studying black boxes; it is to study how through the 
construction of single parts, of actors of a machine, a collective disappears and 
becomes a darker and darker black box. For studying technological projects, the 
paths of the “incarnation” of the mechanisms and automatisms of humans and 
non-humans (Latour, 1996, p. 207) need to be traced and extracted.  
 
Which sociology (sociological standpoint), which philosophy of science, frames 
the perspective of studying technological projects? In the following section, I 
describe how actor network theory positions itself in relation to ontology and 
epistemology. Moreover, I describe what was meant by Latour stating that “to 
study technological projects you have to move from a classical sociology – which 
has fixed frames of reference – to a relativistic sociology – which has fluctuating 
referents” (Latour, 1996, p. 169). 
 
In the “modernist settlement” questions can only be attempted and answered all at 
the same time; the questions of epistemology, ontology, psychology, politics and 
theology. For actor-network theory, there is no sense in talking independently of 
these questions (Latour, 1999, p. 14). When we do not distinguish between these 
questions, what are we asking? We need to escape fixed frames and try to find the 
“hideout in which science has been held since being kidnapped” (Latour, 1999, p. 
212). 
 
In this settlement, where and what is reality when studying science? Can we 
describe science like a photograph as an exact copy of the world? No, we can’t. 
Latour (1999) describes that it is not possible to verify the link between the mind 
and the world, rather, one can, through the study of science, trace the chain of 
                                                                                                                                                            
this: in the very process of their construction they disappear from sight because each part hides the other as they become darker 
and darker black boxes.” (Latour, 1987, p.253) 
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transformations that circulates “verified reference” through “constant 
substitutions” (Latour, 1999, p. 79). Thus, reality is not a fact, a given, but 
moreover, it is something that is generated through translation and 
transformations17. External reality (out there) is thus a consequence of science 
rather than its cause.  
 
“If [...] no dissenter is able to modify the shape of a new object, then 
that’s it, it is reality, at least for as long as the trials of strength are not 
modified.” (Latour, 1987, p.93) 
 
This means that realities are constructed, not by humans, but by science. Still, 
reality exists so far ANT is still a realist – it is however constructed by science in a 
process of constructing facts, which are its products18: 
 
“First, facts need a theory if they are to be made visible, and this theory is 
rooted in the previous history of the research program – it is ‘path 
dependent’ as economists would say – but then, facts may be judged 
independently of earlier history. Once again the mystery of the two 
opposed meanings of the little word ‘fact’ is reiterated.” (Latour, 1999, p. 
129) 
 
Reality may be described as subject, or put differently, be dependent on scientific 
practices. With this dependency, scientific worlds are created that can become 
                                                 
17 “Our philosophical tradition has been mistaken in wanting to make phenomena the meeting point between things-in-
themselves and categories of human understanding. Realists, empiricists, idealists, and assorted rationalists have fought 
ceaselessly among themselves around this bipolar model. Phenomena, however, are not found at the meeting point between 
things and the forms of the human mind; phenomena are what circulates all along the reversible chain of transformations, at each 
step losing some properties to gain others that render them compatible with already-established centers of calculation. Instead of 
growing from two fixed extremities toward a stable meeting point in the middle, the unstable reference grows from the middle 
towards the ends, which are continually pushed further away.” (Latour, 1999, p.71-72) 
18 “Realism would be misleading, for it would construct plausible settings for its narratives on the basis of specific states of 
science and technology, whereas what I want to show is how those states are generated.” (Latour, 1996, p. VIII) 
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“possible worlds in conflict that move and shape one another” (Latour, 1996, p. 
IX). 
 
Leaving classical sociology behind with its reference frames, norms, laws, 
morality, rules, cultures, classes, the nature of power relations and pursuing a 
rather relativistic theory with no fixed references, with no knowledge about 
classes or cultures, with its own version of facts is the perspective of ANT. It is 
not “more scientific than the actors” (Latour, 1996, p. 200).  
 
For the researcher this means that instead of being cut off entirely from the world 
outside while at the same time being realistic about the outside world, s/he needs 
to “reconnect through as many relations and vessels as possible within the rich 
vascularisation that make science flow” to speak about the world (Latour, 1999, p. 
113). Hence, the more connected science is, the more verifiable and solid it is. 
How this is to be pursued is discussed in the next section. 
 
The epistemological question of what our representation of the world is must 
therefore not only be confused, but also mixed with the ontological question of 
what the world is really like (Latour, 1999, p.93). I discussed the reality not as a 
state of affairs, a state of order, but as something that is being constructed. It is not 
that social structures or sources emit power that diffuse through and order society. 
Rather, translations of actors construct associations. ANT is thus a “sociology of 
associations” (e.g. Latour, 2005, p.9) in which power is mediated through actors 
that “transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning of the elements they are 
supposed to carry” (Latour, 2005, p. 39). Thus, there is no state of affairs, no state 
of order but only translations that generate associations.19 As Elder-Vass (2008, p. 
                                                 
19 “To be sure, the social environment can either hinder or encourage their development, but it never forms or constitutes the 
very content of the sciences [...] Science studies follows those implausible translations which mobilise in completely unexpected 
ways fresh definitions of what it is to make war and fresh definitions of what the world is made of.” (Latour, 1999, p.91-92) 
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465) stated about ANT: “In addition to its neglect of realities beyond the empirical 
domain, it also strives to ignore the existence of emergent social structures.” Thus, 
by doing that, epistemological and ontological questions are tied to one another 
(Latour, 1999, p.98). 
 
ANT is more of a methodological stance in that it, rather than categorising or 
frame-working something, takes on the explanation of how things are formed, how 
they hold together, or how they fall apart. In the following sections I seek to 
explain this methodological stance of ANT as a study of “science, technology and 
society”. 
 
As already discussed, instead of talking about science, technology and society, my 
perspective is focusing on the weaker and stronger associations (Latour, 1987, p. 
140). One needs a starting point for studying technology and society. Do we have 
facts or objectives (3.1.2)? Furthermore, what are objects and are they constructed, 
and moreover, by whom? Is it only by humans (3.1.3)? When we focus on “in the 
making” who are the actors and what are their actions (3.1.4)? What is mediated in 
these actions (e.g. intermediaries or mediators) (3.1.5)? How do we understand 
translations and what are their outcomes (3.1.6, 3.1.7)? Finally, what do we need 
the answers to these questions for (3.1.8)? I will discuss this in the next section. 
 
3.1.2 From facts and where to begin to study 
 
One should always begin by tracing associations. But by doing this, aren’t there 
then pre-existing entities? Latour (2005, p. 166) talks about virtual entities that 
should “at least for now” not be followed. What does “at least for now” mean? 
Well, if one considers what reality is in ANT terms, namely “if [...] no dissenter is 
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able to modify the shape of a new object, then that’s it, it is reality, at least for as 
long as the trials of strength are not modified” (Latour, 1987, p.93), then it might 
be clear what “at least for now” means. Where the trials of strength are not 
modified, the tracks are not interesting to study. Where the social aggregates are 
modified, one should begin to trace the associations. By doing this, the researcher 
may on the one hand, not define in advance “what sorts of building blocks the 
social world is made of” (Latour 2005, p. 41); “let the actors do the job for us. 
Don’t define for them what makes up the social” (ibid., p. 36). On the other hand, 
what is called “virtual entities”, are actors that are present in researching the traces 
of creation, recreation, formation and dismantling. If one then traces the 
associations of the constantly modified social aggregates, one must trace actions, 
following actors generating these associations. Thus, by following actors and 
tracing associations, actors that modify the trials of strength have to be 
described20. 
 
3.1.3 General symmetry: humans and non-humans 
 
Thus one important method in ANT is to “follow the actors”. But who are the 
actors? If society in ANT terms is not socially constructed, who is constructing it 
if not humans? Society is constructed from humans and non-humans; “humans, for 
millions of years, have extended their social relations to other actants with which, 
with whom, they have swapped many properties, and with which, with whom, 
they form collectives” (Latour, 1999, p. 198).  
 
Things only exist if humans and non-humans are holding them continuously 
together. What are the forces then? Not “social forces” because then objects are 
                                                 




leaving the stage and “the magical and tautological force of society is enough to 
hold every thing with, literally, no thing” (Latour, 2005, p. 70). Objects, things 
too, have agency. The forces of holding together controversies that modify, form 
and deform groups are the ties of humans and non-humans. “…any thing that does 
modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). 
Everything is a full-blown actor and objects too now explain the relations of 
power, and that they are active. Either things are made to act or they act 
themselves.21 “On the one hand, it [the thing] can be said to hold people together, 
but on the other hand it is people who hold it together” (Latour, 1996, p. 213); 
starting from this symmetry between humans and non-humans towards 
asymmetries through their relations and through their actions. No asymmetry may 
be presupposed. In the next sections I discuss the actions and the controversies 
between the actors. 
 
3.1.4 Focus on actions and actors. Why? 
 
When we talk about associations rather than structures, we have to ask ourselves 
who is then acting. Leaving out the assumption that structure may determine 
actions, as “society”, “culture”, or “classes” determine agency, we need to shift 
our view towards the actions first. Action can be thought of as a “node, a knot, and 
a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly 
disentangled” (Latour, 2005, p. 44). Action alone is here not possible; the question 
is what and who is acting: while somebody, “we” are acting. An actor is thus not 
acting alone, it has no force of inertia (Latour, 1996, p. 176), it is “what is made to 
                                                 
21 One example of this is the one of Pasteur and his yeast. Frames of reference are starting points and enablers for actions:  “An 
experiment, as we just saw, is an action performed by the scientist so that the non-human can be made to appear on its own. [...] 
The experiment creates two planes: one on which the narrator is active, and a second on which the action is delegated to another 
character, a non-human one. [...] An experiment shifts out action from one frame of reference to another. Who is the active force 
in this experiment? Both Pasteur and his yeast. More precisely, Pasteur acts so that the yeast acts alone.” (Latour, 1999, p.129) 
Also see Figure 4.1. p 130 
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act by many others” and actors are “constantly engaged by others in group 
formation and destruction” (Latour, 2005, p. 46-47).  
 
“The actors in a technological project populate the world with other 
actors whom they endow with qualities, to whom they give past, to whom 
they attribute motivations, vision, goals, targets, and desires, and whose 
margin of manoeuvre they define. It is precisely because of this work of 
populating that they are called actors. For a given actor, this is the way 
the strategy of the other actors is interdefined.” (Latour, 1996, p. 163) 
 
When the researcher now focuses on the course of action, these (associations) 
become uncountable and information of controversies is unlimited. Thus the 
empirical domain provides the researcher with endless entities: all of them 
heterogeneous. But what should the researcher then do while focusing on action 
and following actors? Latour (2005, p. 47) states that the researcher has “to ignore 
the queerest, baroque, and most idiosyncratic terms offered by the actors, 
following only those that have currency in the rear-world of the social”. This may 
look like a craft, the art of doing research, but only through feeding off these 
controversies, only through discovering which actors fill the social world and keep 
us from making use of a priori settings through actions and group formation. 
 
How do you feed off controversies? Well, agencies are always changing the state 
of affairs, “transforming some As into Bs through trials with Cs” (Latour, 2005, p. 
52-53). Thus, the social is there, where change is happening and thus, it has to be 
assembled anew each time. Hence, for gathering data on actions, one needs to 
constantly compare courses of actions: “recording not filtering out, describing not 
disciplining” (Latour, 2005, p. 55). In this course, actors may constantly add or 
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withdraw other entities, formulating the empirical trace (what is acting and how?) 
for the researcher. S/he then shifts from certainty about action to uncertainty.  
 
“Following the actors” is the way to trace social connections. Concreteness in this 
course comes “from the increase [...] of the relative share of mediators over 
intermediaries” (Latour, 2005, p. 61). I will elaborate on intermediaries and 
mediators as entities of actions in the next section. 
 
3.1.5 Intermediaries and mediators or “give me the cause and I will have the 
effect”22 
 
When talking about “making someone do something” we may have a cause and 
effect relationship. Does input predict output? No, not in the way we discussed 
action in terms of mediation. For an intermediary the connection between cause 
and effect is clear as effect is already in the cause, but for mediators this is not the 
case. “Causes do not allow effects to be deduced as they are simply offering 
occasions, circumstances, and precedents. As a result, lots of surprising aliens may 
pop up in between” (Latour, 2005, p. 59); uncertainty and unexpected action enter 
the stage!  
 
Intermediaries can be defined as a “black box counting for one” (Latour, 2005, p. 
39) whereas mediators are specific, and their outcome and output unpredictable. 
“Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements 
they are supposed to carry” (ibid). ANT thus describes the means and tools for 
construction as mediators and not as intermediaries: 
 
                                                 
22 Latour, 2005, p.58 
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“For ANT, there is no preferable type of social aggregates, there exist 
endless numbers of mediators, and when those are transformed into 
faithful intermediaries it is not the rule, but a rare exception that has to be 
accounted for by some extra work – usually by the mobilisation of even 
more mediators!” (Latour, 2005, p. 40) 
 
The transformation by the “mobilisation of even more mediators” may thus lead to 
intermediaries: to a black box. This concept is described in the next section, which 
deals with the process of translation. 
 
3.1.6 Translation, alignment, and convergent networks – from extreme 
weakness to the greatest strength23 
 
We discussed that objects have agency too, that humans and non-humans are 
actors without discrimination. We learned that uncertainty and controversies are 
the sources of constructions and that “the identity and the respective importance of 
actors are at issue in the development of controversies” (Callon, 1986, p. 199). 
These principles are the starting point for the sociology of translation. “No one 
lives in a ‘culture’, shares a ‘paradigm’, or belongs to a ‘society’ before he or she 
clashes with others. The emergence of these words is one consequence of building 
longer networks and of crossing other people’s paths” (Latour, 1987, p. 201). In 
the study of ANT, we are searching for this consequence. “Something more is 
needed to turn the temporary juxtaposition of interests into a durable whole” 
(Latour, 1987, p. 122). 
 
                                                 
23 Latour, 1987, p.121 
79 
 
The question then is, what is happening when humans and non-humans interact, 
from the perspective of no a priori distinctions in social dimensions, and when 
uncertainty and controversies are in action? Actors having contradictory and/or 
disputable arguments; how then do they interact and how is group formation 
done? How may alignment between actors occur? Well, the observer has to follow 
“the actors in order to identify the manner in which these define and associate the 
different elements by which they build and explain their world, whether it be 
social or natural” (Callon, 1986, 201). Callon (1986) introduced the four moments 
of translation in which the world is built and explained by actors. These are 
problematisation, interessement, enrolment, and mobilisation (Callon, 1986). 
 
Problematisation refers to the determination of a set of actors and the definition of 
their identities in a way where one actor becomes an obligatory passage point for 
the other actors. In this process that actor becomes indispensible (Latour, 1987, p. 
120). Why would the one actor do this? Because there is this one question of what 
the problem is and how to solve it. This single question “is enough to involve a 
whole series of actors by establishing their identities and the links between them” 
(Callon, 1986, p. 205). 
 
The second moment of translation concerns interessement. Entities are not 
formulating their goals and identities independently. Action is needed to adjust the 
goals and identities. In this course, interessement “is the group of actions by which 
an entity [...] attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it 
defines through its Problematisation” (Callon, 1986, p. 207-208).  IF A interests B, 
then it needs to cut or weaken the links between B and other entities (e.g. C, D, E) 




“The properties and identity of B [...] are consolidated and/or redefined 
during the process of interessement. B is a ‘result’ of the association 
which links it to A. This link disassociates B from all the C,D, and E’s [...] 
that attempt to give it another definition” (Callon, 1986, p. 208). 
 
As discussed, agencies are always changing the state of affairs, “transforming 
some As into Bs through trials with Cs” (Latour, 2005, p. 52-53). In this course, a 
system of allies is constructed.24 
 
Enrolment, the third movement, is achieved through successful interessement. The 
actors that are made interested now accept the roles that are defined and attributed 
to them. “To describe enrolment is thus to describe the group of multilateral 
negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany the interessements and 
enable them to succeed” (Callon, 1986, p. 211). The translation of the individual 
goals of two agents results in a composite goal that is different from the original 
ones. (Latour, 1999, p. 179)  
 
Mobilisation, as the fourth moment, is the process of rendering entities “mobile 
which were not so beforehand” (Callon, 1986, p. 216). Actors form an alliance and 
act as a unit force. The actors that were not mobilised together beforehand and that 
occupied different spaces and times are now displaced and assembled in the same 
space and time. “To translate is to displace” (Callon, 1986, p. 223). In other 
words, diverse actors have been mobilised to act as one.25 A composite goal out of 
more subgoals becomes a common achievement of each of the agents (Latour, 
                                                 
24 “In the geometric sense of translation it means that whatever you do, and wherever you go, you have to pass through the 
contenders’ position and to help them further their interests.” (Latour, 1987, p.120)  
25 “It is necessary to consider more generally the mobilisation of resources, whereby I meant the ability to make a configuration 
of a maximal number of allies act as single whole in one place.” (Latour, 1987, p.172) 
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1999, p. 181). The result is action, “action is a property of associated entities” 
(Latour, 1999, p. 182) 
 
“Now at the end of the four moments described, a constraining network of 
relationships has been built” (Callon, 1986, p. 218). A shared space has been 
created in which heterogeneous actors are aligned through common goals (Callon 
& Muniesa, 2005). When these networks are coordinated (i.e. the extent to which 
rules guide interactions) these networks are convergent (Callon, 1992; Callon & 
Muniesa, 2005). Thus, in summary, translation leads to alignment of a network 
with heterogeneous actors. When the network entails coordination through “the 
existence of numerous conventions and local procedures” (Callon, 1992, p. 94) it 
is strongly convergent. 
 
Heterogeneity has been aligned and is now a black box, a punctualised network. 
“When many elements are made to act as one, that is what I will now call a black 
box” (Latour, 1987, p. 131). Thus, in doing research we need to focus on the 
contradictions that are mediated and to build up black boxes and we also need to 
focus on black boxes that fall apart because of the contradictions. 
Depunctualisation, and thus opening black boxes, is the perspective, the 
methodology which will be applied and pursued in this thesis. 
 
3.1.7 How to use ANT in the thesis now? 
 
As I will be analysing product development networks and thus how machines 
(technology) are becoming durable I will analyse how diverse actors are made to 
act as a whole, how concepts, technologies, innovations and components are 
becoming what they are. “A machine, as its name implies, is first of all, a 
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machination, a stratagem, a kind of cunning, where borrowed forces keep one 
another in check so that none can fly apart from the group” (Latour, 1987, p. 128-
129). I discussed what we understand by borrowed forces: namely, the process of 
translation. We need to follow the actors, their heterogeneity, and their 
contradictions and should trace how efforts that enrol humans and non-humans are 
mediated and how controversies are settled (Latour, 1987, p. 144). 
 
However, ANT is not only the methodology of how to analyse the empirical 
accounts. Moreover, ANT is the perspective of how this thesis contributes to 
science. It should help to penetrate “from the outside the inner workings of science 
and technology” and then “to explain to the outsider how it all works” (Latour, 
1987, p. 15). This process is divided into the following steps. 
 
First, as in Chapter 2 the relevant body of literature is revised and gaps that arise 
for further research are identified. Open questions and doubts lead us from the 
“world of literature to Nature as it is” (Latour, 1987, p. 67). The literature or 
rhetorical resources are the starting point for finding controversies in the rhetoric 
resources themselves and in the empirical domain. We do not start off with facts 
or building blocks but with doubts and questions about quasi-facts. Quasi-facts 
referring here to the scientific work inscribed in the publications I discuss. 
 
The second step is to discuss the concepts that have been touched by the gaps 
through the lens of ANT. This is discussed in Chapter 3.2. I focus mainly on the 
concepts and instruments26 that are needed to form technology, such as 
calculations and control; thus, I focus on the tools that are needed to adjust 
durability. 
                                                 
26 “When science in action is followed, instruments become the crucial elements, immediately after the technical texts; they are 
where the dissenter is inevitably led.” (Latour, 1987, p.69) 
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Thirdly, in Chapter 4, the research methods need to be discussed in relation to the 
perspective by which I strive to make a contribution. 
Fourthly, in Chapter 5, as this is a paper-based thesis, the papers with their 
perspectives, methodologies, theoretical underpinnings, empirical work and their 
conclusions are presented: each based on the perspective of ANT and dealing with 
the questions ”Why and in what conditions do controversies occur? How are they 
ended?” (Callon, 1986, p. 219) 
 
In Chapter 6, following the paper presentation, I discuss the conclusions of the 
papers together with the earlier introduced overall research question and 
contribute back towards the body of literature and to the discussions and 





3.2 The ANT approach to strategy, control, mechanisms, innovation 
and fabrication 
 
If everything is constructed and we wish to unfold the constructed facts, then we 
may end up infinitely opening black boxes. Thus, we have to discuss facts, such as 
theories and studies, and we have to ask the formal questions and accept (although 
to a certain degree) that we believe in something or not; the fate of facts is in our 
hands (Latour, 1987, p. 29). 
 
If a product is a fact, something that is in front of us and that is working, we may 
ask ourselves why? Furthermore, the same kind of products may differ 
significantly. Cars, for example, although being in the same sector, competing for 
the very same customer, are varying in design, function, price, volume, quality and 
so on. That is, a car is not simply a fact; it is something that is made a fact. The 
question about the “made” or “fact-making” is thus the one we need to discover 
and break down the black box of a car as an example. I discussed earlier the 
foundations of actor-network theory and how things are in the making. Now I 
wish to elaborate on the concepts I discussed in the literature review through a 
sociological lens: strategic objectives, calculative and non-calculative devices, 
control and innovation. This perspective assists in understanding relations and 
influences of actors within the network of management control and product 
development. It helps to understand how products become durable by providing 
themselves with a context and by how they change this context over time. This 
involves looking at the space and its relations as if they were not pre-given 
(Callon, 1986, 1991; Latour, 1987).  
 
To study management control and product development a more systematic 
approach, that focuses on interdependencies between different actors in the 
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organisation, is suggested to avoid ambiguity in results and conflicting findings 
(Abernathy and Brownell, 1997; Chenhall, 2003; Ferreira and Otley, 2009). But 
rather than using “snapshot” perspectives (e.g. Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 276) 
for the analysis of the study I strive to analyse how things are in the making. 
Especially if the analysis is striving for a “complete description of the totality of a 
control system” (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 263) then the framework might serve 
on the one hand, as a tool for documenting certain practices. However, on the 
other hand, strategic objectives, calculative and non-calculative devices, control 
and innovation can only be accessed while tracing the changes in all possible 
spaces and by analysing how resources are mobilised: thus, by focusing on time 
and space.27 In the following I discuss these concepts, from a sociological 
perspective, focusing on actor-network theory. 
 
3.2.1 Strategic objectives and inscriptions 
 
“‘Oh around the sixties. The Kennedy era. Private cars were on the way 
out – that’s what everyone was saying.’” (Latour, 1996, p. 15)  
 
This is an example of Latour’s story on Aramis (1996). Ideas such as private cars 
being “on the way out” are mediated within organisations. These main ideas may 
be initiators of change or act as guidance in decisions about change or 
preservation. Inscribed in documents (e.g. as mission or vision), they are mediated 
throughout the organisation and by referring to them, allies that combine different 
parts of the organisation are drawn together and mobilised28. Through inscriptions 
                                                 
27 Here it is important to look at the space and its relations as if they are not pre-given. The question is how things are related 
within that space and time. Latour (2005, p.71) states that “any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is 
an actor”. The relationship between actors thus build up a network and they produce spaces and times and the actors “mobilise, 
cumulate and recombine the world” (Latour, 1987). 
28 “It is necessary to consider the mobilisation of resources, whereby I meant the ability to make a configuration of a maximal 
number of allies act as single whole in one place.” (Latour, 1987, p.172) 
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in e.g. documents or calculations, these strategic perspectives are translated into 
“more concrete” objects and provide a “routine basis” (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, 
p. 269). Through these objects, acting at a distance becomes possible by:  
 
“Devising inscriptions that retain simultaneously as little and as much as 
possible by increasing either their mobility, stability, or combinability. 
This compromise between presence and absence is often called 
Information. When you hold a piece of information you have the form of 
something without the thing itself. [...] As we know, these pieces of 
information [...] can be accumulated and combined in the centres” 
(Latour, 1987, p. 243).  
 
In this definition, the inscriptions, the information act as a representation of 
something (human or non-human entities). This can be a strategic document, a 
calculation, a prototype, or a shareholder. Each of these objects represents 
something as something is inscribed into them; a strategic document may 
represent the customer; a calculation may represent a shareholder or a design 
model the creativity of an individual.  
Influence on behaviour, on decisions, is furthermore a vital part of representations. 
They may ,for example, make things profitable that weren’t beforehand and vice 
versa (e.g. Latour, 1996, p. 184). They can, like the “sleeping policeman” in 
Latour’s collective of humans and non-humans (Latour, 1999, p. 186), modify 
behaviour, shift meanings and display goals. An engineer, for example, may not 
believe in profitability as much as a CEO, but more in technologies; however, 
within a frame of business cases that calculate his inventions, the goal of the 





Thus, to discuss strategy and strategic objectives we have to search for devices 
that represent human and non-human entities and in which these are being 
inscribed. Through this perspective, maybe every representation become 
“strategic”; we do not know yet. But by following these representations as actors, 
we may get an idea of what strategy is and how it is done. In the next section I will 
discuss in which form these representations may appear, how they translate 
decisions, and how they control are networks. 
 
3.2.2 Representations, control, mechanisms 
3.2.2.1 Representations – non-calculative and calculative devices 
 
Representations are able “to sum up, to summarise, to totalise – as the name ‘total’ 
indicates – to bring together elements which are, nevertheless, not there” (Latour, 
1987, p. 234). This is the principle of representation. Representations can only 
make a difference once the networks behind them are in place (e.g. Paper 2). 
These representations can be devices of calculative or non-calculative nature.  
 
Non-calculative devices refer here to representations that are not calculated. Texts 
or technical objects for example are non-calculative devices. They “can be vital 
expressions of core values, signalling to people how they should act toward those 
things. “Identities and crucial roles are often defined with incommensurable 
categories” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, p. 327). For example, strategic documents 
may contain texts with words such as dynamic, family-oriented or aggressive. 
These may represent strategic objectives and act on engineers, designers or 
managers while developing a product. These non-calculative representations are 
present as actors in product development networks. 
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On the other hand, there are “calculative devices”29. Calculations are built on how 
things are and should be commensurable. The process of calculation is the process 
of commensuration. Calculation may therefore be conceptualised as a process of 
searching and overcoming boundaries to calculation: through commensuration 
(Espeland & Stevens, 1998). Commensuration is the transformation of qualities 
into quantities, into common metrics (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). Such a 
calculation entails a three step process (Callon & Muniesa, 2005). First, a 
calculative space needs to be created in which entities can be moved, arranged and 
ordered based on common principles. Secondly, the entities become associated 
with one another. Here, Valorimeters are tools that translate entities into numbers 
(Caliskan & Callon, 2010, p. 17). This commensuration is the “expression or 
measurement of characteristics normally represented by different units according 
to a common metric” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, p. 315). In the end, the 
calculation is finalised by summarising the results.  
 
Used for decision making, and thus of immense interest to this thesis, calculations 
are argued to mechanise decision making. Especially “value” plays an important 
role in the process of commensuration and decision making30. Through becoming 
part of a network, and being set in relation to other calculations or actors, 
calculations become measurements of performance. They become valued in the 
sense that they display good or bad value. In footnote 9 I already introduced an 
example in which the weight of a car was calculated. The arising question in 
product development could in this case be: do we have to decrease weight? As 
                                                 
29 “I refer to calculative devices as devices that “a) circumscribe the group of calculative agencies that are to be met, by making 
them identifiable and enumerable; b) organize their encounter, that is, their connection; and c) establish the rules or conventions 
that set the order in which these connections must be treated and taken into account (formats, queues, etc.).” (Callon & Muniesa, 
2005, p. 1242) The three step process is further described in the text. 
30 “When used to make decisions, commensurated value is derived from the trade-offs made among the different aspects of a 
choice. Value emerges from comparisons that are framed in terms of how much of one thing is needed to compensate for 




long as this calculation stands for itself, we don’t know. But if it is linked to other 
calculations, for example, to the weight of competitors, or to consumption-levels 
based on weight, one can relate the weight performance to better or worse, good or 
bad. A calculation thus becomes a performance measurement when it is put into a 
context; when it is linked with other actors. 
 
3.2.2.2 Conflicts of non-calculative and calculative devices 
 
As discussed, in product development, various interests of multiple departments 
need to be coordinated; heterogeneity and conflicts arise in the process of 
mobilising strategy. The mobilisation may also lead to tensions and 
inconsistencies through being mobilised differently throughout the organisation. 
Heterogeneity is cause and effect of possible conflicts. “Cause” as different parts 
of the organisation add different perspectives on strategies (representations) and 
“effect” as the mobilised representations lead to contradiction and tension among 
different parts of the organisation. For example, cost reduction strategy and 
customer value strategy may lead to conflicting views through the generation of 
cost reduction measures that are in conflict with customer functions which add 
value. Thus, it becomes crucial to analyse how these heterogeneous perspectives 
(and thus strategies) are mobilised in organisational networks. 
 
I will follow the call of Espeland and Stevens (1998) to shift attention to the 
processes of commensuration and calculations to get novel insights into fields of 
sociological inquiry. To focus on the making of calculations and on making things 
calculable is furthermore to focus on obligatory passage points, as “calculators 
whoever they are, sit at a central point inside the centres because everything has to 
pass through their hand” (Latour, 1987, p. 244). How we may define these 
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“centres” and what the actions are within them is to be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
3.2.2.3 Control systems and mechanisms 
 
When talking about management control, in Callon’s (1991) view, the use of 
calculations would be defined as intermediaries put into circulation by actors. This 
view provides insight into the world that circumscribes the calculations. Here, I 
consider both calculative and non-calculative devices intermediaries. What is 
happening now in the centres in which these devices are accumulated? The centres 
may be called systems (such as management control systems, MCS) in which 
calculative and non-calculative devices are translating other actors. A strategic 
document, for example, may problematise something, interest and enrol other 
actors (such as managers). and mobilise them towards a new, common goal. 
Latour’s definition of the centres of calculations can be used to define MCS: 
 
“How to act at a distance on unfamiliar events, places and people? 
Answer: by somehow bringing home these events, places and people. How 
can this be achieved since they are distant? By inventing means that (a) 
render them mobile so that they can be brought back; (b) keep them stable 
so that they can be moved back and forth without additional distortion, 
corruption or decay, and (c) are combinable so that whatever stuff they 
are made of, they can be cumulated, aggregated, or shuffled like a pack of 
cards. If those conditions are met, then a small provincial town, or an 
obscure laboratory, or a puny little company in a garage, that were at 
first as weak as any other place will become centres dominating at a 
distance many other places.” (Latour, 1987, p. 223) 
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(a), (b), and (c) were discussed in the previous section, where each is considered a 
step towards representation. But we can only start talking about MCS, if alignment 
through these processes is met. Domination, in terms of MCS in product 
development, has only occurred when durability in terms of product development 
and the finalised product is an end result of the development process. Thus, 
alignment in and through management control leads to product decisions and the 
finalised product. There are the many traces that are cumulated in the MCS and 
through which “everything can become familiar finite, nearby and handy” (Latour, 
1987, p. 230). Oversight31 is created. The MCS is like a machine and can thus be 
studied as such. “We were well aware that thousands of sightings, ‘looks’, sensors, 
feelers, signals, alarm bells make it possible to transcribe by sight on a control 
panel what the mechanism seals up. No machine without its control panel” 
(Latour, 1996, p. 222). Thus, only through opening the black box of a MCS, can 
one understand what is represented and how, and, more importantly, why 
decisions are made towards the outer world and for shaping new objects, such as 
cars, through product development. Space and time are reversed and are inscribed 
into the MCS to oversee and control space and time. Through this oversight and 
control we may become superior to the outer world and construct it. With MCS 
“we are able to gather together synoptically all the actions that occurred over 
many days and that we have since forgotten” (Latour, 1999, p. 64). Revealing 
them or, put differently, ungathering them from the MCS is to discover the actions 
carried out to develop a product and that is the research that has to be done to 
understand the process of product development, which is exactly what I attempt in 
this thesis.  
 
                                                 
31 “In a beautiful contradiction, the English word ‘oversight’ exactly captures the two meanings of this domination by sight, 
since it means at once looking at something from above and ignoring it.” (Latour, 1999, p.38) 
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When I said that a MCS is like a machine, then one may ask for its mechanisms. 
Callon and Latour are talking here about formalisms. The more representations are 
accumulated in the system “the more formalism they will require simply to stay 
together” (Latour, 1987, p. 245). But what is meant by formalism here? As 
discussed, Callon (1991) describes a strongly convergent network as one that 
entails coordination. In this network, heterogeneous humans and non-humans 
(technical objects) evolve predictably through conventions and procedures “as if 
acted on by rules to which they conform” (Callon, 1992, p.94); “despite the 
heterogeneity of the assembled entities, they work in unison” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 
363). It is exactly this process (the one that creates coordination) which I will refer 
to as control mechanism. Although the word mechanism sounds as if something is 
done over and over again it is nothing stable but is a result of the links that are 
assembled and reassembled in every moment. Thus, a control mechanism is the 
translation of representations (such as strategic documents, calculations, 
prototypes) within a MCS that leads to alignment of respective actors. From this 
perspective, control mechanisms include decisions, incentives, rewards or 
punishments. Every translation that leads to an aligned and coordinated network is 
a control mechanism. 
 
The process of alignment and the combination of the worlds’ representations 
within the MCS becomes interesting when “forms coming from completely 
different regions” (Latour, 1987, p. 243) interact in the MCS; thus, when new 
strategic objectives are mobilised within the MCS. “Unexpected 
connections“(ibid.) are what happen in innovation and what cause uncertainties in 




3.2.3 Innovation and uncertainty 
 
“But the more the fate of the project is bound up with these new 
participants, the more room they take up, comparatively speaking. The 
only thing a technological project cannot do is implement itself without 
placing itself in a broader context. If it refuses to contextualize itself, it 
may remain technologically perfect, but unreal. Technological projects 
that remain purely technological are like moralists: their hands are clean, 
but they don’t have hands” (Latour, 1996, p. 127). 
 
Here the “broader context” for a product can be defined as the market with its 
customers, costs, technologies, production facilities, suppliers and so on. I 
discussed how, through calculative and non-calculative devices and their 
connection, product development networks are assembled and held together. The 
result is this “broader context” into which innovation is fabricated. Different 
actors have divergent interests in the very beginning of the process of innovation. 
With the process of translation towards a “common” project, a project that has a 
“good agency of translation” (Latour, 1996, p. 48), goals become common ones 
and the product development network starts off with the fabrication of a product: 
of an innovation. 
 
Latour describes the degree of innovation as follows: 
 
“Here is the difference between a project that is not very innovative and 
one that is highly innovative. A project is called innovative if the number 
of actors that have to be taken into account is not a given from the outset. 
If that number is known in advance, in contrast, the project can follow 
quite orderly, hierarchical phases; it can go from office to office, and 
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every office will add the concerns of the actors for which it is responsible. 
As you proceed along the corridor, the size or degree of reality grows by 
regular increments. Research projects, on the other hand, do not have 
such an elegant order: the crowds that were thought to be behind the 
project disappear without a word; or, conversely, unexpected allies turn 
up and demand to be taken into account. It’s like a reception where the 
invited guests have failed to show; in their place, a bunch of unruly louts 
turn up and ruin everything.” (Latour, 1996, p. 72)  
 
For studying innovation and product development respectively, one therefore 
needs to follow unexpected events, and the discussed unexpected connections that 
are made. If one were to only study processes on the blueprint, one would end up 
just studying the blueprint and not what is really developed. Things, products, are 
being developed and thus develop over time, and as they do, unexpected, 
previously unseen actors enter the stage. As with research work (like this thesis) it 
cannot be written from a blueprint, as it needs to come up with something new and 
yes, something unexpected; a product is not being developed from numbers and 
actions that are known in advance: at least not innovations. Uncertainty and 
controversies are the sources of social constructions and “the identity and the 
respective importance of actors are at issue in the development of controversies.” 
(Callon, 1986, p. 199). Uncertainty is thus a concept that is inherent to ANT (See 
Appendix 2). Certainty may only be achieved through alignment of different 
actors and their interests; hence, through translation. 
 
When focusing the research on management accounting systems and innovations, 
Latour is very concise about the relationship between both, as accounting systems 




“Of course you have to ‘take into account’ all the elements, as people say 
naively, but only the not very innovative projects know in advance which 
accountant to believe and which accounting system to choose. We use the 
term ‘innovative’ precisely for a project that requires choosing the right 
accountant and the right accounting method, in order to decide which 
actors are important and which ones are dangerous.” (Latour, 1996, p. 
73)  
 
Here, and in the discussion of minimising uncertainty and representing the outer 
world, management accounting is held accountable for the “success” of an 
innovation, as it decides which actors to choose. Because innovation needs to 
grow, control and innovation are not separated but tied together. Furthermore, 
heterogeneous actors and controversies are settled through the process of 
innovation and control. The innovator deals with uncertain and heterogeneous 
things. They have to assemble them, they need to be “recruited, seduced, 
modified, transformed, developed, brought on board” (Latour, 1996, p. 57), in 
order to get to the fabrication of an object. “The innovation [...] will make it 
possible to “translate” and to “reconcile” contraries in order to establish chains of 
translation and to situate [...] expertise as the obligatory passage point that will 
resolve the great problems of the age. The work of generating interest consists of 
constructing these long chains of reasons that are irresistible, even though their 
logical form may be debatable.” (Latour, 1996, p. 33) It is thus not about the logic 
of action but about the translation and enrolment of all actors. If such a thing as 
logic were to be responsible for product development, then why, for example, does 
every Automotive Company produce different cars? And why are some called 





Of course, if we stay with the example of cars, some actors are well known 
beforehand and some processes as well. Maybe a new model will never hold to be 
called a “radical innovation”. Think of all the customers already enrolled and 
inscribed in current as well as future car projects. They are already a reality in 
existing cars (e.g. volume and price, positioning, and so on) and are easier enrolled 
into future car projects through estimations. Through tying estimations to past 
numbers they become more real32: more realistic, and uncertainty decreases.  
 
Still there are controversies and uncertainties about future markets, future 
customers and about technologies. New actors and objectives become part of 
product development and provide a project with a context33; the network is 
developing through these actors and it is exactly these actors that are to be studied. 
New customer demands, new technologies, new laws, new management 
technologies and creativity are all to be taken into account. “Innovation always 
comes from a blending of redistribution of properties that previously had been 
dispersed.” (Latour, 1996, p. 36) We need to trace where they come from and how 
they are acting to understand the translations they are causing within product 
development and thus how fabrication takes place. “In order to follow a 
technological project, we have to follow simultaneously both, the narrative 
program and the degree of ‘realisation’ of each of the actions.” (Latour, 1996, p. 
81) The many compromises, the settlement of uncertainties and controversies that 
increase a project’s reality are of interest. 
 
  
                                                 
32 “Anything can become more real or less real, depending on the continuous chains of translation”. (Latour, 1996, p. 85)  
33 “A technological project is not in a context; it gives itself a context, or sometimes does not give itself one. What is required is 
not to ‘replace projects in their context,’ as the foolish expression goes, but to study the way the project is conceptualised or 
deconceptualised. To do that, the rigid, stuffy word “context” has to be replaced by the supple, friendly word ‘network’. [...] The 
impression of a context that surrounds the project comes from the fact that one forgets to count the handful of mediators who 
speak in the name of money, Official Bodies, chips, or voters.” (Latour, 1996, p.133-134) 
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3.2.4 A brief summary of strategic objectives, calculative and non-calculative 
devices, control, and innovation 
 
The in Chapter 3.1 discussed actor-network theory provides a perspective on the 
concepts of strategic objectives, calculative and non-calculative devices, control 
and innovation. Uncertainty and controversies are sources of social constructions 
(Callon, 1986, p. 199). Heterogeneity is one important aspect as, instead of 
becoming homogeneous, networks are convergent through the alignment and 
coordination of heterogeneous actors (Callon, 1986).  This process defines how 
the world is built and it is explained by actors (Callon, 1986).  Diverse and 
heterogeneous goals become a composite objective: a common achievement of the 
actors (Latour, 1999, p. 181). The result is action which “is a property of 
associated entities” (Latour, 1999, p. 182). The actor-network perspective (as 
examined in Chapter 3.1) conceptualise the product development as a network that 
“describe[s] a coordinated set of heterogeneous actors which interact more or less 
successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse methods for generating 
goods and services” (Callon, 1991, p. 133).  
 
Strategic objectives are mobilised and are cause and effect of heterogeneity. Their 
mobilisation is a process of conflicts by which new networks are developed and 
constructed. Representations (calculative and non-calculative) and control 
mechanisms are here important actors as they are translators and align 
heterogeneity towards innovation. They settle controversies and conflicts in the 
fabrication of innovation by displacing goals. The result of the discussion so far is 
the fabrication of the future. Decoupled interests, goals, objectives and things are 
made durable; they are fabricated into an innovation. In the next section, I discuss 




3.3 Analytical strategy and paper coherence 
 
I have come a long way from discussing the relevant literature on control, strategy 
and innovation, and on greening and design, the sociology of ANT, and finally 
from discussing the relevant concepts of this thesis. The literature review pointed 
to several gaps that I intend to fill with the four papers of this thesis. I argued that 
in studies of control of strategy and innovation, a perspective that focuses on the 
dynamic relationships of control and innovation is needed to investigate the rather 
unexplored ground of control and strategy (Chapman, 2005) and that current 
studies do not provide a detailed perspective of the contexts that are developed and 
created through management accounting and control in product development 
networks. Furthermore, calculations play an active role in organisations, and in 
product development networks respectively. Knowledge and understanding is 
needed about the role of calculations and the limits of accountability in innovation 
activities and strategic change. I strive to contribute to the literature on control of 
strategy and innovation through the discussion of different characteristics of 
product development and innovation, focusing on the role of strategic objectives 
and control mechanisms with calculative and non-calculative devices. I develop 
the contribution through investigating the use of these devices and control 
mechanisms in product development and focus on strategic issues (e.g. product 
greening) and development issues (e.g. aesthetical design). Through discussing the 
coherence of the four papers and their relation, I strive to shed light on the overall 
research question: 
 
How do management accounting and control mechanisms interact with strategic 




Here, particularly the heterogeneity among actors (e.g. strategic objectives, 
calculations, and managers, technologies) is interesting to study, as it needs to be 
aligned through the settlement of conflicts and controversies. 
The ANT perspective assists here in understanding the interrelations between 
heterogeneous actors and helps us to understand how products become durable; in 
that, strategic objectives, calculations, or control mechanisms are not defined as 
pre-given (Callon, 1986, 1991; Latour, 1987). Thus, interrelations can only be 
studied through tracing changes in time and space. This perspective unravels 
unexpected connections that are drawn throughout product development and that 
are responsible for innovation; thus, providing a dynamic perspective of 
innovation, strategic objectives and control mechanisms. Following the actions 
carried out to develop a product is the research that has to be done to understand 
the process of product development and this is exactly what is to be developed in 
the four papers. 
 
3.3.1 Links and relationships of performance measurements in strategic 
change 
 
Focusing on the dynamics in the mobilisation of strategic objectives, we lack 
insights about the particular interactions of management accounting calculations 
and strategic objectives. Here, specifically the issue of the choice of accounting 
calculations and performance measurements become interesting areas of research. 
There is a further understanding needed in relation to strategic objectives and their 
implementation and mobilisation by management accounting calculations. As 
discussed in Chapter 2.1.2, studies in management accounting that deal with the 
choice of performance measurements are mainly focusing on attributes and 
characteristics of performance measurements and on how these may be influenced 
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by organisational parts or strategic objectives (e.g. Malina and Selto, 2004; 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Tuomela, 2005).  However, I here see the 
actor-network perspective as relevant for understanding the links between and 
among performance measurements and strategic objectives and how this 
influences how measurements are created (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Studies 
drawing, for example, on contingency or practice theory assume that managers 
actively choose performance measurements to implement strategic objectives, 
neglecting the perspective that the links that are drawn by existing calculations 
may be of specific importance. Performance measurements are not simply 
intermediaries that are put in circulation to implement strategic objectives (Callon, 
1991) but are actors in the sense that the links and contexts they establish impose 
the design and choice of new performance measurements within strategic change. 
Hence, interdependencies of performance measurements and the implementation 
of strategic objectives are still an unexplored issue that is important for the 
literature on control and strategy as the relationship defines the linkage between 
strategy and operations. Therefore the research question that is explored in Paper 1 
is: 
 
How are new strategic objectives (such as reducing product complexity) 
translated into the new product development process and which role do existing 






3.3.2 Creating and exploring calculative spaces for innovation and the 
environment 
 
In addition to the problem of interdependencies between calculations in strategic 
change, it becomes interesting to investigate the specific process of mobilising 
new strategic objectives through calculative processes in product development. 
Here, for example, calculations are, rather than just describing or representing 
activities in product development networks, creating contexts for activities and 
strategic change (e.g. Mouritsen et al., 2009). If so, then, as discussed in Chapter 
2.2, strategic objectives may be transformed into numbers, or simply be 
represented by calculations: especially in settings where calculations are strong 
actors. Limits on accountability and commensurability are here often argued to 
hinder strategic objectives from being either transformed into numbers or from 
being implemented at all. The literature of product greening points, for example, 
to limits on management accounting, which argues that product greening and 
green innovations may be restricted by management accounting functions or 
processes. But here we lack general knowledge of how limits on accountability 
and commensurability may be encountered or handled and if and how they may be 
overcome. Insight into the translation processes in product development networks 
is missing, in which strategic objectives are incorporated that are argued difficult 
to commensurate.  
 
Here, it becomes interesting if through the introduction of new strategic objectives 
calculative processes may fall apart. These objectives may weaken the alignment 
of a network, yet create a need for the network to be realigned. One aspect here 
may be that not everything is represented by calculations but that calculations 
form collectives through the process of translation (Latour, 1987). Or, 
furthermore, through a process of commensuration, objectives may be represented 
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by a common metric (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, p. 315). A study focusing on 
these processes would fill the previously discussed gap and would contribute to 
the literature of control and strategy, innovation and product greening. The 
emerging research question, which is posed in Paper 2, therefore is: 
 
How is greening calculated in heterogeneous product development networks? 
 
3.3.3 The translation of strategic objectives in the process of aesthetical 
design 
 
In some cases strategic objectives may be primarily mobilised by other means than 
calculations, however they may still interact with them over time. In Chapter 2.3 I 
pointed towards the issue of aesthetical design and technological innovation as 
two different routes towards innovation, although possibly separated, yet with the 
need to be integrated. In aesthetical design, strategic objectives are thus likely to 
be mobilised differently and decisions may be taken based on different objectives 
due to the incommensurable nature of aesthetics. However, accounting 
calculations as strong control mechanisms may play a role in the process of 
aesthetical design. This has so far not been a subject for research and more 
empirical insight is needed. With the focus on strategising: as the process of the 
mobilisation of strategic objectives, calculations, and other actors within the 
product development network develops a deeper insight into this issue may be 
granted. Instead of talking about strategy as practice focusing on social actors (e.g. 
Jarzabkowski et al. 2007; Whittington, 2003, 2006), I seek to develop an ANT 
perspective of strategising and exploring the process of strategic mobilisation in 
design as a process of translation. Calculations may displace strategic objectives 
(Latour, 1999), although objectives may also act as guidance or reference in 
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decisions about change or preservation. Thus, the mobilisation may also lead to 
tensions and inconsistencies through first, being mobilised differently throughout 
the organisation, and secondly, through calculative and non-calculative devices 
being in the same space. Thus, the research question investigated in Paper 3 is: 
 
How are strategic objectives translated in the process of aesthetical design? 
 
3.3.4 Controlling, separating and converging design and product 
development 
 
Building on the previous problem, technological innovation and design may have 
different control mechanisms in which strategic objectives are mobilised. 
However, at some point there is a need for integration of both throughout product 
development. In this process, there are controversies and uncertainties about future 
markets, future customers and about technologies so heterogeneous contexts need 
to be converged towards the final product. The convergence of design and 
technological innovation thus plays an important role in the development process. 
Divergent interests are translated into a “common” project with “good agency of 
translation” (Latour, 1996, p. 48) and goals are displaced and common ones are 
created through decisions. If management accounting decides which actors to 
choose, and if abstractions of relationships and heterogeneous relationships 
between actors are impacted by calculations on the one hand, and if accounts such 
as design may have different control mechanisms than in technical product 
development, then we need to have insights about the convergence of these 
mechanisms. Contributing to the literature on control and innovation and 




How is design and technological innovation controlled, when both separation 





Through the four presented research questions, I strive to make a contribution to 
the discussed literature by applying a more detailed perspective on calculations 
and control in strategy and innovation. The papers relate to each other in the 
discussed form and make a rather specific contribution to the field. Although each 
paper discusses particular problems and cases within product development 
networks, they make an overall point, which is developed in Chapter 6. I see this 
form of contribution to the literature as an advantage due to the lack of in-depth 
studies in this field. Furthermore, product development is, due to its complex and 
diverging nature, an issue that is hard to study and may present conflicting and 
ambiguous findings (e.g. Chenhall, 2003). With an actor-network perspective, I 
strive to point to particular issues in product development and to conceptualise a 
contribution and further implications, rather than developing a framework. Links 
and relationships of calculations in mobilising strategic objectives (Paper 1), the 
role of calculations in the process of mobilisation of objectives (Paper 2), the role 
of calculations in the strategising process of aesthetical design (Paper 3), and the 
different mechanisms in product development and their convergence (Paper 4) are 
thus relevant in studying the question of how management accounting and control 





4 Research methods applied in the PhD 
 
The focus on calculations, MCS, and product development guided the assembly of 
the empirical material and the data collection methods of this PhD thesis. The 
empirical domain is a European car manufacturer that has been studied for a 
period of three years. I have thus studied the company in a longitudinal study, 
while I was employed in the department of product development, controlling and 
product cost steering. Here, I participated in the calculation of cost and value of 
functions and components. Through this, participant observation, access to 
relevant documents and information, and insights into the product development 
network and cases were granted.  
 
I strongly focused on episodes in which product decisions were prepared and 
generated, and in which innovation, design and the environment played an 
important role. To discover and understand these episodes I had to understand the 
product development network, the control mechanisms and the general ways in 
which calculations were performed within the product development network. 
Thus, rather than focusing on how things fall apart, I focus on how things are 
being constructed. 
 
In order to understand how controversies occur and how they are settled in the 
realm of innovation and calculation, I have studied “unpredictable and 





(a) how causes and effects are attributed; 
(b) what points are linked to each other; 
(c) what size and strength these links have; 
(d) who the most legitimate spokespersons are; 
(e) and how all these elements are modified during the controversy” (Latour, 
1987, p. 202). 
 
I did this in a cumulative study of special cases and divided this thesis into four 
papers, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. In the following sections I will first 
describe how I chose the cases, secondly how and why I collected the data, and 
thirdly, I will close with a brief summary on methods and methodology. However, 





4.1 Selection of cases and papers 
 
All four papers cover a broad range of issues in relation to the central research 
question. Each paper is a step to understanding how control mechanisms interact 
with strategic objectives and heterogeneous innovation networks. Paper 1 focuses 
on product complexity reduction and the choice of performance measurements. It 
specifically investigates the role of calculations in the process of the translation of 
new strategic objectives within product development. Paper 2 deals with 
calculating greening and innovation, and focuses on different modes of 
calculations that are used to translate previously incommensurable objectives into 
commensurable ones thus translating greening and innovation into the product. 
Paper 3 focuses on the mobilisation of strategic objectives in aesthetical design 
processes and how objectives interact and emerge within these processes. Paper 4 
addresses the issue of controlling and managing design and technological 
innovation, which have both the need to be kept apart and the need to be 
integrated. It investigates the mechanism by which design and technology are 
controlled and converged. All four papers address the different issues and provide 
diverse angles to the research question. The diversity of the papers enables a more 
complete picture of the different issues in product development. I found that all 
papers were highly concerned with the research question as new product 
specifications had to be decided upon and developed. Furthermore, I searched for 
episodes in which controversies through new strategic objectives (such as product 
greening or product complexity reduction) and aesthetical demands arose within 
the cases and needed to be settled. However, this is discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
The cases enable theorisations that add and extend extant literature and frames by 
providing unique and convincing insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). By focusing on 
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important particular episodes, actors and their relationships can be traced while 
being de- and constructed and complex situations become more transparent.  
 
The choice of the cases and the episodes was to a certain extent influenced by the 
time available for this thesis. Within the three years, these cases were present and 
pertinent, and in these three years, interviews, participant observation and material 
could be gathered. 
 
My employment in the company presented challenges and advantages for 
conducting research for this thesis.  The employment granted insight about actual 
cases and facilitated case selection by enabling the choice of the for the thesis and 
research question relevant cases. Furthermore, throughout the employment, 
complete access to relevant data, material and persons was granted. This would 
have been inaccessible for researchers outside the company due to confidentiality. 
The limitation (discussed in the final chapter) of the employment is that it may 
have led to bias, causing omissions of likely relevant actors or processes within 
the data (Hermanowicz, 2002). Bias might influence the choice process of the data 
and may direct the research away from neutrality towards unconscious direction. 
Furthermore, while conducting interviews, the interviewer may have sought to 
probe and develop meaning, steering the interview in a specific direction. One 
means to address this issue and improve the focus on the empirical material was 
the co-authorship of Papers 2 and 4. As, e.g. interviews are local 
accomplishments, meaning that the interviewer affects the interviewee through 
her/his behavior and interpretations (e.g. Alveson, 2003), or as the choice and 
interpretation of company material is dependent on the collector, co-authorship 
and the involvement of more researchers leads to more diverse material and 




4.2 Data collection and analysis methods 
 
The papers have used multiple methods for gathering data on the discussed issues. 
First, 71 interviews were conducted with key respondents in the firm (see 
Appendix 1). Secondly, participants of relevant meetings were observed and 
thirdly, access to all relevant documents was granted. Fourthly, a questionnaire for 
Paper 2 was conducted with 52 respondents from R&D, finance and marketing. 
The chosen approach, of using multiple data collection methods (survey, 
documents, observation and interviews) and through the co-authorship, enabled 
the use of triangulation between the different data sources. This supported further 
insights into processes and how actors were involved in them and specific 
inferences of the material could be made (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2001). The methods are 




All interviews except 20 were recorded and transcribed verbatim. A list of the 
profile of the interviewees is presented in Appendix 1. The transcribed interviews 
were coded using thematic and pattern codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994), and 
great care was taken in the analysis in order to gain a broad picture and discover 






Company material, such as meeting minutes, presentations and documents about 
methods and processes could be accessed. In relation to the cases I chose materials 
from key decisions to follow the actors that were involved in the decision process. 
Furthermore, where possible, I observed meetings in which decisions were either 
prepared or taken in order to get a deeper understanding of the specific cases, their 
network and the relations.  
 
Questionnaire 
As discussed, a questionnaire was conducted in Paper 2. Here, the level of 
differences and views on calculations, greening and innovation is measured. The 
analysis feeds into our qualitative interpretation of the level of heterogeneity in 
PDN and does not reflect a quantitative analysis of hypotheses. Specifically, the 
understanding of the positions of how the groups (accounting, R&D and 
marketing) see greening in relation to market and customer preferences and how 
the different groups see calculations in relation to product decisions should be 
increased. 
 
The contradiction between a questionnaire assessing groups and actor network 
theory is here evident. ANT could be argued as a pitfall in the methodological 
application in relation to a questionnaire. In ANT groups are not existent: only 
group formation. Through a questionnaire causes are interpreted rather than 
outcomes: 
 
 “Analysts who use groups endowed with interests in order to explain how 
an idea spreads, a theory is accepted, or a machine rejected, are not 
aware that the very groups, the very interests that they use as causes in 
their explanations are the consequence of an artificial extraction and 
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purification of a handful of links from these ideas, theories or machines.” 
(Latour, 1987, p. 141) 
 
In Paper 2 the heterogeneous views that were the result of the questionnaire were 
however not used as causes to explain how product development advances but 
were used to discuss the process of alignment of heterogeneous actors through 
calculations. Heterogeneity as one main element in the process of translation and 
one main pillar in the sociology of ANT is more of a prerequisite of the same 
process (Callon, 1986, 1991). If heterogeneous actors become aligned through 
calculation it is important to understand their views on relevant “entities” in the 
study, i.e. greening, calculation and innovation. A questionnaire was conducted to 





4.3 Discussion of methods and methodology 
 
“How are we to study these unpredictable and heterogeneous 
associations that are revealed by the growing intensity of the 
controversies? Certainly not by dividing them into ‘knowledge’ and 
‘context’, or by classifying them into ‘primitive’ or ‘modern’ ones [...] All 
actions like ‘dividing’, ‘classifying’ or ‘ranking’ do not do justice to the 
unpredictable and heterogeneous nature of associations. The only thing 
we can do is to follow whatever is tied to the claims.” (Latour, 1987, p. 
202)  
 
ANT searches in the studies of technology to follow how causes and effects are 
attributed, which actors are linked together, the durability of these links, and how 
these elements are modified and translated prior to, during and following 
controversies. Thus, boundaries and controversies (as discussed in Chapter 4) are 
in the focus of this research work. Interviews and qualitative methods (e.g. Miles 
and Huberman, 1994) are setting (as in every study) limits to the scope of the 
research work, but in following these methods, boundaries are set by the 
interviewees and the material itself. “This will let the actors add whatever they 
choose to the framework; it will let them take it as far as they care to go.” (Latour, 
1996, p. 19) The material will open up, while following the translations they are 
going through, while being in other hands. The study of statements, as Latour 
(1987) called it, is starting off from the stage it is in and then goes through all the 
actors that make a fact or not out of it. Following all contradictions, controversies, 
break-downs and evolvements opens up the complete process of translation. This, 
however, is only possible through triangulation, following statements from 
interviews, participant observations and company material: as through coding the 
traces of translations become visible (Latour, 1987, p. 59-60). 
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Going into a company and studying the process is the same as following and 
studying scientists in their laboratories. “If the scientists we shadow go inside 
laboratories, then we have to go there, no matter how difficult the journey.” This is 
exactly what was striven for in this thesis. Although it appears that my journey 
was short because I worked on site already the opposite might be the case. I had to 
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5.1 Paper 1 – Mobilisation of strategic objectives – The role of 
performance measurements in their design and choice process  
 
 
This paper shows how the mobilisation of new strategic objectives is 
influenced by existing links of management control systems. Interviews 
and internal documents from a case company in the carmaking industry 
provide the empirical data. In the organisation the introduction of the new 
strategic objective “reduction of product complexity” was firstly 
addressed by a new performance measurement. Failing to steer with this 
measurement, the company chose another way. Through the calculation of 
a price tag, which could be included in the existing measurement “IRR 
calculation”, the strategic objective could be mobilised in the product 
development process. Drawing on actor-network theory, the paper finds 
that the design and choice of performance measurements are influenced 
by performance measurements already in place. It adds to the literature in 
that it displays the relevancy of contexts in the choice of performance 
measurements that are created through existing performance 
measurements. Performance measurements are influencing: the way 
information flows and how systems and networks are configured and 
linked. Besides the accuracy of performance measurements, the role of the 
measurements and the networks in place may be important in the choice 
process of performance measurements. Organisations facing strategic 
change and searching for the most appropriate connection between 
strategy and control may find connections by using the working links of 







The implementation of strategic objectives into practice is a challenging task for 
organisations and provides a challenging setting for research in the field of 
management accounting and control. In a framework that distinguishes the levels 
of management control, strategic planning, and operational action (e.g. Anthony, 
1965), management control is characterised as the link between strategy and 
action. A performance measurement system (PMS) is argued to translate strategic 
objectives into practice by providing relevant information and it maintains or 
alters patterns in organisational activities (Otley, 1999; Simons, 1995). If strategic 
objectives should be carried by control systems then changes in strategic 
objectives change the configuration of these systems (e.g. Malina and Selto, 2004; 
Morecroft et al. 2002). These changes are argued to be managed by organisations 
by using information that creates transparency about operations in relation to 
strategic priorities and about connections of activities across the value chain 
(Nanni et al., 1992; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993). One key aspect for this 
transparency is the use of performance measurements. Performance measurements 
are designed to coordinate decisions and activities to achieve a balanced set of 
strategic priorities (Lynch and Cross, 1992; Nanni et al., 1990). Thus, to cope with 
issues in the current environment and to address changing strategic objectives an 
organisation must be able to change the configuration of its performance 
measurements.  
 
Performance measurement is an interesting research area, particularly in product 
development networks. Product development is a complex process which is 
managed with multiple performance criteria (e.g. Davila and Wouters, 2004; 
Chenhall, 2003; Malina and Selto, 2004; Otley, 1980, 1999). In product 
development environments, performance measurements may deal with different 
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strategic foci such as customer value, target costs or activity improvements (e.g. 
JIT/JIS, lean manufacturing) (e.g. Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Perera et al. 1997). 
Thus, industrial organisations face challenges with the management of multiple 
performance measurements and with the implementation of new measurements. 
Dealing with both, existing and newly introduced performance measurements may 
result in several issues for organisations such as ineffective management, 
confusion or a lack of focus (Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Jensen, 2002).  The design 
of accurate measurements that link strategic objectives to action, and their 
integration into existing networks are two important issues in strategic change 
(e.g. Malina and Selto, 2004). However, few studies provide a deeper look into the 
specific choice and implementation issues while focusing on existing links of new 
performance measurements (Lillis, 2002, Stringer 2007).  
 
Perspectives including elements such as culture, reward systems, or planning 
systems (e.g. Malmi and Brown, 2008; Ferreira and Otley, 2009) may provide 
holistic views for studying PMS within organisations. However, I strive to focus 
on performance measurements as actors which tie organisational networks and 
mobilise resources. This study investigates the interplay of existing performance 
measurements and the effect it has on the choice and implementation of new 
performance measurements that are derived from new strategic objectives. The 
paper explores the research question: 
 
How are new strategic objectives (such as reducing product complexity) 
translated into the new product development process and which role do 





Drawing on actor-network theory I try to understand relations and influences of 
actors within the network of management control. The ANT perspective helps to 
understand how performance measurements evolve and get established, by 
providing a context, and how they change this context over time. It looks at the 
space and its relations not as if they were pre-given (Callon, 1986, 1991; Latour, 
1987). Contradictions, controversies and uncertainty are conditions between 
actors. I strive to follow “the actors in order to identify the manner in which these 
define and associate the different elements by which they build and explain their 
world” (Callon, 1986, p. 201). This process is the process of translation (Callon, 
1986) in which a network is built by creating a forum in which, in turn, other 
actors enrol and are mobilised through problematisation and interessement. Thus, 
by following controversies and following how they are resolved through 
enrolment and mobilisation of actors, a perspective opens up through which the 
choice and the influence of performance measurements can be analysed and 
explained. I analysed the mobilisation of the strategic objective and the related 
creation of new performance measurements. Hereby, I focused on the 
configuration and influences of performance measurements which were already in 
place and how these had an influence on the choice of new measurements. 
 
To follow the suggestion of Ferreira and Otley (2009) a case study was conducted 
to understand the complexity of interdependencies in PMSs in the process of 
performance measurement choice (see also Dent, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Langfield-Smith, 1997). The study is a longitudinal study that was carried out over 
a period of two years. The company is an international car manufacturer (which I 
call hereafter Automotive Company) where I was employed during the study. 
Automotive Company is a medium sized car manufacturer that is known for its 
innovative and design driven products.  At Automotive Company a new strategic 
objective of reducing product complexity (part numbers and variants) was 
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introduced. The case concerns the management of product complexity in new 
product development and how this can be reduced while still creating value for the 
company.  
 
The paper contributes to the literature of management control systems 
configuration and to the literature on the choice of performance measurements by 
making the interplay of performance measurements more transparent and by 
connecting performance measurements in place with the choice and 
implementation of new measurements. The study finds that the by existing 
performance measurements created contexts play an important role in the 
mobilisation and choice of new performance measurements. It suggests focusing 
more on how performance measurements are mobilised, and how strategic 
objectives are translated in studies on the choice of performance measurements 
(e.g. Malina and Selto, 2004; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith,1998; Lynch and 
Cross, 1992; Nanni et al., 1990). 
 
The paper is organised as follows. First, I discuss the literature on the role of 
performance measurement choice and PMS. Secondly, I briefly discuss the 
literature on product development in relation to performance measurements. 
Thirdly, I discuss the theoretical perspective drawing on ANT. Fourthly, the 
empirical study is presented. Fifthly, the findings are discussed, and sixthly, I 
conclude the paper and discuss its limitations. 
 
5.1.2 Theoretical discussion - Performance measurement choice and PMS 
 
Performance measurement may help firms achieve a balanced set of strategic 
priorities and objectives (e.g. Lynch and Cross, 1992). It supports firms when 
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implementing and describing strategic objectives; it guides decisions through 
influencing behaviour, and by providing a basis for rewards or punishments. 
Performance measurements are used in the organisational context and are 
organised as models that “model performance relations among key value-chain 
activities and outcomes” (Malina and Selto, 2004, p. 442). These performance 
measurement systems (PMS) can be of a financial nature (such as IRR) or be more 
comprehensive describing links between action and outcomes, providing 
feedback, supporting strategy development and implementation (e.g. APL from 
Epstein et al., 2000; BSC from Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Value based 
management from Ittner and Larcker, 2001). These comprehensive models include 
financial and non-financial measures of operational and strategic performance.  
 
When organisations face strategic change, new strategic priorities and objectives 
need to be described and implemented (e.g. Lynch and Cross, 1992). Simply said, 
the gap between the operational level, with existing links of performance 
measurements, and the strategic level, with new strategic priorities, needs to be 
closed. New performance measurements are then designed and implemented to 
mobilise the new objectives. Here however, two problems arise. First, 
organisations have to derive and design accurate measurements that link strategic 
objectives to operational action (Malina and Selto, 2004; Stringer, 2007) and 
secondly, the new performance measurements need to be integrated into the 
existing links of the performance measurements already in place. The links and 
interrelations that performance measurements build within organisations are thus 
important in the implementation process of performance measurements. A deeper 
look into the networks of performance measurements reveals thus further insights 





Theories of the choice of performance measurements are focusing, for example, 
on the characteristics of performance measurements and on organisational parts 
that influence these characteristics. Here, studies often characterise the 
organisational setting as an important factor for the choice, e.g. entrepreneurial vs. 
conservative settings (e.g. Malina and Selto, 2004), or they evaluate the 
environmental situation (either stable or unstable) as an important factor for 
choosing performance measurements. As Malina and Selto (2004) state, it is rather 
interesting to focus research on the importance of attributes that are influencing 
the consideration of performance measurements. They argue that besides 
organisational and environmental characteristics, organisations have enough 
flexibility to choose the portfolio of performance measurements and that they use 
this freedom to decide which measures best fit their actual situation. Performance 
measurements have to be continually improved to manage changing strategic 
objectives and to create and/or maintain strategic advantages and positions. In this 
process organisations choose: which performance measurements are continued 
and which are discontinued; which to create and which to dismiss. Malina and 
Selto (2004) discuss attributes that are relevant in this process. They analyse the 
trade-off of attributes in deleting or retaining performance measurements. They 
found that measure-attributes are important in the choice-process of performance 
measurements and that design attributes are more important than use attributes. 
What is interesting here is how these attributes are defined and shaped in 
organisations. Further insights can be revealed by taking a closer look into how 
these attributes may be influenced by existing links and the interrelationships of 
performance measurements already in place. The use of the performance 
measurements may thus be influenced by these links and interrelationships, and 




As not only human beings have an influence on the choice but all elements of the 
PMS, attributes and their evaluation are implicitly incorporated into the PMS in 
place. It is the question of what in the network influences the process of choice. 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998), for example, analysed how and to what 
extent management accounting in companies contributed to the development of 
performance measurements in organisations undergoing change programs. Their 
study is not concerned with the appropriateness of measurement attributes, it 
identifies rather the role that the accounting function plays in the process of 
change and, hence, in a process of performance measurement choice. The study is 
a step towards explaining constellations of PMSs and of the factors that influence 
PMSs. It gives insight into the influence of a certain function (accounting) of the 
organisation and addresses thus the question of which structures and functions are 
in place to support the operation of the PMS (see Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 273-
274). A focus here on the existing links could provide further insights about how 
these relevant actors (such as existing performance measurements, decision 
processes or strategic objectives) may have an influence on the choice of 
performance measurements. 
 
Furthermore, Merchant (1996) discusses how congruence with objectives, 
controllability, accuracy, intelligibility and cost effectiveness are important 
qualities for performance measurements. Further studies on performance 
measurements and their choice focus on the role of the measurements, their 
appropriateness of fit and their use in PMS (see Stringer, 2007). These studies are 
analysing organisational strategy and their relation and fit with the use of 
performance measurements within PMS (e.g. Tuomela, 2005). What would extend 
and add to the literature on the choice of performance measurements would be a 
field study on performance measurement choice that follows specific cases 
throughout the organisational network (e.g. Stringer, 2007). The choices of 
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performance measurements in relation to existing links of measurements is still a 
rather unexplored issue that is important as it defines the relations within the PMS 
and their interdependence in the choice-process of performance measurements. To 
focus on existing performance measurements and their links reveals conflicts and 
tensions that might exist among performance measurements. Although these 
conflicts may improve cross functionality and may result in improving shared 
outcomes (Simons, 1995, Kaplan and Norton, 1996), the links that are tied 
between them may result in conflicts for the implementation of new performance 
measurements (Jensen, 2002). Although studies have discussed solutions of how 
organisations may avoid these conflicts (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Lillis, 2002; 
Mc Noir et al., 1990), there is little empirical insight about how conflicts between 
existing and new performance measurements have an impact on possible 
solutions. Especially in product development environments the role of 
performance measurements makes for an interesting research aspect due to their 
complex and conflicting nature34.  
 
However, the decision making context plays an important role in the use of 
information internally and on the choice of performance measurements (Booker, 
Drake, Heitger, 2007, p. 20). Performance measurements mobilise distant places 
and build up the organisational world (Robson, 1992). Thus, performance 
measurements influence the networks and the (re-)production of time and space. 
They have an influence of how PMS are designed and how new performance 
                                                 
34 Management control over product development is struggling with focusing on cost and value at the same time. Especially 
strategic objectives such as profitability and efficiency play an important role in industrial organisations. Means such lean 
manufacturing, design to value or target costing thus may play important roles in the PMS and product development 
environment. Product development and innovation is a complex field in which not only costs but other key success factors are 
mediated, such as time-to-market and customer value. Thus, multiple performance measurements lead to trade-offs in product 
development (e.g. Booker, Drake, Heitger, 2007). How these trade-offs are made is related to the way, information and 
performance measurements are designed and provided. “Designers need a comprehensive cost model to balance trade-offs 
involved.” (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998, p.214).  Both, relatively accurate information on product costs and useful and 
comprehensible information for engineers for product decisions are needed in new product development. It is thus important for 
managers to choose information or performance measurements that fit not only the engineer’s terminology, but also the decision 
systems in place; accuracy and comprehensiveness need to be balanced (e.g. Kaplan and Cooper, 1998, p.216-217). 
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measurements are created and selected. The discussed literature shares the view 
that organisations design the PMS, and that they select the performance 
measurements to link their objectives and the means by which the objectives 
should be realised. However, the existing performance measurements may have 
significant impact on these processes. The research question is thus: 
 
How are new strategic objectives (such as reducing product complexity) 
translated into the new product development process and which role do 
existing performance measurements play in relation to the choice of 
performance measurements? 
 
5.1.3 Research approach - Performance measurements and actor networks 
 
For studying performance measurements a systematic approach, which focuses on 
interdependencies between different actors in the organisation, is suggested to 
avoid ambiguity in results and conflicting findings (Abernathy and Brownell, 
1997; Chenhall, 2005; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown, 2008). Malmi 
and Brown (2008) argued for understanding management control as a package in 
which subsystems build an interrelated whole. They point towards the need for 
studying elements, such as cybernetic control measurements and their 
interdependencies within the package and towards a lack of studies that analyse 
these interdependencies. Ferreira and Otley (2009) furthermore address this issue 
by providing a framework for description that “allows researchers to obtain a 
holistic overview in as efficient a way as possible” (ibid, p. 264). The framework 
should help discuss the issues that pervade or influence the whole PMS. Their 
intention is to provide a more holistic perspective on the system, its interrelations 
and its design. These perspectives (e.g. management as a package or MCS 
framework) argue for holistic approaches and for including elements such as 
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culture, reward systems or planning systems (e.g. Malmi and Brown, 2008; 
Ferreira and Otley, 2009). While I agree that these elements are important actors 
in studying performance measurements I strive to focus on performance 
measurements as actors which tie organisational networks and mobilise resources. 
I will elaborate this argument a bit further in this section. 
 
Furthermore, rather than using a “snapshot” perspective (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, 
p. 276) on the analysis of the study, I strive to analyse how things (performance 
measurements) are in the making. Especially if the analysis is striving for a 
“complete description of the totality of a control system” (ibid, 2009, p. 263) then 
a framework might serve, on the one hand, as a tool for documenting certain 
practices. However, on the other hand, the choice and design of new performance 
measurements can only be accessed while tracing the changes in all possible 
spaces and by analysing how resources are mobilised; thus by focusing on time 
and space.35  
 
Miller and O’Learly (1993) discuss how and by what means accounting expertise 
is problematised in relation to “particular demands”; the selection of performance 
measurements is to be discussed from a perspective of problematisation and 
involvement. If one talks about the selection of performance measurements within 
PMS, one needs to understand how they evolve through the network of the 
organisation and how they establish an organisational context. Here, the actor 
network perspective provides an approach through which the relationships within 
organisational networks can be revealed by tracing changes in all possible spaces. 
Mouritsen et al. (2009) study here the dynamic interaction between performance 
                                                 
35 Important is here to look at the space and its relations not as if they were pre-given. The question is how things are related 
within that space and time. Latour (2005, p.71) states “any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an 
actor”. Thus, the relationships between actors build a network and produces spaces and times, and the actors “mobilise, cumulate 
and recombine the world” (Latour, 1987). 
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control and innovation from an actor-network perspective. They propose that 
performance calculations link activities to organisational concerns and create 
contexts for innovation activities. Their study provides a deeper insight into the 
interrelation between management accounting and control and innovation. 
 
Strategic objectives should be the guidance for organisations in their decision 
about change or preservation. Inscribed in documents, they are mobilised 
throughout the organisation and by referring to them, allies that combine different 
parts of the organisation are drawn together and mobilised. “It is necessary to 
consider more generally the mobilisation of resources, whereby I meant the ability 
to make a configuration of a maximal number of allies act as single whole in one 
place.” (Latour, 1987, p. 172). Callon (1986) introduced four moments of 
translation in which this “single whole” is built and explained by actors, namely 
problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. In the process of 
problematisation one actor becomes indispensable by determining other actors’ 
identities and links. Through interessement the actors’ identities and goals are 
adjusted; it is “the group of actions by which an entity [...] attempts to impose and 
stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematisation.” 
(Callon, 1986, p. 207-208).  Through the adjustment, links to other identities are 
displaced towards one goal and a single actor. The other actors are enrolled by 
accepting their roles through successful interessement.  The translation of 
individual goals of two (or more) actors results in a composite goal that is 
different from the original ones (Latour, 1999, p. 179). By acting towards the 
composite goal, actors act as one unit as they are displaced from their previous 
locations and are assembled in the same time and space (Callon, 1986, p. 223). 
“Now at the end of the four moments described, a constraining network of 




The process of translation is especially interesting for studying the choice of 
performance measurements in relation to new strategic objectives. Strategic 
objectives may lead to inconsistencies and tensions through being mediated 
differently throughout the organisation (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 268). Here, 
performance measurements play a crucial role as they may either cause or settle 
inconsistencies and thus become the actors that translate strategic objectives. 
Therefore, I will analyse the case by discussing the four moments of translation – 
problematisation, interessement, enrolment, and mobilisation. This adds to the 
development of analysing and explaining controversies and how “a constraining 
network of relationships has been built” (Callon, 1986, p. 218). 
 
Performance measurements are intermediaries that are holding the network and its 
actors together. Rather than talking about causality between strategic objectives on 
the one hand and performance measurements on the other hand, it is the alignment 
of heterogeneous actors through the latter that defines the PMS. Thus, 
performance measurements could be defined as intermediaries, put into circulation 
by actors (Callon, 1991). This view provides insights about the world that 
surrounds the performance measurements. Here, I also consider performance 
measurements mediating actors and not just intermediaries. Performance 
measurements have a role in PMS that have an impact on the organisational 
networks and its environment. It is therefore interesting to ask how performance 
measurements have an impact on their use and how this is related to the choice of 
performance measurements when new strategic objectives arrive. They are 
involved in anticipating changes in the organisation and its environment thus 
providing the initiative to change. Extent and type of change is not only initiated 
by performance measurements but are also influenced by them. In the course of 
change, new actors, different ones, are entering or leaving the network, causing 
breakdowns of alignments, new translations and new alignments between parts of 
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the PMS. From an actor-network perspective a network is inherently unstable 
because it has to be assembled and reassembled in every moment. Relationships 
and links are constantly under construction36. One has to look for relationships and 
links that last and thus for actors that may construct, reconstruct, or deconstruct 
the network. To find these actors one has to follow the translations and their 
episodes within the network. 
 
Rather than seeing an outcome and thus an end, or a function (e.g. Power, 2004) in 
performance measurements I understand performance measurements as actors that 
create, that do something. I go beyond the call from Power (2004) to open up the 
black box of performance measurements and to “recover the social and political 
work that has gone into their construction as instruments of control”.  
 
In summary, the ANT approach attempts first, to describe a case in detail in which 
a new strategic objective is translated. The four moments of translation help here 
in the discussion about how controversies arise and how they get settled. This 
provides the literature on the choice of performance measurements with further 
insights into how the choice and design of performance measurements is 
influenced by existing links. Secondly, by performance measurements being 
defined as actors rather than just intermediaries, much more respect is given to 
existing measurements which may have an important role in influencing the extent 
to which PMS are altered, or the introduction of new performance measurements. 
Thirdly, ANT shifts the view from a more static, snapshot view on the status quo 
towards a view in which things are in the making. Through describing how 
measurements and their links are in the making, important factors in the 
                                                 
36 “Thus, the object, the real thing, the thing that acts, exist only provided that it holds humans and nonhumans together, 
continuously. Slightly out of phase, it resides neither in the social element (it is made up of chips and hinges, shock absorbers 
and pairs of subway cars) nor in technologies (it is made up of passions, transported people, money, Communist ministers, and 
software). On the one hand, it can be said to hold people together, but on the other hand it is people who hold it together.” 
(Latour, 1996, p. 213) 
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mobilisation process of new strategic objectives become apparent. This may give 
new implications for further research on the choice of performance measurements. 
 
5.1.4 Research methods 
 
The empirical domain is the international car manufacturer (Automotive 
Company) where I was employed, at the time of the study37, in the department of 
product development and innovation controlling. For this longitudinal study 
empirical material was gathered over a period of two years. 
 
I gathered relevant empirical material and attended related business meetings 
within that timeframe and focused on new product development. The material 
consists mainly of product cost calculations (business cases) as a basis for 
decisions, documents about related product decisions and related strategy papers. I 
attended more than 50 meetings and management decision circles in which 
product decisions were made and discussed. I focused on input measures of 
product decisions and how they were related to product decisions. Furthermore, I 
conducted twelve interviews ranging from thirty minutes to one hour of which 
eight were recorded and transcribed. An overview of these interviews is provided 
in Appendix 3. The interviews were conducted with managers and engineers of the 
product development network. The interviews were semi-structured focusing on 
the choice and the reasons for the choice of performance measurements as well as 
on their use. I focused strongly on episodes in which performance measurements 
were discussed, chosen, and in use to understand the translations and to research 
the PMS and relations to performance measurements (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
                                                 
37 The employment in the company at the time of the study may have led to bias (e.g. Hermanowicz, 2002). Validity and 




The material was organised to follow the calculations that influence the product 
development network and to analyse how performance measurements change the 
decision network and its relations. Focusing on the change of management 
accounting calculations and performance measurements within a specific 
organisational network creates visibility of aspects of the change process (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000). The employment in the company may have led to bias in 
leading the interviews and choosing material. To overcome this limitation I made 
use of the triangulation of all data (interviews, participant observations and 
documents) through which I could follow the episodes and get in-depth insights 
(e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
 
First, I had to understand the product development network and how calculations 
and performance measurements act in this network. Secondly, I had to trace the 
process of the choice of performance measurements and the interrelation with the 
product development network. Thirdly, I had to analyse how the change in 
performance measurements translated action and changed the product 
development network. 
 
5.1.5 PMS and new product development: The complexity case 
5.1.5.1 Introduction to Automotive Company 
 
Automotive Company’s vision is to enhance profitability, create value and ensure 
its future through international success. Automotive Company strives towards the 
goal of being the leading car manufacturer in its sector. The goal for its product 
portfolio is to have clear and pure product lines and provide excellent mobility for 
its current and future customers. These statements are inscribed in official 
company documents, internal company documents and presentations.  
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In new product development managers can refer to these documents, and interpret 
them towards the statements, when describing strategic objectives. By doing this, 
tensions arise in conflicting strategic objectives. Enhancing profitability is 
described through customer value, efficiency improvements and lowering costs. 
More efficient component design, new supplier markets, and improved assembly 
and manufacturing processes are objectives in product development. On the other 
hand, the focus is set on value and the customer, focusing on quality, innovation 
and sustainability. These strategic objectives are sometimes contradictory in 
product development, as in cases where increased product value results in higher 
component costs. 
 
Different units and departments within the product development networks 
explicitly advocate strategic objectives. These are inscribed explicitly in 
documents and could provide a basis for departments to argue for specific 
decisions in new product development. As discussed, tensions and conflicts arose 
through these different objectives, because they were advocated for by different 
departments (e.g. marketing advocates for innovative materials while finance 
argues for cheaper materials).  
 
The new product development process was structured through car projects, each 
having its own development teams and its representatives from the divisions, units 
and departments. Thus, car projects had a rather autonomous position, being 
guided by the different strategic objectives of Automotive Company, such as 
market views, quality standards, cost targets, innovation, time, weight, 
manufacturing, social and environmental standards, law, capacity and other 
factors. Thus, the product development network was a very complex network that 
included interests from all areas of the organisation, having a matrix-kind, 
decentralised management in terms of projects and in terms of units. 
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Performance measurements derived from strategic objectives are mobilised in the 
product development network. These are based on strategic objectives, such as 
bringing down costs, improving efficiency in design and production, and creating 
more value for customers through quality, innovation and sustainability. 
Performance measurements concern mainly customer value (price and volume), 
weight (kg), quality (ppm), CO2 Emissions (g/km), engineered hours (h), 
assembly time (h) and costs ($). Costs are split between logistic costs, proportional 
costs per vehicle, development costs, investment cost and overhead cost within the 
product development network. Furthermore, an overall project business case is 
calculated resulting in a rate of return (IRR), which is reported as performance 
measurement. All performance measurements are agreed upon from project 
management and targets have to be reached at the start of production. The targets 
are set based on experiences and tests of current products, and results are 
incorporated into the targets. Targets are redefined and adjusted when new results 
and findings point towards a different route of product configuration. The actual 
level versus the targets is sometimes reported on a daily basis to project 
management. Thus constant changes can be reported, traced and acted upon by 
project management38. The managers are rewarded based on all performance 
measurements and their achievement. Monetary, as well as non-financial rewards 
in the form of career portfolio remarks are rewarded. As long as the product 
development network accepts the performance measurements and as long as 
project management is held accountable for the measurements and the targets, 
decisions can be taken towards these targets and with the performance 
measurements.  
 
                                                 
38 Systems are designed to carry and visualise performance measurements. They are visualised in an intranet IT application in 
which all units report their status on a weekly basis. This tool can be used throughout the organisation and is organised with 
information access limitations to address the information needs of managers at different levels. The information is thus provided 
from the operational level and is organised to provide management with performance measurements and the actual status on a 
weekly basis. Furthermore, when product decisions are made, the actual status could be made transparent instantly in meetings. 
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5.1.5.2 Performance measurement and decision in new product 
development 
 
Decisions in the projects are made based on the evaluation of all relevant 
performance measurements. To address all factors and to minimise the complexity 
of the decision a standardised decision making process is inscribed into the 
company’s documents. There are decisions without alternatives, i.e. law 
restrictions or concept-feasibility; but besides these “no-go” decisions all concept 
changes are concerned with the impact on performance. Decisions on the project 
level are mostly concerned with cost, quality, weight, engineered hours and CO2. 
Furthermore, customer value and innovations are discussed and calculated at 
project level. For these decisions, specific meetings are held on a regular basis. In 
these decision circles representatives articulate their interests and present them 
through the means of performance measurements and their calculations. In this 
process, the change is visualised to managers by an IT tool and they base decisions 
on the visualisation: on the information provided to them. Performance 
measurements were thus used interactively in the decision process of product 
development. 
 
In the studied organisation every product related decision in the development 
process is evaluated under the aspects of cost and value. For every decision there 
is a business case giving transparency about the financial impact of the decision, 
which should ensure the objective of profitability. These calculations guide all 
decisions around the configuration and development of a car project. Business 
cases are here IRR calculations based on predicted cash flows generated by 
alternatives. These calculations build a very strong argument in product decisions 




"When the financial target is tough, which is basically the case in all our 
projects, we decide mainly based on positive business cases. At least as 
long as there is not a generic strategic decision or as long as we are not 
having serious problems with achieving our other targets." [Project 
manager] 
 
Performance measurements to meet quality, weight, engineered hours and CO2 
are always discussed under the aspect of cost, and the related business case that is 
visualised through the performance measurement of IRR. Decisions to meet or at 
least to lower the gap to these targets are often postponed or even dismissed, as 
long as there is a negative business case. This should generate alternatives and 
foster innovation. A project leader commented in a decision circle on a weight-
reduction alternative:  
 
"I don't want to decide, now let's check and see if there are other possible 
alternatives...” [Project manager] 
 
But, when time becomes critical, product related decisions to meet other targets 
have to be made. A project manager stated in a decision process: 
 
"We have no alternatives... We need these features to meet our CO2 goal I 
don't see any alternatives..." [Project manager] 
 
As long as meeting non-financial targets is not time critical, the business case is 
the actor that has a strong impact on this network. Even finding solutions to meet 





"We really have to make sure that there are positive business cases to 
ideas, otherwise we can't decide." [Coordinating Developer Car 
Components] 
 
When meeting non-financial targets is critical, these targets gain more momentum 
but are still strongly evaluated under the aspect of cost. Alternatives become 
heavily discussed when the target IRR of the alternative is not met or is even 
negative. The steering and controlling of non-financial targets are thus extremely 
difficult and financial measurements play an important role in the product 
development network. However, although the financial dimension is strong in the 
process, other performance measurements still play an important role in the final 
decisions on product concepts, as targets in these dimensions have to be met as 
well. 
 
In the following I describe how first, a new strategic objective of reducing product 
complexity was initiated, secondly, how it struggled to enter the product 
development network, and thirdly, how it was mobilised. 
 
5.1.5.3 Product complexity in new product development 
 
The product development network was facing a new strategic objective of 
reduction of product complexity and started struggling with the implementation of 
a new performance measurement.  
 
The issue was that while focusing on efficiency, the reduction of “product 
complexity” in the supply chain and the management of part numbers became 
important. In Automotive Company product complexity referred to the number of 
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parts generated through additional derivatives or variants. Automotive Company 
stated in strategy documents that on the one hand, the idea of producing the least 
product complexity reflects the most efficient production, referring to Henry Ford 
(“Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is 
black”). On the other hand, addressing customer needs and therewith the 
individualisation of a car leads to high product complexity and may even lead to 
“incontrollable” complexity, as it was stated in a strategy document. Thus, there 
was a range between high efficiency and low cost at one end, and high customer 
value at the other. It was described in the documents, that the individualistic 
character of a customised and high value car was still the objective, but that 
product complexity had to be reduced.  
 
A program was initiated to strengthen operations to be prepared for future events 
such as market crises. An external consulting company brought the information 
into the organisation that the organisation had a problem with the complexity of its 
products, referring to the strategic objective of efficiency in product design. The 
problem the organisation was facing was that product complexity had grown 
relatively higher than sales and profit. The analysis by the external consulting 
agency showed that these inefficiencies do not fit with Automotive Company’s 
objectives of being efficient and profitable while providing customer value. The 
argument was that benchmarked competitors are able to provide similar customer 
value while having less product complexity. Pointing towards the objective of 
efficiency (in product design and production) and profitability, plus keeping the 
customer value focus, a new strategic objective namely reduction of product 






The reduction of product complexity along the supply chain and management of 
part numbers to bring down cost was a central concern of that program and was 
introduced as a new strategic objective in the management of resources, value and 
cost. To implement this strategic objective a separate initiative was set up that was 
concerned with the implementation of a management process, and with the design 
and choice of performance measurements. The initiative was concerned with the 
product development network where decisions about the configuration and thus 
about the complexity of a product were taken.  
 
5.1.5.4 The strategic problem of product complexity – Problematisation 
 
The reduction of product complexity initiative was implemented and managed by a 
team of 5-10 members39. The problem of reducing product complexity was 
displayed with the chart of the consulting agency stating that parts had grown 
relatively higher than sales and profit, and that Automotive Company’s 
competitors had less parts compared to their sales and profit. Through attaching 
part numbers to the strategic objectives sales and profit, the problem was 
visualised to managers and while using the common goal of increasing sales and 
profit, a new goal (strategic objective) of reduction of product complexity was 
introduced. Thus, product complexity was problematised through its relation to 
sales and profit. 
 
5.1.5.5 Interessement and enrolment 
 
A target was set by the team for the managers of the product development network 
to reduce part numbers and thus product complexity. Every car project had a target 
                                                 
39 The exact number of participants is disguised due to confidentiality but lies somewhere in between.  
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regarding part numbers and the objective to initiate ideas to reduce them. A 
manager from the team explained: 
 
“Yes, the project managers are responsible for generating ideas of how to 
reduce complexity and they have to close the gap to the part number 
target. They didn’t do anything, because they never had a target. Now, 
since top management had decided to do something, they are urged to do 
something. They have to come up with ideas to reduce complexity.” 
[Manager of complexity initiative team] 
 
A new performance measurement was created; namely, the number of parts per 
car project. The status quo in development of planned part numbers was reported 
and measured against the target. A new performance measurement was thus 
created that should be managed within the PMS of new product development. 
Although project managers agreed on the target and on reducing the number of 
parts per car project, there were problems with the new performance 
measurement in the projects and decisions, which I discuss in the following 
section. 
 
5.1.5.6 Limits of translation – Product complexity as a value driver 
 
It became apparent that the product development network did not successfully 
steer the complexity because the set of limitations couldn’t be met. In the product 
development network, business cases had a strong position. When alternatives 
were generated, adding new product substance, then product complexity was a 
revenue driver for the business cases because often with higher product substance, 
customer value was added and market prices could be increased. Furthermore, the 
complexity initiative team was struggling to reduce part numbers, and reach the 
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targets with ideas: as they often generated lower margins through a loss of product 
substance that came with the market price decrease. These alternatives generated 
negative business cases. A controller stated: 
 
"There is no chance that we reduce part numbers when we have a 
negative business case to that idea. Project management will never decide 
on that basis." [Controller]  
 
No project manager decided a decrease in part numbers, when the business case 
told him not to do it. Although the complexity initiative team argued with 
relatively higher growing part numbers in relation to sales and profit, the link 
between decreasing part numbers while increasing profitability was not apparent 
in the decisions. This was due at that time to product complexity being understood 
rather as a revenue driver instead of a cost driver. The problem was that costs that 
were tied to the complexity of the car couldn’t be measured for single decisions 
and thus couldn’t be implemented in the business cases. Costs such as overhead or 
step costs, or other relevant complexity drivers couldn’t be directly measured but 
had a long-term impact on performance. These are discussed later in more detail. 
 
In Figure 1 the performance measurements for management decisions are 
displayed. On the one hand, there is the financial performance measurement 
(business case) and, on the other hand, there are non-financial performance 
measurements including the number of parts. The business case, weight, CO2, 
engineered hours per vehicle, quality and number of parts are measurements 
which were provided to management for every product decision. Furthermore, it is 
visualised how cost and value are input for business cases. Value drivers such as 
additional functions, individualisation, optional equipment, more colours and 
materials provided, on the one hand, positive input for business case calculations. 
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On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1, functions, optional equipment and other 
drivers for customer value increase the number of parts. Thus, these drivers of 
value resulted in positive (business case) and negative (number of parts) 




Figure 1 – Cost, Value, and Performance Measurements – Product Complexity as number of parts 
 
Even though managers had agreed on the target and the performance 
measurement, action towards the reduction of parts was not taken. Furthermore, 
reporting structures and rewarding processes were focused on the current 
performance measurements. Due to the problem of steering the process, the part 
number targets did not gain acceptance and thus did not change decisions towards 
product complexity reduction. The dilemma was here that the strategic objective 
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“Yes, we had given them a target. And now, I can’t say I reduce the part 
numbers in a car project by X in the development process with no 
appropriate tool. You would have to generally limit the number of parts 
and that is not possible. How would you steer it, it’s too complex.” 
[Manager of complexity initiative] 
 
The performance measurement number of parts per car project was apparently not 
an “appropriate tool”. I will discuss in the next section, how the strategic objective 
was translated into action. 
 
5.1.5.7 New interessement and enrolment - Product complexity as cost 
driver 
 
After recognising the previously described dilemma, the initiative team decided to 
analyse how many indirect "costs" were tied to one part number. The team 
analysed the supply chain and found three kinds of costs related to one cost driver, 
that were thus far not considered in cost calculations. These were step costs, 
indirect/non-assignable costs and “forgotten” costs, all of which couldn’t be 
directly measured but had significant impact on performance. Step costs refer to 
costs that occur through a sum of decisions (part number increase), which then 
result (in sum) in a cost jump (e.g. a sum of decisions leading to complexity so 
that parts, rather than being provided to assembly in separate boxes, now need to 
be delivered in sequence, which is costlier and requires more assembly space). No 
assignable or indirect costs refer to costs that come with part number increases 
(such as quality measures or higher administration efforts). “Forgotten” costs refer 
to costs that are direct but that occur outside the focus: without being measured 
and incorporated in business cases (e.g. due to more parts, more boxes are 
needed). The cost driver is thus number of parts with costs assigned from all three 
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kinds of costs. The price tag for every part number was thus derived from the 
indirect resources a part number generates along the supply chain. Interviews, 
KPIs, and other relevant data were evaluated by the initiative team and the result 
was an average cost per part number that reflected the efforts it generated through 
product complexity. The goal was to incorporate these costs "adequately" into the 
business cases to change the decision making process and thus to reduce product 
complexity. The result of an extensive analysis was a price tag that was 
incorporated into the calculation of the performance measurement business case 
(IRR calculation).  This price tag was then to be incorporated into all business case 
calculations, whether it was an alternative to reduce part numbers or to augment 
the substance of the car. If the alternatives to be decided increased the number of 
parts, a malus for every new part was incorporated; if decreased a bonus was 
incorporated. With this price tag, the strategic objective was translated into 
practice by monetising resources that reflect present and future consumption of 
product complexity. The business case (IRR calculations) was shown with and 
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Thus, product complexity was now not only steered through the absolute number 
of parts and the target, but through being incorporated into another performance 
measurement, namely, IRR calculations. Product complexity became a cost driver. 
The dilemma of prior competing performance measurements number of parts and 
customer value in IRR-calculations was addressed by understanding product 
complexity as a cost driver, which was in turn fed into IRR-calculations. 
 
5.1.5.8 “New” mobilisation – Translation of strategic objective into 
decisions 
 
A number of cases in which the reduction of part numbers so far had shown a 
negative business case were recalculated right after the introduction of the price 
tag. The business cases showed both the outcome without, and with the price tag. 
In some of the cases the business case shifted from being negative to being 
positive: including the price tag. Though still highly discussed in the product 
development network and critically analysed by project management, the 
decisions skipped and the reductions of part numbers were decided. A financial 
controller described: 
 
“It was highly discussed and it took quite some time to being decided but 
in the end project management accepted the price tag and decided for the 
reduction measure. It was decided top-down to calculate with the price 




The price tag became institutionalised and got incorporated into every business 
case calculation shortly after the first decisions were made. The initiative stressed 
this topic in car projects and forced a quick implementation. A manager of the 
initiative said: 
 
“Project management have to implement it now, because their boss told 
them so. They have targets. We say it has to be implemented immediately 
because the experience shows us that you can only reduce part numbers 
in the early development stages or in a complete revision of a project. 
After the start of production part numbers are more increasing due to 
changes in parts and the offer.” [Manager of complexity initiative] 
 
The implementation of the price tag had an impact on some substance related 
decisions that, as an effect, increased or decreased the number of parts. But the 
price tag and the business case calculations didn’t just have an effect on the 
decisions. A manager of the initiative stated his thoughts: 
 
“The leverage is that the engineers produce less part numbers. Through 
that leverage you are only able to reduce part numbers, straight from the 
head of the engineers. The price tag sensitised from the beginning on.” 
[Manager of complexity initiative] 
 
In various meetings in which alternatives were discussed for the first time (before 
the calculation of a business case), the increase or decrease of part numbers 
became more and more an argument, and was always discussed in combination 





“No, I don’t want to follow that solution. We are producing a high 
amount of new part numbers. The malus for the business case would be 
too high. Let’s focus on something else.” [Coordinating Developer Car 
Components] 
 
Though every alternative was calculated, engineers were sensitised concerning the 
augmentation of part numbers when constructing concepts or finding alternatives. 
Through the current position of the calculation, the price tag gained momentum 
and was translated through business cases as well as through sensitising engineers. 
Though already implemented and an influencing measure in business case 
calculations, the price tag was highly discussed. Project managers were concerned 
about the validity of the price tag, and they did not agree completely to implement 
costs that occur indirectly in the life cycle of their project in their business case. 
But not only project managers had concerns with the correctness of the price tag 
and its evaluation. A controller criticised: 
 
“I cannot accept that you have the same price tag for generating an 
additional colour as for generating an additional front axle. The price tag 
does not say the truth then.” [Controller] 
 






“Of course you can question the validity of the price tag. It might be that 
in some cases the price tag does not say the truth and that because of this 
some decisions might go in the wrong direction. But at least the price tag 
gives transparency about complexity to some extent. People here need 
clear targets and everybody needs to understand that. That might lead to 
a car with fewer options, yes, but we cannot deal with the complexity 
anymore, we have to reduce complexity, that’s what our competitors have 
been doing since quite a while.” [Manager of complexity initiative] 
 
Since mostly project management and controlling raised concerns about the 
validity and correctness of the price tag, and not about the existence of the price 
tag itself, management started discussing the amount of the price tag and whether 
this would need to be adjusted. However, as time was limited, the issue of the 
“correctness” of the performance measure could not be empirically evaluated. 
 
In summary, the following observations can be made from the empirical material. 
First, new strategic objectives were derived from calculations that are based on 
existing strategic objectives (increasing number of parts in relation to profit and 
sales). Secondly, new performance measurements (number of parts) were based on 
these calculations. Thirdly, links of existing performance measurements (IRR 
calculations in decisions) were a boundary for new performance measurements. 
Fourthly, by using existing performance measurements and links, new strategic 







A “snapshot” perspective (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 276) may help to get a 
“complete description of the totality of a control system” (ibid., p. 263). This may 
serve as a tool for documenting certain practices (see Appendix 4 – this table 
shows the structured findings in the choice process of the performance measure of 
complexity, the price tag). Although this perspective may describe certain 
categories and processes, such as organisational structure, strategies and plans, or 
information flows and systems, it does not provide insights about how things are 
in the making and why the snapshot looks as it does. I added two columns 
(Appendix 4) to display the change that occurred in the product complexity case 
over time. Although this may serve to get a comprehensive overview about certain 
levels and how they change over time, the links between performance 
measurements and strategic objectives and how action may influence both may not 
become transparent. Initiatives to change, failure, disruptions, translations and 
convergence are happening in between these levels and shed light on problems 
and solutions as they occur in performance measurement systems. I will try to 
apply another perspective to overcome this problem. The actor-network 
perspective adds here in that it helps to trace changes in time and space, and by 
analysing how resources are mobilised. Rather than talking about causality 
between objectives (key success factors, and strategies and plans) on the one hand, 
and the key performance measurements (and target setting, performance 
evaluation, and reward systems) on the other hand (Ferreira and Otley, 2009; 
Malmi and Brown, 2008), it is rather the process of translation of heterogeneous 
actors that builds up the links in an organisation. In the coming sections I elaborate 
on the translation of strategic objectives and on how performance measurements 




In the case company, IRR calculations have a strong position. In Automotive 
Company the calculations are the most important decision basis for product 
relevant decisions. Although other performance measurements are in place, such 
as weight or CO2, these non-financial measurements merely play a role when they 
indicate that decisions have a critical impact on these dimensions. With the new 
strategic objective (reduction of product complexity), a new performance 
measurement (number of parts) was introduced. This measurement, however, had 
no impact on product decisions, and IRR calculations were still the main decision 
basis. Thus, for Automotive Company the link between the new strategic objective 
and operational product decisions was not built. The measurement “number of 
parts” could not mobilise decisions nor alter decisions towards reducing the 
amount of part numbers and thus product complexity. Thus, the initiative derived 
a price tag which was then implemented into IRR calculations as these were the 
main decision basis. This step linked the number of parts with the IRR calculation, 
and by referring to IRR calculations the strategic objective of reducing product 
complexity could be mobilised. In conclusion, the IRR calculation is the actor at 
Automotive Company that everybody has to go through. By using the linkages the 
calculation builds up, new strategic objectives can be mobilised through simply 





Figure 3 – Translations in the Product Development Network 
 
In Figure 3 the different stages before and after the introduction of the strategic 
objective “complexity” are illustrated.  The graphics are schematic visualisations 
of the decisions of the product development network. The three (3) stages 
illustrate the product development network and the process of decision making of 
product alternatives. Strategic objectives are represented by performance 
measurements that act on project management. The strategic objectives are 
positioned on the left and right end of the figure; the strategic objectives in place 
are on the left-hand side and the new strategic objective of “reduction of product 
complexity” is on the right-hand side. Performance measurements are then 
connected to the strategic objectives, as they should link these to the operational 
decision processes of project management. Connected to the strategic objectives in 
place are financial and non-financial performance measurements; connected to the 
new strategic objectives is the non-financial performance measurement “number 
Stage 1: Before introduction of new strategic objective “reduction 
of product complexity"
Stage 2: New strategic objective “reduction of product complexity" 
translated into non-financial measure  “number of parts”
Stage 3: New strategic objective “ reduction of product complexity" translated 











































of parts”. All performance measurements are connected to project management 
which then links alternatives to the project through decisions based on 
measurements.  
 
The alternatives, proposed by engineering, represent product alternatives that 
are/get measured 40. The arrows represent the decisions that are either made 
around financial IRR calculations (bold arrow) or non-financial (dotted arrow) 
performance measurements. As discussed in the empirics, decisions were mostly 
made around IRR calculations; the bold arrow illustrates the choice of the product 
alternative. At times decisions were made around the other non-financial 
performance measurements, which are shown with the dotted arrow. 
 
5.1.6.1 Problematisation through connecting things 
 
The basis of the initiative for reducing product complexity were efficiency 
improvements, efficient design and enhanced processes as strategic objectives. A 
new actor, the consulting firm, problematised the issue of product complexity and 
made it a strategic objective. Arguing that product complexity had grown 
relatively higher than sales and profit and through benchmarking competitors, two 
arguments were calculated for the interessement of the executive committee 
enrolling them into the issue of reduction of product complexity. Sales and profit, 
both being strategic objectives and inputs of the performance measurement IRR 
calculation, were used to demonstrate that product complexity (in part numbers) 
                                                 
40 The proposed alternatives are different technological solutions for a specific problem. Alternative II in this figure is the one 
that has a positive business case with the highest rate of return and no critical technological issues. Alternative III is an 
alternative with strong importance on non-financial measurements such as weight, CO2, or quality and no critical or negative 
business case. In both alternatives the number of parts may be critical. This is shown in Alternative IV which becomes the one 
with the highest rate of return when the part numbers become monetised. Alternative IV is thus chosen when the price tag is 
included in the business case and product complexity is incorporated as a cost driver. Alternatives I and V both neither have the 
highest rate of return (with or without price tag) nor are these alternatives with critical technological solutions. The decision 
process and the alternatives are further described in the next sections. 
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had grown relatively higher. This calculation provided the initiative for a new 
strategic objective (and thus for change) based on existing strategic objectives 
directly (efficiency improvements), and performance measurements (IRR 
calculation) indirectly. A calculation was here mobilised for problematisation 
(compare short-/long-translations, Mouritsen et al., 2009). The process of 
calculation mobilised existing strategic objectives towards the issue of reduction 
of product complexity and drew the first connection between the performance 
measurement and the strategic objective.  
 
Strategic objectives become measured and mobilised in and through calculations. 
Connections between activities across the value chain and strategic priorities are to 
be made visible (Nanni et al., 1992; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993) to maintain or 
alter patterns in organisational activities (Otley, 1999; Simons, 1995). Thus, 
calculations are strong actors in the process of problematisation in which other 
actors’ identities and links are described and determined. Part numbers, projects, 
profitability, sales and competitors were subsummarised in a calculation that 
proplematised the issue of product complexity. 
 
5.1.6.2 Boundaries for new performance measurements – Existing links of 
performance measurements 
 
Depending on the context a measurement defines for itself, it can have more or 
less influence on the links between actors and intermediaries. Furthermore, a 
measurement can gain or lose influence in certain stages of time. Within the 
choice process in the product complexity case, the first proposition41 was to 
establish a performance measurement that measured the number of parts and 
                                                 
41 As Latour (1999) described it, propositions are occasions given to different entities to enter in contact. They can be found in 




related them to a target. The connection towards the strategic objective was clearly 
expressed through the enumeration of parts and through striving to control the 
absolute amount of parts. Used in the problematisation, part numbers (in relation 
to profitability and sales) became a non-financial performance measurement (as 
illustrated in stage 2 in figure 3). Thus, the design of the performance 
measurement was dependant on the calculation used in the problematisation and 
directly linked to it. As there was no impact regarding the decisions on product 
alternatives, the arrows did not change42. The measures that were already in place 
were stronger propositions and lasted throughout stage 2; while the performance 
measurement of product complexity (number of parts) did not have an influencing 
position. Thus, alternatives with a high amount of part numbers were still chosen 
because these had either the business case with the highest rate of return 
(Alterative II), or strong importance on other non-financial dimensions such as 
weight or CO2 (Alternative III).  
 
As shown in the product complexity case, the mobilisation through the 
performance measurement failed due to several reasons. First, the performance 
measurement of number of parts was subject to existing performance 
measurements. This means, secondly, that the new performance measurement 
could not enrol all actors: as value and cost were often jeopardised by managing 
the reduction of product complexity. This was expressed in business case 
calculations (IRR) that evaluated product complexity reduction measures. With 
the new performance measurement of number of parts the decision circle had to 
incorporate one more dimension into their decision. Managers were provided with 
the number of parts that were generated additionally with the product decisions, 
and were provided with an overall target per car. The decision circle had problems 
                                                 
42 I created two dots of non-financial performance measurements and “number of parts” to show that the existing non-financial 
performance measurements had a certain impact on decisions on product alternatives, whereas the “arriving” performance 
measurement of number of parts had none. 
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deciding product relevant options, as business cases (IRR calculations) were often 
negative and thus other performance measurements more important. Thirdly, 
although reduction of product complexity was targeted and measured in number of 
parts, the information received was more important than the action towards 
reaching the target (see Booker, Drake, Heitger, 2007, p. 35). Conflicting targets 
and the information in the decision circles were thus prioritised in favour of 
existing performance measurements and not of reduction of product complexity. 
The fit of performance measurements in development networks thus depends, not 
on the attributes of a measurement itself, (e.g. Malina and Selto, 2004) but on the 
links with other, existing performance measurements. 
 
Managers were enrolled and agreed upon the reduction of product complexity; 
however, the strategic objective could not be mobilised in the product 
development network. Decision making and choosing between alternatives may 
here become a problem through multiple and new measurements because 
managers do not know “the tradeoffs between the multiple measures, they cannot 
know whether they are becoming better off” (Jensen, 2002, p. 249). However, 
conflicts and trade-offs shaped the decision processes as they generated cross-
functionality, shared outcomes and new alternatives as discussed in chapter 5.1.5.2 
(e.g. Simons, 1995, Kaplan and Norton, 1996). 
 
5.1.6.3 Mobilisation – Fitting with existing performance measurements 
 
The mobilisation of the strategic objective reduction of product complexity was in 
this case dependant on the existing performance measurement (IRR calculation). 
The information that was provided to management in the form of additional part 
numbers was not used for the decisions as the IRR calculations were still 
considered a strong basis for decisions. Steering the product development through 
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IRR calculations should lead to higher long-term profitability of the organisation. 
In stage 3 (Figure 3) it is illustrated how the new strategic objective reduction of 
product complexity was transformed through “understanding the complexity of a 
car as cost”. The initiative decided to “adequately incorporate” product complexity 
into IRR calculations. It changed the outcome of decisions without changing the 
performance measurement system in place (visualised in Figure 3 through the 
arrow going from alternative II to alternative IV). To mobilise the strategic 
objective, product complexity was calculated as cost: to become part of the 
performance measurement IRR calculations and to become comparable with other 
financial measures. A strong composite goal of all actors was, prior and 
throughout the performance measurement IRR calculations, understood as cost; 
product complexity became part of that goal, becoming displaced from the 
previous definition of the number of parts. The strategic objective was translated 
by being displaced and mobilised together at the same time and space as IRR 
calculations (Callon, 1986). Thus, it is not the goals and performance 
measurements of the product development network that were different from the 
original ones, but through product complexity being integrated into an existing 
goal (IRR calculations), it was translated into action. 
 
The extent and type of change may depend on the performance measurements in 
place and their working links. Existing performance measurements might have a 
position that can be used by new strategic elements. In this case the mobilisation 
was enabled through monetising. In place performance measurements thus have an 
effect on extent and type of change within PMS, as they already have a position 
and links that can be used by new strategic objectives. The constellation of the 
propositions in place thus had an effect on the mobilisation of the new strategic 
objective as first, the propositions in place (time dimension) were stronger in the 
network than the first proposition of product complexity (non-financial measures) 
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and secondly, the powerful actor financial measurement had an impact on the 
choice of the second proposition (the monetisation of complexity). The goal of 
profitability through IRR calculations was used as a mobiliser of the strategic 
objective product complexity for altering product decisions. As Malina and Selto 
(2004, p. 66) stated, the use of performance measurements is influenced by the 
relation of “performance measurements (e.g., some non-financial measures) that 
cannot be measured or audited as objectively or accurately as financial measures.” 
Rather than seeing the accounting function responsible for influencing the choice 
of performance measurements (e.g. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998), it is the 
position of the IRR calculation and the context it creates that contributes to the 
development of the performance measurement. 
 
There may, on the one hand, be limitations to financial management control 
models (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Lynch and Cross, 1991; Epstein, Kumar 
and Westbroek, 2000); however, if the constellation of the PMS has an influence 
towards financial measurements, an organisation may use financial measurements 
to mobilise strategic objectives into its operations by using financial management 
control. More generally, existing performance measurements may provide a space 
for new strategic objectives by displaying goals. Thus, it is not a question of the 
design or the use of attributes (Malina and Selto, 2004) of performance 
measurements, but of the contexts they create and act in. Accuracy is not tied to 
the performance measurement itself but calculations and evaluations within 
existing contexts may determine whether they are mobilised and whether strategic 
objectives are mobilised. Furthermore, achieving a balanced set of strategic 
priorities through balancing decisions (Lynch and Cross, 1992; Nanni et al., 1990) 




5.1.6.4 The “imperfection” of the price tag 
 
The price tag was still in discussion as there were some actors in the network that 
saw the performance measurements as “logically calculated”, and other actors that 
did not agree on the calculation or the principle of monetisation itself. Although 
the adequacy of the price tag may be discussable and was discussed in the 
complexity case, the method of incorporating the price tag in calculations reduced 
uncertainty in decision processes and was “sufficiently simple that the product 
engineers understand it immediately” (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998, p. 217). Product 
complexity became present in product decisions and comparable to other financial 
dimensions. But the monetisation did not only become present in calculations, but 
also in the product development network of head-engineers, at the very beginning 
of a construction and development process. It altered the way alternatives were 
generated and avoided imminent complexity from the onset. It sensitised the 
product development network to reducing the complexity of their products. 
 
Adequacy of measurements is thus not defined by the design of the measurement 
itself (Malina and Selto, 2004) but by the way the measurement is used. Through 
being mobilised by the IRR calculation, the price tag had an effect on the 
calculation of cost and value. Number of parts became comparable through being 
monetised. This effect is the reason why the price tag worked on alternative 
product decisions. Product complexity can thus be managed through the 
mobilisation of the price tag. 
 
Although it is not a perfect calculation it is however accepted due to the 
transparency it provides. The use of performance measurements may be thus more 
important than its design. It is the mobilisation which the measurement creates that 
made the strategic objective present in decisions. As long as through this the price 
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tag becomes mobilised, decisions are being altered and the measurement is, so to 
say, functioning; as long as it is mobilised, it is getting managed (e.g. Catasus et 
al., 2007). What comes and goes, what stays, and what develops is to be defined in 
the product development network and through propositions (Callon and Latour, 
1981). As the strategic target stays, the durability of propositions of translation 
depends on the position of actors within the network. For how long measures are 
constructing or even exist depends on when the next actor changes the networks 
and provides another powerful tool to work with. Nonetheless, as not only one 
actor and thus not only one performance measurement is part of the network, 
interacting measurements lead to different propositions. These propositions in turn 
influence the way strategy is inscribed in future measurements and how these 
measurements are visualised. 
 
5.1.7 Conclusion and limitations 
 
Conclusion 
Organisations that introduce new strategic objectives are facing a problem when 
adding new performance dimensions into operations. New measurements that 
strive to implement strategic objectives and to provide management with a basis 
for decision making are interacting and competing with existing measures. The 
studied organisation was struggling with the introduction of a new performance 
measurement that should reflect the direct link to the strategic objective “reduction 
of product complexity”. They overcame this problem by introducing a price tag 
using the IRR calculations to influence the decisions and the output of the product 
development network. In that way, product complexity could speak the language 
of the product development network.  
 
The configuration of performance measurements in place and the tied links were 
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important as they provided a vehicle for transporting the strategic objective. This 
study shows how performance measurements that are already in place influence 
the design and choice of new performance measurements. The choice and 
translation of performance measurements do not only depend on the objective 
itself, but on the network it acts in. Performance measurements in place are 
embedded in information flows and systems, and link relevant parts in the PMS 
and the organisational network. They are much more than intermediaries in this 
case; existing performance measurements act upon the choice of new performance 
measurements and create coherence through the translation process in which 
heterogeneous actors converge (Callon, 1991, p. 144). To what extent a PMS is 
altered or new performance measurements are introduced, and which type or 
configuration of PMS and performance measurements are chosen thus depends on 
the role of performance measurements that are already in place.  
 
The study adds to the literature in that it is not only interesting to focus on 
accuracy and attributes of performance measurements (e.g. Malina and Selto, 
2004; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Lynch and Cross, 1992; Nanni et al., 
1990) but on how they are mobilised and how strategic objectives are translated. 
They mobilise distant places and create the organisational world (Robson, 1992). 
The contexts that performance measurements create in decision-making play an 
important role in the mobilisation and choice of performance measurements 
(Booker, Drake, Heitger, 2007, p. 20). Furthermore, contexts shape the 
configuration and design of new performance measurements. Existing literature 
points to functions or attributes that influence the choice of performance 
measurements, and analyse the links between strategic objectives and the means 
by which the objectives are implemented. Furthermore, it adds to the analysis 
using a framework such as the one of Ferreira and Otley. It is not only the answers 
to the twelve questions that may be important in studying PMS but also the focus 
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of ties and links within the overall organisational network and their relation to 
change: not focusing on a status quo or snapshot, but on the changes and new 
relations that occur throughout the PMS.  
 
Organisations that are facing a strategic change and that are asking for the “most 
appropriate” connection between strategy and control may answer this question by 
using the working links of their in place performance measurements. Theorists and 
practitioners have to take existing actors and ties that may provide the translation 
of new strategic objectives into consideration. 
 
Limitations 
There are two main limitations to this study. First, employment with the company 
may have led to bias and to preoccupation in conducting interviews and choosing 
material. This limitation was addressed by integrating and triangulating all data 
(interviews, participant observations and documents), and via the access I had 
during the study, which might not have been granted to researchers outside the 
company. Secondly, the time for the study limited the analysis of further 








5.2 Paper 2 - Calculating green innovation: creating and exploring 
calculative spaces for innovation and the environment in the automotive 
industry. 
 
This paper analyses how cost, value and the environment are calculated 
in innovation processes, focusing on the specific calculations that 
translate “green” concerns, functions and technologies into cost and 
value. Specifically, the study analyses how a medium sized European car 
manufacturer (Automotive Company) calculates green options and 
technologies in innovation processes, managed through a comprehensive 
target costing system. The approach is longitudinal and has made use of 
multiple data sources, i.e. interviews, surveys, observations and document 
analysis, to track the development and significance of “green 
calculations”. 
 
The paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the 
literature on environmental management and accounting by analysing 
how greening can be enumerated and affects operational decision making 
and design choices. Secondly, it details, to a larger extent than extant 
literature on target costing and control of innovation, how links and 
relations between cost, greening, value and functionality are established 
in and through calculations. Thirdly, it adds to the literature on control of 
innovation and the making of markets by conceptualising specific modes 
and ways of overcoming perceived calculative limits. These modes entail 
both calculative and social elements and they create and explore 
calculative spaces through attaching, valorising, packaging, imaging, 




Much controversy existed concerning the value, calculability and 
necessity for greening in Automotive Company. The cases illustrate how 
greening, rather than being in opposition to the rationalising force of 
accounting, was in a process of being enrolled and incorporated into 
calculations. This makes greening a much more mundane issue than often 
posited, which on the one hand, may not overthrow established structures 
and values in a post capitalistic, ecological society, but may quite 
contrarily give hope for a greener future through its incorporation into 






The relationship between accounting and the environment (Burritt & Schaltegger, 
2010; Gray 1992; Henri & Journeault, 2008; Perego, 2005), and control of 
innovation (Davila, 2003; Davila & Wouters, 2004; Jørgensen & Messner, 2010; 
Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen et al. 2009) are two lines of inquiry receiving 
increased attention from academics and practitioners alike. The two subjects are 
important, as the consequences of energy consumption are increasingly perceived 
as generating excessive societal risk and as innovative activities that become more 
important to firms.  
 
These two concerns, management of innovation and the greening of industry, are 
closely interrelated, because green innovation enables the creation of new 
innovative paths with the potential to generate cost reduction opportunities and 
customer value. Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argue that “Managers must start 
to recognise environmental improvement as an economic and competitive 
opportunity, not as an annoying cost or an inevitable threat… the early movers – 
the companies that can see the opportunity first and embrace innovation based 
solutions – will reap major competitive benefits” (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995: 
130).  When organisations explore these new strategic opportunities a shift from 
only regulatory compliance towards the anticipation of regulations, and towards 
the implementation of environmental strategies and policies that go beyond 
compliance can be recognised (e.g. Banerjee, 2001; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Biondi, 
Frey, & Iraldo, 2000; Hart, 1995; Hoffman, 2001; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; 
Porter & van der Linde 1995; Prakash, 2001; Sharma & Henriques, 2005; 
Shrivastava, 1995; Smith, 2003). Firms seeking to achieve competitive advantage 
through greening need to develop connections between greening, innovation and 
cost, if they wish to compare alternatives and optimise cost and value. Greening 
166 
 
therefore becomes another value and function to be calculated in innovation 
networks.  
 
While there is literature investigating how firms should disclose and control 
environmental and social issues and how firms manage and control innovation, 
there is less knowledge about how firms are seeking to represent and calculate 
environmental concerns and about how calculations are carried out within the 
product development process. This may be important because the power of 
environmental concerns within firms’ decision-making processes may increase as 
these concerns are monetised, calculated and rationalised (Kadous, Koonce & 
Towry, 2005). 
 
The literature on target costing and control of innovation is only a partial help 
here. The literature on target costing (Ansari, Bell & Okano, 2007; Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 1999; Ellram 2006) argues that the value of functionalities are 
developed through a process where target costs (equalling market price minus 
profit) are allocated to functions based on customer valuation (using e.g. conjoint 
analysis), and that “expert judgment of engineers” divide the cost of functions into 
components (Ansari, Bell & Okano, 2007: 515).  The literature on target costing 
thus points to translations of non-monetary preferences into a value, which is then 
further divided into functions and components, but how this is specifically 
accomplished is a black box.  In parallel, the general literature on innovation and 
cost (e.g. Jørgensen & Messner, 2010) argues that there are limits to 
representations and calculations, especially in relation to uncertainty (Knight, 
1921) and there are situations where accounting should not be used (Davila and 
Wouters, 2004) or where accounting is limited and other activities are more 




Basing our study on writings in economic sociology (Callon, 1991, Weber, 1980; 
Knight, 1921) and following Callon and Muniesa (2005), a key concern in this 
paper is how calculations meet, translate and supersede perceived uncertainty and 
calculative boundaries and how calculations are performed in innovation processes 
under pressure from environmental and profit concerns, through a process of 
“isolating objects from their context, grouping them in the same frame, 
establishing original relations between them, classifying them and summing” 
(Callon & Muniesa, 2005: 1232). ). More specifically, we investigate the research 
question: 
 
 How is greening calculated in heterogeneous product development 
networks? 
 
This research question helps us understand how greening is integrated into 
innovation calculations, how calculations increase the power of greening and how 
greening as an actor affects the integration and convergence of a product 
development network. We do this through a study of a medium sized European car 
manufacturer, hereafter called “Automotive Company”, focusing on how 
perceived uncertainties and limits to calculability are pushed and superseded so 
that effects of green policies on product development may be calculated. 
 
In the automotive industry, concerns for environment, cost and value intermingle 
and interact in innovation processes because car manufacturers make decisions in 
product development that are responsible for a large part of the world’s CO2 
consumption, and car manufacturers are under pressure to produce more 
environmentally friendly cars, whilst generating adequate profits.  The industry is 
furthermore one of the prime examples of the use of target costing, making 
Automotive Company a good site for studying how greening is calculated. 
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Automotive Company is renowned for its focus on corporate social responsibility 
and has generated large profits for many years. Yet, margins have recently been 
under pressure and the Company has therefore sought to control cost in 
development through the instalment of an improved target costing process. We 
have studied Automotive Company in a longitudinal study, where one of the 
authors was an active participant in the calculation of cost and value of 
(environmentally friendly) functions and components, we have had full access to 
all relevant documents, interviewed key respondents in the firm and performed a 
short survey to test views on the relationship between calculations and greening.  
 
The paper seeks to develop three contributions. First, we contribute to the 
literature on environmental management and accounting through illustrating how 
links between innovation, the environment, competitiveness and cost are 
established and how through this calculations of greening become embedded in 
decision making processes. Secondly, we contribute to the literature on control of 
innovation and target costing: by, analysing and theorising how value and cost for 
specific functions and components are established through the creation and 
exploration of calculative spaces. Thirdly, we add to the increasing literature on 
the mechanics of calculation (Rowe, Birnberg and Shilds, 2008; Kadous et al, 
2005; Lillis, 2002) and the making of markets (Callon & Muniesa, 2005), through 
a more explicit and detailed focus on calculations, theorising how uncertain green 
entities are made calculable, and potentially optimised, through the creation and 
exploration of calculative spaces. We argue that attaching, projecting, valorising, 
packaging, solidifying and imaging are among the modes that facilitate first, how 
greening become embedded in decision making processes, secondly, how value 
and cost for specific functions and components are established and thirdly, how 
uncertain green entities are made calculable. These modes build on Frank Knight’s 
theorisation concerning ways of meeting uncertainty through focusing on the issue 
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of uncertainty and calculability, and extend it through incorporating a more 
explicit social theorisation and through the suggestion of new categories.  
 
Specifically, we argue that greening in Automotive Company, rather than being a 
purely altruistic, uncertain and incalculable constraint on product development, 
was rationalised through a set of mechanisms and modes of calculation, which 
made it an integrated part of product development networks. Calculating greening 
was a contested subject, as greening was, to some extent, viewed as an 
incalculably and incommensurable item, especially by management accountants 
who choose to be spectators in some calculative processes. The calculations of 
“green” concerns in innovation were thus input to processes that decreased 
convergence in the network. Despite resistance to moving greening from the 
strategic apex to the operational and calculative level, projects succeeded in 
converging the network and calculating green options in innovation projects, 
through innovative processes and modes that helped the firm create and explore 
uncertain and “green” calculative spaces.  
The paper is organised as follows. First, we briefly review the literature on 
accounting and the environment followed by the discussion of the literature on 
cost management in innovation. Secondly, we develop our theoretical perspective, 
drawing on the writings of Knight, Callon, Weber and others on the making of 
markets. Thirdly, we analyse Automotive Company in two distinct ways. The first 
approach in our analysis is to trace the development of CSR and environmental 
concerns in the firm as well as we detail the overall structure and processes of 
calculating and designing the future cost of cars. We end this section with a brief 
questionnaire that we conducted to trace perceptions of greening, innovation, 
customers and calculations. The second approach is to follow modes of 
calculations and to study specific episodes where value, and cost of “green” 
components and functions are calculated. This helps us detail the use of 
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calculative tools and translations of value, cost and environmental concerns. 
Finally, we discuss findings and conclude the paper. 
 
5.2.2 Management Accounting and Environmental Management 
 
Greening is a new value and factor that firms need to account for and translate into 
numbers43. It is envisaged that management accounting may play an important role 
in shaping decisions towards greening. However, the literature argues that there 
are barriers and drawbacks to successfully integrate environmental concerns in 
management accounting processes. Four issues are pertinent. First, companies 
seem to lack experience in “handling environmental issues creatively” (Porter & 
van der Linde, 1995) and performance measures are argued not to be well 
developed. The creation of a working and sophisticated measurement system may 
take time and seems to be problematic. There are “rules of the game” (e.g. 
management accounting functions) that keep the measurements not only from 
being integrated but also from being “invented” (Perego, 2005). Secondly, “true” 
costs and benefits of greening are difficult to estimate. Though costs are somewhat 
calculable based on estimates, profits are more difficult to grasp (e.g. Pedersen and 
Neergaard, 2004). In estimating profit, for example, customer behaviour plays an 
important role. Companies have limited ability to answer the question of 
“willingness to pay” and predict impacts on benefits. Thirdly, the link between 
                                                 
43 Following the call from Gray (1992), studies of accounting and greening have been focusing on determinants or on outcomes 
of environmental accounting and management Some studies of the determinants have been concerned with the underlying 
factors that make organisations disclose their environmental performance (e.g. Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Gray et al., 2001; 
Lehman, 1999; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998) or that make organisations adapt environmental management practices, studies 
of the outcomes have been concerned with the relation of disclosure and environmental and/or financial performance (e.g. Al-
Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes II, 2004; Clarkson, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008) or the relationship between environmental 
management and environmental and economic performance (e.g. Christmann, 2000; Melnyk, Sroufe, & Calantone, 2003; Roy, 
Boiral, & Lagacé, 2001). The approach we take here is different as we are interested in how greening is calculated rather than 




environmental strategy, performance measures and product development may be 
difficult to trace. Bartolomeo et al. (2000) found, by analysing eighty-four 
companies in four countries, that although organisations might claim 
environmental management accounting activity, this often represents only singular 
experimental projects, rather than a systematic and comprehensive approach. 
Fourthly, the existence of an environmental strategy may not be sufficient to 
ensure its implementation (Perego, 2005). Firms face problems integrating 
greening in overall firm objectives, and into calculations and performance 
measurement systems. Similarly, Henri and Journeault (2008) discuss to what 
extent eco-control as the integration of environmental matters within MCS 
influences environmental and economic performance. They distinguish between 
direct effects of eco-control on economic performance and indirect effects through 
environmental performance, and conclude that eco-control has no direct effect on 
economic performance, but indirect effects through enhanced environmental 
performance. From the perspective of organisational structure, for example, 
Fryxell and Vryza (1999) examined the integration between corporate 
environmental departments and other functions such as accounting. They focused 
on most critical areas in the integration process and on the mechanisms of 
integration. They found that environmental projects face difficulties in getting 
acceptance in functions that use monetary measures to evaluate projects, more 
precisely, accounting functions. In relation to this, Harris and Crane (2002) 
discuss how green culture changes organisations and what factors act as barriers or 
facilitators. Professional beliefs, e.g. in accounting functions, emerge as potential 
obstacles as they conflict with dominant green values and activities.  
 
The literature on management accounting and greening thus points to issues of 
integration, between management accounting functions and environmental 
management, as an important element in furthering greening in firms. Firms’ 
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cultures and difficulties in measuring and calculating effects of green policies act 
as a barrier to the acceptance of environmental management within accounting and 
finance functions. Management accounting may restrict green innovation or be 
sidetracked from decision making, due to organisational resistance and 
uncertainties related to the greening of innovation. In such a case management 
accountants may be spectators rather than participants in decision making and 
innovation processes. “Greening” is thus a new, uncertain value that faces 
resistance when incorporated into future product projects and thus into the 
calculations, negotiations and discussions of product development networks. The 
literature however provides little insight into how greening is calculated in product 
development networks and how it affects decision making in industrial 
organisations.  
5.2.3 Target costing, translations and innovation 
 
If greening is to be integrated into the operational processes of firms, it must be 
integrated into the calculations and control systems in product development. The 
literature investigating this has followed two paths. One path is the literature on 
target costing, counting at least 177 articles (Ansari, Bell, & Okano, 2007), the 
other is a more general literature trying to conceptualise how accounting affects 
innovation processes, competencies and organisations. In the following we discuss 
this literature.  
 
Target costing is a system that seeks to plan profits through processes of 
translating value into numbers and redesigning products44. Target costing is 
                                                 
44 The literature on target costing is predominantly occupied with advocating for the system and sorting out technical issues (see 
e.g. Ansari et al, 2007; Bernstein & Macias, 2002; Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999; Elramm 2006; Ibusuki & Kaminski, 2007; 
Swenson et al. 2003). However, a few studies look into wider effects and Mouritsen et al. (2001) e.g. found that the 
implementation of target costing and outsourcing of production had effects on the strategy of their case firm. Carlsson-Wahl et 
al. (2009) examined what happens when the hierarchically oriented target costing system is inserted into an uncertain and 
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argued to be important because key decisions about product design, 
manufacturing, sourcing and distribution are made, which may determine as much 
as 70-80% of a product’s lifecycle cost. The basic mechanics of the system is a 
process of allocation or assignment of cost and value to functions and to 
components. Target costs for a product are found by deducting a target profit from 
the market price and target cost (allowable cost), and are then allocated to 
functions based on perceived customer value. This is followed by a process where 
target cost (allowable cost) for functions is allocated to specific components. Cost 
targets are compared to estimated costs of production and development and hence 
problem functions and components are identified. Target costing is thus a system 
that involves several translations from overall customer preferences to product 
value to function/feature value and to component value. Target costing thus seeks 
to control and calculate uncertainty through a series of translations that ends up 
consisting of clear and unambiguous targets that can be compared to current cost 
levels. 
 
The literature on target costing argues that two translations are especially difficult. 
First, the customer valuation of a feature must be estimated using conjoint analysis 
or Likert Scales (Ansari et al., 2007). Bernstein and Macias (2002) illustrate how 
discrete choice analysis (a variant of conjoint analysis) can be used to generate 
customer valuation of specific attributes in a product through quantitative testing 
of product attributes, where a software program pairs attributes, and respondents 
choose a product.  In this way, ideas about customer preferences can be translated 
into a concrete valuation of attributes, features, functions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
interactive world. They argue that target costing defines problems that development should solve. The solution of problems 
however happens in an interactive mode involving suppliers and sub suppliers.  
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The second translation or assignment of value has to do with estimating how much 
several different components contribute to the value of a function. Ansari et al 
2007 argue, “how engineers or product engineers distribute the relative importance 
that the customer places on a feature, such as safety into product components like 
brakes or seat belts is largely judgmental” (p. 515). Thus, translation is key to 
understanding how target costing works, and both techniques and judgements are 
important. There is however little knowledge of how these translations and 
assignments of cost and value to functions and components are performed in 
actual innovation processes.  
 
In the more general literature on control of innovation (Davila, 2003; Davila & 
Wouters, 2004; Davila & Forster 2005; 2007), control and innovation are often 
conceptualised as two opposing objectives. On the one hand, the accounting 
literature typically argues for the relevance of control in innovative organisations, 
e.g. departing in Simons’ finding that prospectors rely more heavily on 
management control (Simons, 1987), the literature however also focuses on the 
issue of how and when accounting should be supplanted by other concerns. Davila 
(2003) investigated the relationship between short term economic incentives and 
performance of development processes and found a positive relationship between 
the use of short term economic incentives and project performance in situations 
where the project group faces low levels of uncertainty, and a negative 
relationship between performance and short term economic incentives when 
uncertainty is high. Davila thus found a U-shaped relationship between short term 
economic incentives, uncertainty and performance. In a study of different types of 
translations (short and long), Mouritsen et al. (2009) found that the contradiction 
between innovation and control somewhat dissolves by arguing that long 
translations create contexts for innovation (i.e. control systems add to innovation 
through the effects on the innovation strategy). Jørgensen and Messner (2009) 
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illustrate how their case firm was strongly committed to an “enabling form of 
control” based on flexibility, transparency and repair actions that facilitated search 
processes and made room for experimentation and errors. The approach with 
enabling controls however was problematic in relation to the implementation of 
larger strategic changes. In another paper Jørgensen and Messner examine how 
accounting affects new product development activities, arguing that accounting in 
some cases works as “rules and a general understanding”, (see Schatzki, 1996; 
2002), it becomes a powerful means that allows managers to move forward despite 
high degrees of complexity and uncertainty”. (Jørgensen & Messner, 2010, p. 185; 
see also Ahrens & Chapman, 2007), while in other cases, the “representational 
limits of accounting” (Jørgensen & Messner, 2010, p. 185) made strategising more 
important. Control, therefore, may both enable and constrain innovation and the 
literature argues that there may be limits to the use of accounting in innovation, 
especially when uncertainty is high.   
 
The literature on target costing, and on innovation and control thus points to 
several important and interesting issues. The role of management accounting in 
innovation is contested; it may be unable to inform decision makers in situations 
of high uncertainty and the management accounting systems used may decrease 
uncertainty through calculations translating cost and value. In the following we 
theorise on these issues. 
5.2.4 Calculations, uncertainty and networks 
 
Greening and innovation are uncertain activities because firms have limited 
knowledge of the translations and relations between greening, innovation and 
customer preferences. The relation between accounting, greening and innovation 
may therefore be conceptualised as a problem of measurability or calculability of 
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new green functions, options and technologies. Frank Knight (1921) analysed the 
problem of measurability or calculability in his work on risk, uncertainty and 
profit, arguing that “calculability” of economic situations (probability situations) 
can be divided into three groups. The first group is a priori probability, which is 
absolute certainty about calculations based on “Absolutely homogeneous 
classification of instances completely identical” (Knight, 1921, p. 224). A priori 
probability is distinguished from the second category of calculability (statistical 
probability) through the latter’s reference to empirical datum. Knight illustrates 
this through the following example: “an illustration of the first probability we may 
take throwing a perfect die. If the die is really perfect and known to be so, it would 
be merely ridiculous to undertake to throw it a few hundred thousand times to 
ascertain the probability of its resting on one face or another. And even if the 
experiment were performed, the result of it would not be accepted as throwing any 
light on the actual probability.” (Knight, 1921, p. 215). This first form probably 
cannot be found in calculations of green innovations, whereas the latter is 
dependent on knowledge and systems in place within the firm.  The third form 
consists of estimates, and here “there is no valid basis of any kind for classifying 
instances” (Knight, 1921, p. 225). This last form is what characterises true 
uncertainty and what, in Knight’s discussion, is the basis of profits, where the two 
other types of probability are risks that are less problematic to deal with for 
business. Knight further argues that risk is more objective, whereas uncertainty is 





While Knight analyses the three forms and uncertainty and risk as distinct forms, 
he argues that uncertainty can be managed and made calculable through various 
means: “It goes without saying that rational conduct strives to reduce to a 
minimum the uncertainties involved in adapting means to ends... In attempting to 
act "intelligently" we are attempting to secure adaptation, which means foresight, 
as perfect as possible” (Knight, 1921, p. 238). We therefore suggest that 
calculability refers to the extent to which calculations are believed to be true 
representations of the object that is calculated. 
 
Therefore, an important question is how firms seek to reduce uncertainty and 
thereby increase the “calculability” of greening.  Knight argues that there are six 
ways of dealing with uncertainty 1) grouping, where the key issue is the 
homogeneity of classes 2) specialisation, in order to facilitate judgment 3) control 
of the future, e.g. through the use of marketing to manipulate the future 4) 
increased power of prediction gaining better knowledge of the future through e.g. 
outside experts 5) diffusion of uncertainty and risk on more people/firms to 
minimise consequences and 6) avoiding or staying out of uncertain business. In 
our treatment 5) and 6) are generally irrelevant and 2) is related to the functional 
specialisation within the firm, this makes consolidation and grouping, increased 
prediction and controlling the future key ways of addressing uncertainty for firms 
and individuals attempting to “act intelligently” in the face of uncertainty.  
 
The calculation of green policies may move ecological concerns from the realm of 
values (and estimates) to the realm of instrumentally rational actions and 
calculations. The calculation of green policies is therefore related to 
rationalisation, because accounting and calculation is an impetus to rationalisation: 
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“All rational calculation and double entry bookkeeping, [insert authors] 
Through the system of accounts creates a fiction of exchange 
relationships between different departments or individuals or accounts 
which enables the optimal control of  the profitability of  all alternatives 
and options. The investment calculation in the most formally rational 
mode presupposes fight between people... In rational enterprises all 
alternatives are calculated with estimated profitability as the target.” 
(Weber, 1980, p. 49 & p. 58) 
Calculation is at the core of (rational) firms’ effort to improve profitability. In 
Weber´s groundbreaking work, calculations are a key pillar and impetus to the 
rationalisation, demystification and modernisation of the world (Habermass, 1999; 
Weber, 1980), as well as producing tensions and potential conflict.  
 
Parallel to Weber’s and Knight’s perspective, current economic sociologists view 
calculability not as a trait of the “thing” in itself but as a process by which things 
become calculable. Calculation of green options in product development may 
therefore be conceptualised as a process of searching and overcoming boundaries 
to calculation, through commensuration (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). In such a 
process, calculation of “green innovation” entails a three-step process (Callon & 
Muniesa, 2005). First, a calculative space has to be created where, based on 
common principles, entities can be moved, arranged and ordered. Secondly, the 
entities are translated and associated with one another. In this process 
Valorimeters are the tools, procedures etc. that translate entities into figures and 
monetary amounts (Caliskan & Callon, 2010, p. 17). This is a process of 
commensuration, which is the “expression or measurement of characteristics 
normally represented by different units according to a common metric” (Espeland 
& Stevens, 1998, p. 315), i.e. a process of grouping and translation of units into a 
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common (monetary) metric. Finally, the calculation is finalised through 
summarising the result. Thus, there are two moves involved in making a 
calculation. First the calculative space has to be created and secondly the entities 
have to be associated, i.e. the calculative space has to be explored through various 
means.  
 
In product development, especially when controlled by target costing, the 
commensuration process involves the coordination of multiple departments, 
groups and relations with customers and suppliers. We therefore choose to 
conceptualise the innovation process as an innovation network that “describe[s] a 
coordinated set of heterogeneous actors which interact more or less successfully to 
develop, produce, distribute and diffuse methods for generating goods and 
services” (Callon, 1991, p. 133). Such networks exhibit varying degrees of 
convergence, which is “the extent to which the processes of translation and its 
circulation of intermediaries leads to agreement” (Callon, 1991, p. 144). A 
network is strongly convergent when it is aligned (i.e. a shared space has been 
created and things are commensurable) and coordinated (i.e. the extent to which 
rules guide interactions). A converging network is not equal to a homogenisation 
of actors, their interests, knowledge and cognition, but is a temporary stabilisation 
of the network around specific approaches to innovation and calculation. In the 
process of aligning and coordinating networks, calculative tools may be important 
because things that act as money “become greatly accessible” (Caliskan & Callon, 
2009, p. 389); their circulation is smoother. It is therefore important to understand 
how entities are valued because such valuation will increase the “power” of the 
entity within the network (see also Kadous et al. 2005).  
 
Controversy is related to the boundaries of calculation and commensuration, and 
these controversies are “good entry points” (Caliskan & Callon, 2009) to 
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understanding the studied innovative network. Calculation is related to boundaries 
because “incommensurables can be vital expressions of core values, signalling to 
people how they should act toward those things. Identities and crucial roles are 
often defined with incommensurable categories” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, p. 
327).  Boundaries of networks have to do with the convergence of a network. A 
boundary is defined in the following way: “an element may be treated as lying 
outside a network if it weakens the alignment and coordination – that is the 
convergence – of the latter when moved into the network (Callon, 1991, p. 149)”.  
 
In product development, calculation has traditionally been conceptualised as 
limited due to uncertainty and dominance by engineers and other groups 
performing the research and development of products and technologies, and 
greening is loaded with ideological and normative claims about the way 
individuals, organisations and societies should behave. Furthermore, greening may 
be perceived as being in opposition to capitalistic values and modes of operation, 
calculation and rationalisation, perhaps especially among accountants, as 
discussed in previous sections. In such a field, incommensurables are likely to 
surface and to reflect “borderlands between institutions, where what counts as an 
ideal or normal mode of valuing is uncertain, and where proponents of a particular 
mode are entrepreneurial” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, p. 332). Greening may thus 
decrease the alignment and coordination of a network because it may upset the 
coordination (rules) of interaction and calculation. Furthermore, greening may 
decrease alignment; when greening crosses the boundaries of the innovation 
network and enters into a calculative process, if, the translation of greening into 
monetary scales is viewed and interpreted as imperfect or arbitrary. Hence, if 
greening trespasses boundaries to calculations it may weaken the alignment and 
coordination of the network. This is especially the case if calculations are 
considered mere estimates by organisational participants, i.e. if greening is 
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considered to have low “calculability”. Investigating boundaries and conflicts 
about calculation is therefore an interesting focus when studying the calculation of 
green policies.  
 
An innovation network seeking to incorporate and calculate environmental 
concerns in an innovation process may then experience decreased convergence 
(i.e. alignment and coordination) and it may succeed when the calculative tools 
create “accounting fictions” that valorise the environment, making it subject to the 
rationalising regime of accounting, and when they create convergence among 
diverse actors through calculations and through the formation of a bottom line. 
This process is likely to make incommensurables as well as controversies surface, 
as novel ways of calculating and valorising emerge. In this paper we therefore 
investigate “how is greening calculated in heterogeneous product development 
networks”. We pursue this analysis by looking into the following four factors: 
 
Diversity and heterogeneity: the divergence in views on calculations and 
greening between groups and nodes in the organisation. Controversies and 
uncertainty are sources of social constructions (Callon, 1986, p. 199). 
Heterogeneity is one important aspect as instead of becoming homogeneous, 
networks are convergent through the alignment and coordination of heterogeneous 
actors (Callon, 1986).  Heterogeneity is thus the starting point of an investigation 
of an innovation network. Specific questioning related to greening would be, for 
example, how much weight do groups attribute greening; is it more important than 
other competitive factors and should it be calculated?  
 
Incommensurables and boundaries: the heterogeneity of views between groups 
is likely to mark boundaries to calculations. Disruption may appear; only where 
trials of strength are modified (Latour, 1987, p.93) something new can be built. 
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Boundaries are here important as they mark trials of strength. Only when they 
become surpassed can new things be created and innovation networks be built. 
These boundaries are related to professional identities and mark the groups’ 
perceptions of the extent to which the item to be calculated (greening) is 
calculable. Is greening outside the boundary of an innovation network’s 
calculative processes, i.e. is it considered strategic?  
 
Calculations:  following Millers call not to treat accounting “in a somewhat 
undifferentiated manner, and without reference to broader issues of the governing 
of economic life” (Miller, 2008, p. 52), a key concern is the specific calculations 
and processes in which calculation, innovation and greening meet. Following the 
perspective of Knight (1921), focusing on consolidation and grouping, increased 
prediction and controlling of the future, the question is, how do actors meet the 
uncertainty of greening moving on a scale of “calculability” from “estimates” 
towards empirical, statistical probability? Which modes of creating and exploring 
calculative spaces facilitate this move?  
 
Convergence (Alignment and coordination): the heterogeneous networks may 
converge through calculations and other means that enable networks to stabilise 
and settle on specific priorities and arrangements. This process defines how the 
world is built and it is explained by actors (Callon, 1986).  Diverse and 
heterogeneous goals become one composite goal. The result is action which “is a 
property of associated entities” (Latour, 1999, p. 182). This does not eliminate 
diversity but enables the network to function despite heterogeneity and diversity. 
The important questions are, will incorporation of greening into the calculative 
process decrease convergence (alignment and coordination) of the network? Does 
the network succeed in converging on greening and how does this occur? 
183 
 
5.2.5 Research methods 
 
Our focus on cost, value and the environment within innovation processes guided 
the assembly of our empirical material and our data collection methods. In our 
analysis we chose not to analyse how production works to implement green 
policies (e.g. minimising wastewater), as we were mainly interested in how 
innovation and greening is connected in calculations related to products. 
Furthermore, Automotive Company has been an industry leader in relation to the 
greening of production for many years and we therefore considered production to 
be a less controversial and interesting research area.  
Studying Automotive Company for a period of two years, we focused strongly on 
episodes in which product decisions were prepared and generated, and in which 
innovation and the environment played an important role. To discover and 
understand these episodes we first had to understand the development of greening 
in Automotive Company, the product development network and the general ways 
in which calculations are performed within the product development network. 
Following this general empirical analysis we found three interesting empirical 
objects or embedded cases (Yin, 1994) that were consider important in the PDN. 
The first case analyses how weight reduction measures are calculated in the 
product development network, the second case focuses on the design and 
calculation of aerodynamic features. The third case looks at the development and 
incorporation of a new lighting technology in several product lines.  
 
All three cases cover a broad range of issues in relation to the calculation of 
greening. We chose cases dealing with different issues and thus providing diverse 
angles of how greening affects the PDN. The case on weight deals with how a 
general function, criterion and performance measure – which by the public is 
perceived to correlate with environmental friendliness – are implemented and 
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calculated in specific projects. Aerodynamics also cuts across multiple car projects 
and is a function and criterion that strongly affects fuel consumption and that is 
heavily influenced by design. The third case of lighting technology also cuts 
across innovation projects and is an example of how a new, greener technology 
enters into calculations and car projects. Thus, we choose not to follow the 
development of a specific car, as the development and target costing processes in 
Automotive Company have a lateral focus across different models and projects 
(see also Hopwood, 1996). The diversity of the cases enables us to get a more 
complete picture of the different modes of calculation in Automotive Company. 
We found that all three cases were highly concerned with the issue of greening 
and innovation as new product specifications had to be decided and developed. 
The choice of the embedded cases was also, to some extent, influenced by the time 
available for our study. We were able to observe participants and decisions only 
within the two years of our study. 
5.2.5.1 Data collection methods and analysis 
 
The paper has used multiple methods for gathering data on the calculation of green 
issues in Automotive Company.  First, we conducted 28 interviews with key 
respondents in the firm (see Appendix 5), ranging from the director responsible for 
CSR, to engineers located within product development. Secondly, we undertook 
participant observation, as the second author had been employed in the department 
of product development and innovation controlling in Automotive Company45. 
                                                 
45 The involvement of the second author in the case company presented both challenges and advantages to the research process. 
On the one hand, it facilitated data collection through making cases relevant to the problem at hand readily available and by 
being able to pinpoint key respondents in processes. Furthermore, we had complete access to a setting that is probably 
inaccessible to researchers, not involved in the case firm, because of confidentiality of innovation within Automotive Company. 
On the other hand, engagement may lead to bias and low reliability of the collected data, and problems in conducting an 
interview seeking to probe and develop meaning (Hermanowicz, 2002). In order to minimise the risk of biased data collection 
and analysis and to improve the reliability of the collected data, the first author conducted 11 interviews with 14 people (one 
interview was a group interview with four participants). 
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Thirdly, we had access to all relevant documents. Fourthly, we conducted a 
questionnaire with 52 respondents from R&D, finance and marketing. 
The chosen approach of using multiple data collection methods (survey, 
documents, observation and interviews) and through letting both authors interview 
respondents, enabled the use of triangulation between the different data sources. 
This enhances reliability and validity of findings (Yin, 1994), and supported the 
authors in making firm inferences based on the triangulation. Our impression from 
interviews and observations, for instance, was that accounting was more sceptical 
towards the calculability of greening, which was then confirmed in our survey. 
Furthermore, the interviews were coded using thematic and pattern codes (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994), and great care was taken in the analysis in order to improve 
reliability and validity of the analysis. 
 
All interviews except seven were recorded and transcribed verbatim. One 
interview was not transcribed as the interview mainly focused on a development 
project of natural gas, which was not the focus of the final analysis.  The other six 
interviews were not recorded due to reluctance of the respondents and because it 
was deemed inappropriate. However, these have served as background knowledge. 
The unwillingness by some respondents to be recorded is an indication of the 
controversial nature of the calculation of green issues in Automotive Company. 
The few instances where quotes were used from these interviews are based on 
direct typing of quotes during the interview.  
 
Company material, such as meeting minutes, presentations and documents about 
methods and processes could be accessed. In relation to the cases, we chose 
materials of key decisions to follow the actors that were involved in the decision 
process. Furthermore, where possible, we observed meetings in which decisions 
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were either prepared, or taken, in order to get a deeper understanding of the 
specific cases, their network and the relations.  
 
Following the analysis of our empirical material we found that the diverse views 
on greening, calculation and innovation played an important role in the way 
calculations were designed and conducted, decisions taken and processes built. If 
heterogeneous actors become aligned through calculation (Callon, 1991), it is 
important to understand their views on relevant “entities” in the study, i.e. 
greening, calculation and innovation. Therefore, we also conducted a survey. 
 
We wanted to increase our understanding of the positions of how first, the groups 
(accounting, R&D and marketing) view greening in relation to market and 
customer preferences and secondly, how the different groups see calculations in 
relation to decisions about product features, design etcetera. We designed a 
questionnaire with seven statements (see Appendix 6). The focus on groups is 
caused by the cross functional nature of product development in Automotive 
Company. The different groups were represented and had specific “functions” 
within the process. 
 
The interviewees should evaluate these statements with a five-point, Likert scale 
ranging from “totally agree” (“5”) to “totally disagree”(“1”). We derived the 
statements from the following observations. Statements 1-3 were derived from our 
observations in discussions about greening and customer preferences. We 
experienced that R&D typically view brand values and typical technological 
performance attributes as being highly important to customers, whereas marketing 
and finance had rather different views on customer preferences, greening and 
technical attributes. Furthermore, as Automotive Company mostly offers models 
in the premium, upper price level we see cost of ownership and price as an 
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interesting factor to be compared with greening. Statement 4 is based on 
interesting findings in the aerodynamics case and due to the fact that design is a 
key competitive parameter for Automotive Company. Statements 5-7 focus on 
calculations and their perception within the PDN in relation to general product 
decisions, product innovation and product greening. These three items are not 
mutually exclusive. However, they reflect certain categories of different product 
related decisions. These questions were important in order to test and understand 
the different views on calculations within the PDN and the perceptions of the three 
items in relation to their calculability. 
 
The questionnaire was conducted with employees from the operational level of the 
PDN. They were among the participants of the cross functional teams, and were 
highly involved in the stage-gate through which every product related decision had 
to pass, and gave recommendations to the technical decision circles of the 
projects. We chose participants that were concerned with cases of product related 
decisions that had to do with either CO2 measures, weight reduction measures, 
products labelled internally as “innovation” or environmental materials. The 
questionnaire was given to random respondents either by e-mail or in person and 
was conducted by the second author over a period of two months. The respondents 
were informed that their answers were randomly mixed after typing them in and 
that anonymity was guaranteed in order to minimise influence and bias. We aimed 
for 20 respondents per section, as capacity and time to pass and collect the 
questionnaire were scarce. We received 19 answers from finance, 17 from R&D, 
and 17 from marketing.  
 
We chose to do a Pearson Chi Square test to determine if the means of the 
discriminant values of the groups are different from each other and thus, to test for 
significant differences in distributions between groups (e.g. Backhaus, Erichson, 
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Plinke, & Weiber, 2005, p. 155-228, p. 700). Our hypothesis is that there are big 
differences between groups, so we have generally interpreted significant results as 
being indicative of differences in means between groups. However, in a few cases 
standard deviations were highly different, whereas means where equal. Therefore 
we conducted the Chi Square test pair-wise in order to indicate which groups do 
not differ. 
 
5.2.6 Empirical analysis 
5.2.6.1 Target costing and the product development network 
 
In Automotive Company the product development network is concerned with the 
development of car projects and their integration with production. The product 
development network is a complex network of constituents of all areas of the 
organisation and it is managed through the target costing process. Among the 
different interests within the product development network, cost, quality, time, 
weight, CO2, customer value, manufacturing, social and environmental issues, 
capacity and law are the most important factors. With every project, R&D 
departments were responsible for specific parts (e.g. fuel system or seats) and 
were concerned with general factors, such as weight or aerodynamics.  There are 
5,000 to 10,00046 employed in the R&D centre of which approximately 3% are 
product development controllers in the finance department. The development 
process – guided by the target costing system – is divided into several stages that 
can roughly be divided into a strategy stage, a conceptual stage and a serial 
development stage. The entire process takes about five years. 
 
  
                                                 
46 Exact figures disguised for confidentiality, the number of employees is within the range. 
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In the strategy stage, the rough design concept of the car is evaluated based on 
market screening, and the platform and production strategy. Furthermore, based on 
an initial, rough estimation, a first business case of the complete project is 
calculated. At the end of this stage the project is confirmed based on the defined 
parameters.  
 
In the concept stage, the concept is developed and verified through cost 
calculations and the assessment in terms of all relevant parameters. At this stage, 
focus is on evaluating alternatives and finding the right solutions to balance 
market and cost views with all relevant factors, including environmental impacts. 
At the end of this stage, the concept with its design and features is validated and 
confirmed and the target achievement of all relevant dimensions (e.g. cost, quality, 
weight, CO2) is confirmed.  Furthermore, most of the suppliers – who are 
accountable for approximately 80% of costs – are nominated at this stage, and 
they initiate co-development with the PDN. As this is the stage at which the 
calculations take place and when the main product decisions are taken, we focused 
on it in the analysis of our empirical material. 
The development of targets is carried out in the following way. A top down target 
(in $/car), based on investments, market price, volume and ROI, is generated for 
each project for the basic model.  This target is not assigned to components. It is 
an overall target for one project that should be reached on an overall level per car, 
and in which customer value is implicitly incorporated. Besides generating a top 
down target, another target is derived in order to reach the benchmarked level of 
components in the industry. This bottom up target estimates future efficiency 
measures in production and construction, and also anticipates the access to new 
and emerging markets. The bottom up target is calculated, per component, by the 
finance section together with cost engineers, and is derived based on the cost of 
the predecessor minus a percentage rate of anticipated price improvement within a 
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range of 5%-50%47 in three categories. This rate depends on the product and 
production technology of the components and sourcing opportunities, and is 
derived based on an extensive benchmark analysis. As these component targets are 
derived based on the concept of the predecessor they reflect the same 
functionalities as the predecessor. The gap between the top down target and the 
bottom up target therefore reflects the costs that could be spent based on 
functional differences between predecessor and successor.  Additional 
functionalities and innovations, in the successor compared to the predecessor, 
have to meet the cost represented by the bottom up and the top down target.  
 
The estimated costs of components are matched against both bottom up, and top 
down target, and are generated in cross functional teams consisting of cost 
engineering, development, purchasing, finance and production. The benefit of that 
system is that in the first step, component for component could be analysed and 
optimised to reach the industrial level. At the second step, the differences between 
successor concept and predecessor concept can be optimised to reach the target, 
and additional or removed functions can be weighed against the target and be 
calculated individually. As project management is held accountable for achieving 
both cost targets, it is in their interest to optimise concepts, screen supplier 
markets and find the right functionalities that differentiate the successor from the 
predecessor. The PDN has to find alternatives and ideas and constantly make 
decisions about the concepts and product substance of every single component. 
The ideas and alternatives are generated either in the cross functional teams or in 
the development and research sections. Pressure to reach cost targets and other 
specific targets such as weight, CO2 or quality is mediated through decision 
circles in which problems are discussed and solutions demanded, and for which 
the concepts get calculated. The relevant factors are illustrated in financial as well 
                                                 
47 The specific percentage for each category of components is highly confidential and therefore not revealed.  
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as non-financial measures. All financial measures are incorporated into a business 
case in the form of an IRR/NPV calculation with predicted cash flows. Thus, 
decisions to meet, for example, quality, weight, CO2 or engineered hours are 
always discussed under the aspect of cost and the business case. In these 
discussions, focus is very much on these calculations, as financial targets are 
tough and have to be reached. 
 
At the last stage, the design is frozen, the first prototypes are produced and the 
implementation of the product into the plant is conducted. At the end of this stage, 
the production of the car starts and the project is handed over to serial control and 
steering.  
 
The development process in Automotive Company is thus a complex calculative 
process that involves multiple departments that all have a say in the decision 
making process. The target costing management process heavily influences 
decisions made to the overall concept of the car. In the following we discuss 
greening in Automotive Company, which was increasingly the subject to the target 
costing process.  
 
5.2.6.2 Greening as s strategic and an operational issue in Automotive 
Company 
 
Greening has a long history in Automotive Company. The implementation of 
environmental management into the formal structure was conducted in the 
seventies; the most important changes however have taken place within the last 
two decades. In the new millennium, the company introduced a comprehensive 
sustainability strategy to address the demands of society and the demands of 
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sustainability indexes that had gained more and more attention on stock markets 
and with the general population. The goal is to produce cars that can be produced, 
driven and recycled with minimal negative environmental effects. This goal 
concerns R&D, production, distribution and marketing. These areas are working 
on alternative engine concepts, improvement of existing engine and car concepts, 
recycling and material technologies, and the reduction of energy and water 
consumption in development and production.  
 
The organisation was beginning to see opportunities in proactively introducing 
environmental technologies into their cars to gain a competitive advantage and 
take a leading position in the market, although in the short term they seemed to 
have a negative impact on the financial performance of the organisation. Greening 
of cars had, in most cases, been strategic top down decisions, which had often 
meant losses: 
 
“And normally we decide no car project if we have a negative business 
case. But we decided a lot of projects with a huge minus because the 
board has the responsibility for environmental issues. And we decided all 
electrical and all hydrogen projects. These were decided looking just on 
the reputation of the company. We never earned any money on hydrogen 
cars. It cost us a lot of money. [...] The company always decided very 
responsibly in the last years.” [Manager Mobility Strategy] 
 
In Automotive Company this had been a board issue and the board reviewed 
negative business cases. As the reduction of around a quarter of the emissions was 
decided, there was no emission tax for the customer and thus no financial benefit 




 “When we decided we didn't have any tax. [...]Then we reduced 
emissions by xx%. And there was no financial aspect at that time. There 
was the fear that taxes will maybe come.” [Manager Mobility Strategy] 
 
As some countries and states raised their taxes, the decisions turned out to be 
positive as the customer value of saved customer emission taxes had a positive 
financial impact on the company: 
 
“We had a reduction of return on investment. And now, as we checked 
again it changed because of the European states raising the taxes. Now 
we have a return on investment. Now.” [Manager Mobility Strategy] 
 
Here, the anticipation of regulations and taxes was first an investment with no 
secure return. This was a strategic decision, without substantiating (calculative) 
benefits of initiatives.   
 
Besides customer taxes, fleet taxes for the OEMs were about to be introduced in 
several markets and the overall emissions of the fleet would have an impact on the 
profit and loss statement. The taxes would be due if permitted emissions of the 
fleet were exceeded. With the taxes, Automotive Company generated a price tag 
for CO2 consumption, which was logically derived, based on CO2 fleet taxes 
saved when reducing one gram of CO2 / km. Developing cars with fewer CO2 
emissions would thus, primarily, generate cash flow for the company if the 
investments for the CO2 reduction did not exceed likely tax payments.  
 
Whenever features or technologies had to be decided, the price tag for the CO2 
impact of the feature could be incorporated into the business case. Through this 
measure, often more expensive CO2 reduction features could be calculated 
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alongside the price tag. The introduction of this price tag was thus important for 
generating ideas and incorporating them into the projects:  
 
“[Automotive Company] has to pay a tax if it doesn’t reach a certain 
value with his fleet, so it says, if you are, let me say five grams above this 
value, that means that you have to pay five times x€ per gram multiplied 
with one million cars, the fleet, whatever and then you can see the figure 
is quite big, that is when we say: “No, Automotive Company will not pay 
the taxes. We have a better idea; we take this money and invest it in 
developing new techniques,” and internally we have a regulation from the 
controlling department, saying: “Okay, internally we give you a certain 
figure for one gram and then we call it a CO2 business case,” it is a 
virtual business case, it’s not real money but virtual money but we can 
deal this with internally…That is one way we did it, there are many other 
possible ways. You could argue with the marketing aspect as well but then 
it is hard to get the figures, right?... Who can tell us today, now we have 
CO2 measures in our cars, so that is the reason why we sell two hundred 
thousand vehicles more, nobody knows really. So our way to do it is 
making it with the CO2 taxes, this internal regulation. 
 
Q: Do you think that is a good way to do it? 
 
A: Yes, I think it helps us a lot to do this kind of ranking, that is a ranking 
everybody on the project understands and I think that is a good way. I say 
this because we didn’t have this kind of business case ranking in the past 
and so it was far, far more difficult to reach decisions and to argue and 
all this again: “Are you really sure you need this much money?” 
[Coordinating Developer Performance and CO2] 
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Through the introduction of fleet taxes in the market, and their translation into a 
CO2 price tag, a first step of commensuration of greening in innovation was taken. 
Costs that will be incurred in the future through likely tax payments are now 
incorporated into business cases with effects on the way decisions are negotiated 
and discussed. The price tag entered the regular calculation process and facilitated 
the decision of CO2 reduction measures by using an understandable and 
commensurate price tag in the target costing process. A calculative space for 
greening in innovation projects was created and greening could cross the boundary 
between greening as a strategic element and greening as part of operational, 
calculative processes, without unsettling convergence.  
 
This was, however, just one step Automotive Company took. Before investigating 
the other steps, we investigate the heterogeneity in the product development 
network by measuring different departments’ positions and perceptions in relation 
to greening and calculation. 
 
5.2.6.3 The nodes in the network and their views on the customer, 
strategising and calculation of green policies 
 
As discussed in the method section, we conducted a questionnaire that measures 
the level of differences and views on calculations, greening and innovation. The 
analysis feeds into our qualitative interpretation of the level of heterogeneity in 
PDN and does not reflect a quantitative analysis of hypotheses. Specifically, we 
wanted to increase our understanding of the positions of how the groups 
(accounting, R&D and Marketing) see greening in relation to market and customer 
preferences and secondly, how the different groups see calculations in relation to 




5.2.6.3.1 View on the customer 
 
Concerning statements 1 and 2, we have significant differences among the groups. 
R&D saw traditional brand values (mean = 4.47) and the brand typical and 
technical attributes, such as power (mean = 4.71), as more important to customers 
than buying a product branded and produced in an ecological manner. The means 
from finance (means = 3.95 and 3.16) and marketing (means = 3.94 and 3.82) 
also point in this direction. However, the perception of these statements is 
significantly stronger in R&D. So, while there is heterogeneity in relation to these 
issues the networks agree on greening being less important than traditional brand 
values48; the network is therefore relatively convergent on this issue.  
In statement 3 the cost of ownership and the price for the customer were perceived 
as more important than the environmental friendliness in all three groups (means 
= 3.89, 4.00 & 3.88)49. Thus, developing a cost-efficient car seems to be a more 
important focus of the PDN than developing a “green” car. As environmental 
regulations started to have an effect on the cost of ownership these costs could be 
a lever for the greening of products. Higher cost of ownership would lead to a 
higher cost of retail that would be a measurable number easily incorporated into 
business case calculations. Here, the cost of ownership would be the cause, and 
greening the effect. Increasing regulations and taxes, as well as rising fuel prices, 
would have an impact on product decisions because they are presented as costs 
that could be incorporated into the PDN’s decisions. The network is thus relatively 
homogenous and convergent on this issue. 
  
                                                 
48 Only one respondent scored a 3 indicating indifference, all other respondent in R&D saw technical attributes and traditional 
brand values as more important for the customer than “greening”. 
49 The standard deviation differs between the groups and is much higher in marketing (1,32) than finance (0,32) and R&D 
(0,61). As the pair wise comparison indicates the results are mainly caused by the differences within the group in marketing. 
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Statement 4 shows no significant difference between the groups and both means 
and standard deviations are equivalent. Moreover, a rather strong importance 
(mean=4.47 – 4.71) for the customer that prefers well designed cars over 
environmentally friendly cars. This relates to the perception in Automotive 
Company that design is a key ingredient in Automotive Company’s strong 
competitive position and design has a strong position within the firm. So the 
network is strongly convergent in relation to the importance of design as 
compared to greening. Design could thus be a potential barrier to greening, as will 
be investigated in the aerodynamics case. 
 
5.2.6.3.2 View on calculations 
 
Statement 5 indicates that calculating general product decisions is more important 
than making strategic decisions50. Accounting and finance’s position on 
calculating general product decisions (mean=4.47) is more pronounced than in 
marketing (mean=3.47) and R&D (mean=3.65), which is unsurprising. The drop 
from statement 5 (mean=4.47) to statement 6 (mean=3.42) in accounting and 
finance’s view indicates insecurity of the calculability of innovation, of features 
that haven’t been in place before and whose input data cannot be derived from 
predecessors. Although this is not a strong indication, they differ significantly 
from the position of R&D (mean=2.29) who saw innovation rather as a strategic 
field. With experiencing this conflict, R&D seemed to think of innovation from a 
strategic point of view rather than from a calculative one.  Marketing also sees 
calculation as more important than strategising. So innovations that were being 
calculated with a negative business case generated conflicts within the PDN, and 
the network was relatively divergent and non-aligned on this issue. Marketing and 
                                                 
50 However, in marketing there is a significant within group variance, with a standard deviation of 1.18 compared to 0.51 for 
accounting and finance and 0.61 for R&D. 
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finance needs a bottom line for deciding product innovation, whereas this is less 
important for R&D.  
 
Statement 7 shows a rather interesting result concerning the calculation of green 
product measures. Whereas statement 5 indicates that general product decisions 
should be calculated, statement 7 shows rather that particularly finance points to 
greening as being a strategic, rather than a calculative problem (mean = 2.11). 
R&D and marketing with means of 2.74 and 2.94 respectively are more in doubt 
on this issue. This may be explained by the general belief that the “connection” 
between profit and sustainability is “not clear” as one accountant stated. Because it 
seems that the value of greening itself can hardly be measured directly and can 
only be calculated indirectly in business cases (see aerodynamics and weight 
cases), greening was often viewed critically as a cost with no direct benefit: 
 
“The connection is not really clear to me, it’s a good idea, we have to do 
it but the connection of profit and sustainability is not really clear. There 
is no red line to see. [...] So is this profitable? That’s the question.” 
[Coordinating Controller Car Projects] 
 
Though potentially open minded for innovations and greening, accounting and 
finance disagree the most with statement 7 and they were sometimes sceptical 
towards green solutions, with a strong focus on costs dominating their outlook and 
evaluations. Finance’s very differing view between statement 5 and 7 shows on 
the one hand, how strong the focus is on calculations and on the other hand, that 
greening to some extent is viewed as an incalculable incommensurable, especially 
by accounting. The missing direct and obvious link between product greening and 
the profit/loss statement could be the strongest reason for this, because 
incommensurables mark identities and differences between groups and because 
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making “soft” calculations would undermine the value of objectivity and 
calculation in accounting and finance. Finance saw greening generally as an issue 
that had to be decided strategically top down.  
 
In summation, R&D had more focus on technical features than other departments, 
while all viewed them as more important than greening and the network was 
converging on this issue. Design is a key value for all groups and is deemed much 
more important than greening. Thus, it is a potential barrier to greening. 
Calculation is viewed as more important than strategising in all groups, but even 
more so by innovation controllers. Greening is generally viewed as a factor that 
should be decided on strategic, rather than calculative grounds, though less so in 
R&D. The network was thus divergent, especially on the question of calculation of 
green business cases. In the following we will investigate how the network made 
decisions and calculated green business cases in the heterogeneous product 
development network, focusing on heterogeneity, calculations and 
convergence/calculative boundaries. The first case shows how controversial issues 
(here weight) can be settled by translating them into cost, and how this enables 
decision making and the incorporation of greening in car projects. The second case 
is concerned with aerodynamic features of cars to lower CO2 emissions, and 
represents a case where networks were aligned before decisions were calculated 
and taken. The third case is an example of a new environmental feature to a car, 
which was highly discussed in all sectors because of design, technological, 





5.2.6.4 Cases – Convergence and divergence of networks calculating green 
innovations 
5.2.6.4.1 Case 1 – Price tags for weight reduction 
 
Weight was gaining more attention in Automotive Company because of increased 
public discussions and test articles pointing to heavier cars as being outdated and 
not state-of-the-art. Car magazines wrote more and more about weight in 
comparisons of cars. An engineer stated: 
 
“You can read it in every magazine, in every car comparison. They are 
writing more and more about weight and about heavier cars as not being 
state of the art. We have to do something.” [Coordinating Developer 
Weight]  
 
Weight was increasingly seen as an indicator of the “greenness” of a car. 
Furthermore, weight was important for Automotive Company as weight in future 
electrical vehicles is extremely important for the range of the car (the distance it 
can drive before recharging). In the PDN the weight in kilos of the car was 
therefore set as a top-down, non-financial target. This was derived from the 
predecessor, through benchmark analyses, and technical specifications.  
 
Heterogeneity:  the relationship between weight and the bottom line 
Cost targets were tough and business cases often hindered weight reduction 
measures. Most of the measures generated higher costs because lighter materials, 
such as aluminium or special plastics were more expensive than basic materials. 
Furthermore, the impact single reduction measures had on CO2 emissions, and 
thereby on the bottom line, were barely calculable. Weight reduction options, 
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therefore, in most cases generated higher cost and the calculations argued for a 
dismissal of most of the proposed options. As more and more ideas of weight 
reduction were proposed to the projects, the projects had to have an idea, whether 
these ideas were cost-efficient or not. To overcome the conflict between weight 
and calculative processes, one project started to put a price tag on one kilogram of 
weight. Whenever a weight reduction measure was proposed as an alternative, the 
price tag acted as a monetary parameter to facilitate decisions around weight 
reduction measures. 
 
With a price tag that reflected a cost-benefit-ratio, and thus a certain value for 
project management, business case calculations could theoretically skip decisions 
related to weight and argue for the decision of alternatives based on the weight 
price tag. This, however, generated resistance from finance because weight had no 
direct or measurable effect on the predicted cash flows of the company and thus 
on the profit and loss statement. When product related decisions were taken, 
finance still calculated without the price tag and argued for a negative business 
case. However, as project management still needed to meet the weight target, it 
had to discuss the negative business case of the decision under the aspect of the 
cost-benefit-ratio of the price tag. These discussions took place in the technical 
decision circle and the use of the price tag facilitated the implementation of 
alternatives, lowering the weight of cars. We briefly discuss this in the next 
section. 
 
Calculation: valorising for decisions and the marginalisation of innovation 
controllers:  
Projects started to rank the ideas in each project to evaluate a cost ($) – benefit 
(weight reduction) ratio. With this ranking they got a first idea of how efficient 
reduction measures would be and they got an idea of how much a weight 
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reduction measure might be worth if it had to be decided. The project managers 
derived a price tag (cost [$] per weight reduction [1kg]) based on these rankings. 
As each project manager derived the price tags individually, they differed from 
project to project. Even though the price tags were obviously heavily influenced 
by the weight reduction target, set in the non-financial performance measure; we 
could not find a general systematic approach behind the derivation with respect to 
weight, which is probably caused by the fact that innovation controllers were not 
coordinating these calculations. Moreover, it seemed that the price tags were 
related to the size and the overall cost of the car. For example, smaller cars seemed 
to be more driven by cost concerns and less by weight. Bigger cars, such as SUVs, 
had more problems with high weight because their absolute weight is higher and 
their perception in the market was more and more influenced by weight. Thus, 
reducing weight in smaller cars would cost less than reducing weight than in 
bigger cars.  
 
However, as we were not able to analyse the exact factors that drove project 
management to the individual amount of the price tag, we focused on how 
calculations within the product development network had been influenced and 
how decisions had been altered. 
 
Though technical decisions concerning weight included mainly negative business 
cases, project management was faced with pressure to reduce weight for the 
overall target for the weight of the car. As they had to decide weight reduction 
concepts they chose the price tag as the basis for discussion and decided on 
concepts that had at least the same or a better cost-benefit-ratio as the price tag. In 
these cases finance and project management disagreed and the projects relied more 
on their self-made measurement. In several cases the price tag substituted the 
business case calculation within the decision circles and weight reduction options 
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were able to enter the product. Besides narratives in interviews about several cases 
in which decisions were made “pro price tag”, we were able to follow two specific 
examples in which a weight reduction alternative was decided taking the price tag 
into consideration. We had access to the documentation of the evaluation and the 
decision, and were able to attend one decision circle in which one reduction 
alternative was decided. In both cases, the material of a body component should be 
switched from steel to aluminium to reduce weight. As no business case supported 
the aluminium scenarios (due to higher costs and low CO2 cost savings), finance 
strongly advised project management to stick to the steel solutions. Project 
management however chose the weight reduction measure pointing in both cases 
towards the price tag, and the decision was not only within the range of the price 
tag but “cheaper”.  
 
Another interesting aspect appeared in one of the two cases where the engineers 
came up with a third solution to compromise on cost and weight. They evaluated 
all three concepts concerning technical aspects, cost and weight. The evaluation is 




Table 3 – Weight reduction: evaluation of alternatives51 
 
                                                 




Steel light weight 
concept
Material Steel Aluminium
Steel (light weight 
construction)
Functional evaluation / 
Feasibility
ok ok ok
Cost $30 $50 $45 
Weight 12 kg 8 kg 10 kg
Recommendation cost weight




As can be seen, compared to the status quo the aluminium concept had a better 
cost/weight reduction ratio (5 $/kg) than the lightweight concept compared to the 
status quo (7.5 $/kg). Although both alternatives were within the price tag range 
and the aluminium concept was the more expensive, project management decided 
towards the better ratio and chose the aluminium concept. In this case, induced by 
the price tag, the ratio was the key decision basis for the concept. In general, 
engineers came up with ideas that were rather below the derived price tag. An 
engineer responsible for weight stated: 
 
“It is not like we are only deciding expensive measures; I mean those that 
are on the level of the price tag. I don’t see the danger today; all of our 
decisions were below the price tag. Development knows exactly that they 
don’t get credit for a measure ranging in the price tag level.” 
[Coordinating Developer - Weight]. 
 
Weight reduction was thus still calculated under the aspect of cost. But the 
original calculation, the calculation of business cases, was complemented and 
even replaced by the calculation of a cost-benefit-ratio in the form of a price tag.  
 
With a price tag that reflected a cost-benefit-ratio, and thus a certain value for 
project management, project managers could make decisions on alternatives 
directly based on the calculated price tag. 
 
Besides differing derivations of the price tags, we experienced different 
acceptance and different practices in product decisions. Finance accepted the CO2 
price tag (as discussed in the greening section of Automotive Company). The 
connection between CO2 and the profit and loss statement made it possible to 
translate future cost into “virtual money”. Automotive Company, rather than 
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paying the taxes, invested the money in “new technologies”. The situation was 
different with the weight price tag. The missing link between weight and 
organisational performance excluded the price tag from being integrated into 
calculations. This controversial issue could nonetheless enter the calculation stage. 
The calculative boundary was surpassed by valorising and creating an “accounting 
fiction” (Weber, 1980, §11) that translated greening/weight into monetary terms, 
which facilitated the coordination and thereby increased alignment and 
convergence in the product development process. Though disagreements on the 
validity of the measurement and its effect on final cash flows and returns still 
existed, it smoothed conflicts and enabled comparisons. This was achieved not 
through the price tag actually being incorporated into calculations but by having a 
monetary measurement that was easy to compare with the calculations. This 
created a “fiction of exchange” between the calculation of the reduction alternative 
and the price tag. 
 
Furthermore, the price tag created not only a barrier for expensive weight 
reductions; it created a path for less expensive ideas. It gave researchers and 
developers a specific target with which they could work and it provided a horizon 
on which they could bring their ideas and “new technologies” into the projects. In 
this case, the price tag was also a measure that enabled ideas and that fostered 
innovation by making it possible to decide weight reduction alternatives with 
negative business cases. 
 
The missing direct link between financial performance and weight reduction made 
weight an incommensurable factor for innovation controllers. As specific 
reduction alternatives in projects were not supposed to be decided on a top-down 
strategic basis, project leaders created a calculative space, so that weight could be 
translated and associated with cost and value. This process was strongly 
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influenced by the fact that all car projects had a weight reduction measurement 
attached. The consequence was that project leaders should conform to the 
objective, and because innovation controllers chose to be spectators to the process, 
project leaders had to perform the calculations themselves.  
 
5.2.6.4.2 Case 2 – Converging aerodynamics and design 
 
As part of the CO2 emission reduction, aerodynamic features should be 
implemented within the projects. In the PDN, aerodynamics belong to the basic 
research areas in which general innovations were developed. They also have staff 
responsible for bringing this research into the projects and develop these ideas for 
them. In the studied case, aerodynamic features were to be developed and 
implemented into the geometry and functions for a certain car project. We focus 
on one particular car project in which the environmental issue could become a 
significant problem in the future. A product manager commented:  
 
“For example, this car was in the past perceived as an environmental 
polluter, because it looks like it, but it isn’t. We thought about it in the 
successor, to communicate it more in the sense of aerodynamics. This is 
something that changes the design. Those were our requirements. In the 
future the customer might have a problem with such a big car and (s)he 
doesn’t want to be perceived as an environmental polluter, so we said to 
design, please shape the car so that it is not perceived as […] an 
environmental dinosaur.” [Product Manager Marketing] 
 
Aerodynamic features were thus not only concerned with the technical aspects of 
reducing CO2, but also with perceptions in the markets in relation to greening.  
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Heterogeneity: competition between design and aerodynamic features and criteria  
The integration of aerodynamic features was a question of technical feasibility that 
was discussed with: the technical departments, to develop the concept and to 
check with geometrical boundaries; the plant and logistics, to check logistics and 
assembly; and with purchasing, to check the availability of suppliers. Besides 
purely technical influences, most of the features had an impact on the design and 
the geometry of the cars. The design department is perceived to have a very 
powerful position, as the company is renowned for innovatively designed cars and 
this value is significantly and uniformly more important than greening (see 
Appendix 6, question 4). In the past, changes made to their design ideas were 
often heavily discussed and neglected. For example, the aerodynamic department 
previously considered itself in a difficult position to implement geometrical 
changes to the shape of the cars: 
 
“This is also very important because in the past often design and 
aerodynamics were not good friends and designers were not interested in 
showing aerodynamic features.” [Coordinating Developer Aerodynamics] 
 
Although they were able to implement these features technically, they used to 
have problems complying with design regulations. Greening decreased the 
convergence in the network and in order to calculate the business case, the 
network had to be aligned in order to facilitate calculations and exploration of the 
calculative space. For aerodynamics, no primarily calculative boundary existed, 
but a strong actor – design –hindered its integration. How did product 




Convergence through attaching 
The message from the market changed the PDN because it put pressure on 
aerodynamics and design to speak one language to address future customers. The 
research and design units initiated a pilot project where an aerodynamic engineer 
was placed in the design department two years to address aerodynamic issues . 
S/he should connect aerodynamics with design and improve the collaboration of 
both. After this collaboration s/he became head of the aerodynamic section. An 
engineer from aerodynamics argues that “Maybe that was one of the reasons that 
design said we have to be more sustainable in design”. This connected the two 
different units and networks and fostered collaboration and support from both 
sides. The result was that design introduced a new stream to design the cars in a 
more “green” manner. The cars should look lighter and more efficient. Design was 
thus becoming interested in aerodynamic features. This was perceived as a new 
political turn: 
 
“It’s very important, it is a new political flow and stream here and that 
for example the design, they really like the feature 1 and the feature 2.” 
[Coordinating Developer Aerodynamics] 
 
Through market perception, employee relocation networks were aligned and 
formed to promote the topic of sustainable aerodynamics. Aerodynamics had been 
part of automobile design for decades and had always been negotiating with 
design departments about taste and aesthetics. The new demand for greener 
products shaped the networks within the PDN and aligned them into one stream to 




Figure 4 – Aligning networks, employee sharing and market pressure 
 
With the alignment of the networks, new support arose for the implementation of 
aerodynamic features in the cars and the calculative space could be explored. 
 
Calculations: implementing aerodynamic features through packaging 
The aerodynamic section was requested by projects to evaluate all aerodynamic 
features concerning all relevant dimensions, including financial measures, non-
financial measures and feasibility. We focus on one particular car project, which 
was highly discussed, in terms of aerodynamics and greening, due to the 
positioning in the market. 
 
The project requested all feasible aerodynamic measures with a business case and 
all relevant data from the aerodynamic section. The aligned network of 
aerodynamics and design initiated the request by convincing project management 
to evaluate aerodynamic features in their project. From tests on models in wind 
Optimising driving 
















tunnels and computer simulations the aerodynamic section could calculate the 
reductions in emissions that could be realised by the aerodynamic features. In a 
second step, the features were checked against their technical feasibility and 
against technical and geometrical boundaries that had been set for the model. In a 
third step, when feasibility had been confirmed, costs were to be calculated.  
 
Together with finance, assembly, purchasing and the cost engineering section, 
costs were calculated and estimated. As the reduction of emissions pays into the 
avoidance of fines for emissions, the CO2 price tag (see greening in Automotive 
Company) could be incorporated as a credit in the business case. The reduction of 
single features had thus a value, which was held against the cost of the feature. 
This was made visible for project management, as a chart where cost and value of 
single features were compared to each other and ranked. 
 
Figure 5 – Cost-benefit chart of aerodynamic measures for CO2 reduction 
 
With this information and the investment that had to be made, a business case for 
all features was calculated. Although finance made calculations that showed that 
some of these features themselves had a negative business case, the sum of all 
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features had a positive business case and was thus contributing to the attainment of 
the emission target. In order to avoid that single features were taken out of the 
project based on the individual calculations, research and development assembled 
all features into a package, which gave the impression that there were no 
alternatives: 
 
“The idea was that we don’t have this cherry picking. [...] In the end we 
wanted to have one package, it costs so much and it brings so much and 
in the end we need every single feature and we don’t have alternatives 
here and we need every single feature to reach this goal.” [Coordinating 
Developer Aerodynamics] 
 
This package was thus a way of avoiding single business cases, as features were 
decided, that individually did not have a positive business case. The focus in this 
discussion was set on the overall achievement of the emission target. In this 
process, politics and the power of the aerodynamics and design network played an 
important role: 
 
“We discussed it with the project leader before the decision circle. So 
that’s always what I said that I do a lot of political discussions with the 
project leaders and people would decide something; and then the project 
leader said it’s a good idea to make the package[...]” [Coordinating 
Developer Aerodynamics.] 
 
Management took some convincing of the merits of the package and the resulting 
target achievement, and they also had to be convinced that no other alternatives 
were available for the reduction of emissions with aerodynamics. All the 
positions: marketing, design, development and quality, aerodynamics, purchasing, 
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production, finance and cost engineering were visualised in one package. This was 
the outcome of an aligned network of design and aerodynamics, which were 
focusing on the future demand for greener products, especially when “greenness” 
could be visualised and given an aesthetic expression. Furthermore, this form of 
packaging reflected the idea of the sustainability strategy to implement new ideas: 
 
“Specialists have to learn the language of the whole organisation. They 
have to understand how to deal with conflicts and that it is not about 
partial optimisation of the system but about the evaluation of all input 
factors and decision criteria and to find the best set at the end of the day 
and to implement it together in the network..” [Manager of Sustainability 
Strategy Department] 
 
The aerodynamics case highlights the work involved in integrating greening into 
the decision making process. The first step was to align networks, that had a 
history of opposing each other, through the sharing of employees. This move 
facilitated understanding between the nodes in the network and enabled the 
creation of perspectives of aesthetical aerodynamics, which was interpreted to be 
important in the market. It enabled the attachment of design with green product 
features, which enabled the projects to create a calculative space. Secondly, it 
illustrates how engineers pass through the decision making process by assembling 
single features in bigger packages that, to some extent, black box the individually 
unprofitable cases and enable a favourable decision on a package of aesthetical 
aerodynamics with both positive and negative business cases. This was possible 




5.2.6.4.3 Case 3 – Calculating a new light technology 
 
In Automotive Company, design, innovation and technology are among the most 
important brand values and strategic directions as detailed in the survey. To be the 
leader in these fields, the implementation of innovative technologies into projects 
is the subject of strategic discussions. In the studied case, a new light technology52 
that was available in the supplier market was found to meet the strategic values of 
the company and was considered for integration into the projects. The status quo 
was that Automotive Company could not differentiate itself from the market, as 
competitors had already introduced new light technology in some of their cars. The 
solution was to introduce the new technology and provide customers with certain 
effects. First, it was argued that through this technology the lighting of the road 
and of obstacles was improved and that safety was thus enhanced. Secondly, it 
was argued that through this technology, the emission of CO2 could be reduced in 
the future based on less electricity consumption leading to lower consumption of 
the light machine and thus less effort for the engine. Thirdly, it was argued that 
with the new technology more design features could be implemented due to 
reduced space requirements, which also created more options when designing the 
lights. It was problematic to evaluate the take-rates and market prices driven by 
customer demand not only because the technology was an innovation but because 
the value of the environmental perception and the design was hard to estimate, 
calculate and account for. 
 
We focus on four different car projects in which the lighting technology was to be 
introduced. All projects were at the concept stage at the same time. In the four 
projects, the numbers and arguments have developed differently as learning effects 
from the first project(s) had an impact on the next project. 
                                                 
52 New light technology is here used as a synonym for an innovative headlight technology. 
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Heterogeneity: estimating uncertain customer demand 
Although there was a strategic direction of the roadmap for new lighting 
technology, the individual projects had to integrate the technology separately and 
decide upon its implementation. As the feature was an option for the customer, it 
could be calculated as a business case with all relevant parameters. This setting 
created a calculative space for every project. The projects demanded a full 
evaluation of the feature and requested a positive business case. However, there 
were problems and disagreements that needed to be resolved. First, putting 
customer value on the innovation and estimating take-rates and market prices was 
difficult, as no experience with the technology existed. Secondly, estimating cost 
was complex, because design and technology were not only new but also volatile. 
Thirdly, as both cost and profits were difficult to estimate, a calculation would 
include these uncertainties, which could potentially cause a lack of acceptance of a 
decision. Fourthly, innovations might not be cash cows as they might involve 
higher investments and costs without yielding an equivalent profit. A negative 
outcome would endanger the introduction of the innovation. We experienced all 
four conflicts in the analysis of the new lighting technology. 
 
In the first car project the technology had to be evaluated for the first time and 
technical feasibility and quality had to be assessed and approved. As technical 
feasibility could be assured, the project focused on generating the numbers for the 
business case. Several sections in the network had to provide their information and 
their expertise to generate the numbers. The relevant technical specifications were 
negotiated between R&D, design and marketing. With this technical solution, 
R&D estimated costs together with cost engineers and the purchasing section. 
These costs were a first estimation, as they found it difficult to predict cost in an 
innovation project like this. Furthermore, by introducing a new technology they 
had to incorporate the cost-development of the new technology. They had learned 
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from the “old” technologies that, being in the market, the cost will decrease every 
year by a certain amount. The learning curve from former technologies was 
therefore instrumental in anticipating cost-development of future technologies and 
cost should be incorporated as “realistic” as possible in the calculations.  
 
Apart from the estimated costs, take-rate and market price had to be predicted 
from the markets. Although the specifications and customer values, such as safety, 
design or CO2, had been discussed with marketing they found it very difficult to 
get high take-rates from the markets. Furthermore, no visualisation of the new 
lighting system was available to the markets. The reason was that first, there was 
no final design decided and secondly, due to the company’s confidentiality policy, 
the first designs couldn’t be sent to the markets. The first estimations of the 
markets were perceived as very conservative and take-rates had been differing 
between markets that usually exhibited similar customer behaviour. Based on 
these estimations, a business case was calculated that was negative and which was 
presented to project management. As they would not decide on a negative business 
case, the numbers of the business case were checked again. Development costs, as 
well as variable costs, were revised and the numbers were given to finance to 
calculate the business case anew. An engineer stated: 
 
“As discussed we have kneaded and moulded the numbers and revised as 
much as we could and as much as we could justify.” [Coordinating 
Developer Light Technology] 
 
After the revision of the cost the business case was still negative. A key problem 
was the heterogeneity and divergence of views on take-rates/value in the market. 




Calculations: reducing uncertainty and creating alignment through visualisation 
and black boxing 
The project demanded further analyses of the market to get a more solid 
foundation of the business case. Furthermore, they showed concepts of the new 
lights to the central marketing manager to convince him of the technology and 
design. In further steps, more and more marketing managers were presented with 
the concept and take-rates rose: 
 
“The more mature the option gets, the better we can communicate it to the 
markets. When we get only the information in the beginning "We are 
doing new light technology now" then we can only make a guess and talk 
to the de central markets - but nobody knows how this technology look 
like. But when we take the markets and give them a whole idea of the 
concept, there is a high possibility that this guess gets revised, because 
markets say "wow, that´s not how we thought about it.” [Product Manager 
Marketing] 
 
The visualisation increased acceptance and the heterogeneity in take-rates among 
largely similar markets were converging. In order to provide management and 
marketing with the information of where the business case had its breakeven, a 
chart was calculated in which take-rate and price were related to the breakeven of 




Figure 6 – Breakeven chart that displays take-rates and market prices53 
 
 
“I collect all these figures11; I would give you a take rate for a 30%. If we 
sell it for €900 I could give you 40% if we could sell it for €500. It is my 
job then. To go to the purchasing department to calculate what the cost of 
manufacturing and development are and then we could decide together 
with controlling: do we want to sell it at a very high level to the customer 
or we want to generate a higher take rate and to sell it at a lower price.” 
[Coordinating Developer Light Technology] 
 
  
                                                 
53  Numbers got coded due to confidentiality reasons. 
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Discussions with markets about take-rates and prices gained momentum and R&D 
tried to lower budgeted development costs as much as possible. Furthermore, 
purchasing started revising their numbers. The network that was brought together 
by this innovation got more and more aligned and it became more likely to be 
convincing as a breakeven of the business case: 
 
“We had a discussion with the head of the product line. We want new 
light technology. As long as I do not have the same return on investment 
like I have on the old technique, then I will not buy this solution/this idea, 
starting with this. The Sales Department also wanted the new light 
technology and they raised their take rate. In this case, this means that the 
business case is better, that means that the controlling department has to 
sell business cases until we have a package that fulfils all the 
requirements that we and the product line have.” [Coordinating 
Developer Light Technology] 
 
The new lighting technology had to meet return on investment criteria and after 
several rounds of revising the numbers the business case was positive and project 
management decided to implement the innovation into its product. With this 
decision, project management pointed also towards the realisation of modular 
technology and equal parts for future projects for generating economies of scales 
and reducing investments. 
 
In this project, the network had been aligned by first, convincing partners about 
the advantages of the technology, secondly, through the calculation of a business 
case that showed a negative financial impact but visualised the potential of 
achieving breakeven by revising the numbers, and thirdly, by creating images of 
the technology, and pulling and changing all possible levers (variable cost, 
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investment, development cost, price and take-rate) breakeven was reached. 
 
In the other three projects, we experienced a black boxing of the estimated cost of 
the first project. Although all four projects were in the concept phase at the same 
time, the estimated costs were considered “realistic”. However, the situation with 
estimating the market input deviated. Take-rates and prices differed due to the 
different positioning of the cars and minor technological changes, obliging the 
markets to revise their numbers and be convinced anew. In the second project, 
making a package with another option could generate a positive business case. In 
the third project, the revision of the numbers was initiated through a meeting with 
marketing managers, which was arranged by project management. In this meeting 
a model was shown to marketing to convince them of the potential of this option, 
and thus, to generate higher predictions of prices and take-rates resulting in a 
positive business case. In the fourth project an analysis showed that take-rates and 
prices could never realistically allow a positive business case because of the 
positioning and segment of the car. As the project decided on the complete offer of 
the headlight options, it decided to include new lighting technology with the 
arguments that first, three projects had already decided on the technology, and 
secondly, the project had to offer this technology to meet the strategic values of 
the products to offer design, innovation and technology to the customer. The fact 
that three projects had already decided on the technology greatly influenced the 
decision. The technology was "institutionalised" by being decided through three 
positive business cases and by the fact that a converging network was behind these 
decisions. Even a negative business case could not question the incorporation of 
new lighting technology into the project. 
 
These four projects show how numbers and calculations mediated innovation and 
aligned networks. The assembly of numbers in business case calculations made 
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three things apparent, first, due to the fact that the business case was negative, 
numbers had to be revised to generate a positive business case, and secondly, 
through showing the breakeven in a chart, the possibility of generating a positive 
business case through revising the numbers was communicated. Investment and 
cost reductions and changes to the components were the outcome of this rather 
strict business case process as numbers, as one engineer stated, were “kneaded” as 
much as could be justified. Thirdly, the use of prototypes and images helped align 
markets, so that they revised the market numbers. This involvement formed a 
network that could be reassembled in the fourth project and that had enough 
influence to form a decision with a negative business case.  
 
5.2.7 Discussion 
5.2.7.1 Case comparison 
 
The product development network in Automotive Company is heterogeneous. 
Multiple departments and sections, with differing objectives and perspectives on 
the development of new cars, had to develop solutions together to construct 
positive business cases. On some issues the network was convergent, e.g. in 
relation to the importance of design and the general importance of calculating 
business cases. In others, especially with respect to greening, the network was less 
convergent and the extent to which greening should be calculated was a highly 
discussed issue. Alignment and coordination within the network was reduced by 
making greening part of the product development network and the target costing 
process. In the embedded cases we have shown how divergent networks were then 
subsequently aligned and coordinated by various means. This convergence did not 
eradicate heterogeneity but enabled the network to communicate, coordinate and 










Weight was increasingly 
seen as an indicator of 
environmental 
friendliness by car 
magazines and 
Automotive Company did 
not perform well. 
Furthermore, weight 
would be important in 
electrical cars.  
Design is a dominating 
decision criterion due to the 
importance of design in 
market positioning. Design 
boundaries and criteria 
hinder the implementation 
of aerodynamic features 
that lower fuel 
consumption. 
Automotive Company’s 
competitors had implemented 
new light technology and being 
a technological leader is 
important to Automotive 
Company. The new technology 
would decrease fuel 
consumption, yield design 







Overall weight in kg for a 
car was set by top 
management and projects 
therefore had to decrease 
weight. Innovation 
controllers could not see 
any relation between 
weight reduction and cash 
flows.  
Two car design criteria 
contradict each other: 
aesthetics vs. dynamics and 
fuel consumption. The 
aerodynamic department 
had difficulty convincing 
design of the value of 
aerodynamics. 
The product development 
network agreed on the 
importance of the technology, 
however the cost of the new 
technology was high compared 
with estimated customer value 
(take-rates). Marketing was 
thus not convinced about the 
new technology and market 
take-rates differed widely 






The translation of weight 
into a price tag facilitated 
decision about weight 
reduction and meant that 
engineers could focus 
their development efforts 
based on the price tag. 
The network therefore 
converged through the 
price tag. Innovation 
controllers however chose 
not to do the calculations. 
A project was set up by the 
aerodynamic section to 
improve coordination and 
alignment between design 
and aerodynamics through 
placing an aerodynamics 
engineer in design for two 
years. The employee later 
became head of the 
aerodynamic section. 
Subsequently, a focus on 
aesthetical dynamics in 
combination with 
calculations aligned and 
coordinated the processes.  
Breakeven charts showed the 
possibility of profitable 
business cases. Visualisation of 
the new technology reduced 
uncertainty about the new 
technology, markets take-rates 






A total weight target was 
set for the car. This target 
was valorised by making 
a price tag for one 
kilogram of weight and by 
comparing cost benefits. 
The price tag differed 
from project to project. 
The price tags created a 
calculative space. 
Cost-benefit-analysis. 
Packaging of multiple 
solutions, so that all 
features were evaluated 
together. These processes 
explored the calculative 
space. Attaching 
aerodynamics and design 
created a calculative space 
for sustainable 
aerodynamics. 
Breakeven charts to show and 
project the possibility of 
making positive business cases. 
Visualisations to reduce 
uncertainty. Once the first 
business case was calculated 
with positive returns, the 
calculations were carried over 
to subsequent projects. 
Calculations were 
institutionalised and solidified. 
These processes explored the 
calculative space.  
Table 4 – Summary of cases 
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5.2.7.2 Creating and exploring calculative spaces  
 
Accounting studies based on theoretical conceptualisations of actor networks 
generally view accounting as an actor or intermediary that aligns and coordinates 
networks. Miller and O´leary (2007) found that Moore’s law, technology 
Roadmaps and TCO calculations aligned the semiconductor industry towards 
accomplishing a doubling of the capacity of chips every two years. Mouritsen et 
al. (2001) discuss how target costing and open books generate new strategies and 
core competencies. Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) discuss how accounting is an 
intermediary that aligns inter-firm networks. Indeed “A network starts to form as 
soon as there are actors joined together by intermediaries” (Callon, 1991, p. 146). 
In relation to the greening of cars, networks and calculative tools were related in 
more complex ways. Specifically, accounting was one actor and mediator 
alongside other actors and mediators. The cases illustrate that greening in and of 
itself was an actor. Likewise, design and technology were important actors in the 
process. Accounting was thus not an actor that “just” translated networks; it was 
dependent on the context of the calculations, i.e. the strategies and criteria of 
design, greening and technological leadership. Accounting was part of a network 
which it both translated and which translated accounting. Accounting was used in 
two distinct ways in the cases.  
 
Firstly, in order to bring greening into calculations calculative spaces had to be 
created. A first important step in Automotive Company was making a CO2 price 
tag, which created a “calculative space” for assessing the economic impact of the 
greening of cars. A space that was not available before due to the difficulties in 
translating and calculating the value of “image chances”. A second step, illustrated 
in the weight case, was to introduce another demand on innovation projects 
through the setting of weight targets. Through the overall weight target, projects 
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were forced to find new solutions that reduce weight and thereby generally reduce 
the use of materials, meet customer requirements for lighter cars and (marginally) 
decrease CO2 consumption. Because the direct effect of weight reductions on 
CO2 consumption (and therefore cost) compared to the cost of changing materials 
was not sufficient to make business cases positive, project leaders created a 
calculative space through making cost benefit analysis on weight reduction 
measures. This analysis generated a price tag, which they could use to compare 
and rank options and make decisions that allowed them to reach their non-
financial weight target.  In both these cases the creation of calculative spaces was 
initiated to meet green concerns. Greening was the actor and the calculations 
mediated the networks. Thus creating calculative spaces refers to the step in 
which something is made calculable which was not beforehand.  
 
Secondly, in other cases, calculations in Automotive Company explored the 
calculative space already installed. This was found in the new light technology 
case, where the new expensive technology was considered important enough to be 
implemented even when the business cases were negative. The negative business 
cases put pressure on projects to explore all options for making the business case 
positive. First, the groups established how far projects were from meeting the 
profitability criterion by comparing take-rates with cost. Groups then worked on 
visualising options, so that sceptical markets could see the new option and commit 
to higher take-rates, while groups worked on minimising costs54. Similarly, in the 
                                                 
54 It was suggested that these processes of calculation are just a way of legitimating decisions already taken. While we would 
concur that it is easier to get decisions through the processes when networks are aligned – or rather make the product 
development network explore possible solutions, we also think that our analysis documents that more is at stake here. Firstly, in 
the new lighting technology case the fourth project was not able to make a positive business case, which illustrates that 
calculations cannot be adjusted to show whatever a convergent network wants it to show. Secondly, once calculations result in 
negative business cases, components, materials and functions are redesigned and budgets and targets are changed and 
negotiations with suppliers are initiated. So, while calculations as a legitimation of decisions already taken seems a possible 
interpretation, our data seems to point more towards convergence being indicative of the utilised effort in finding solutions 
(changing budgets, functions etc.) to the problems that calculations indicate.  
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aerodynamics case a non- convergent, non-aligned network hindered the use of 
green aerodynamic features due to design priorities and geometric boundaries. In 
order to explore options and the calculative space, design and sustainability were 
aligned and coordinated through the exchange of employees. This enabled the 
mixing of solutions, which could then be calculated. Thus, exploring calculative 
spaces refers to the action in which calculations, that are already in place, mobilise 
greening in the innovation network. 
 
5.2.7.3 Modes of creating and exploring calculative spaces 
 
Calculating a greener future in Automotive Company involved several ways of 
translating green issues into calculable entities and increasing their power within 
the product development network. There are six such ways of creating and 
exploring calculative spaces.  
5.2.7.3.1 Creating calculative spaces through Valorising (price tags) 
 
Non-financial or difficult to measure entities, such as the environment or weight, 
were valorised through calculations that generated a price tag. Automotive 
Company, for instance, had a price tag for CO2, which could then easily be 
entered into calculations. The CO2 price tag concerned mainly the future taxes, 
which car manufacturers would have to pay if limits to CO2 emissions of the fleet 
were exceeded. Other cases of valorisation were trickier, such as was illustrated in 
the weight case (Case 1). In case 1, decisions to lower weight had to be made due 
to the targets set on weight-reduction for each project. Here, valorisations were so 
disputed that innovation controllers refused to complete the calculations and 
project leaders made their own prices based on comparing the ratio of weight and 
cost between different options in the car.  
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5.2.7.3.2 Creating calculative spaces through Attaching 
 
Difficult to enumerate entities could be entered into the calculation processes by 
being attached to entities with which the Automotive Company had more 
experience in monetising. Compared with packaging, attaching has to do with the 
functions and values that are performed by an entity, whereas packaging has to do 
with the final components. For example, Automotive Company had sold cars 
where design was an important ingredient for many years, and marketing, 
development, finance etcetera were comfortable with calculating the value of 
design by setting overall prices on cars and estimating “take-rates” on specific 
(design) functions given a certain price. Attaching environmental concerns to 
design, as illustrated in the aerodynamics case (case 2), is an example where 
“environmental friendliness” becomes a design expression, whose value marketing 
was able to enumerate by estimating prices, demand and take-rates. Combining 
entities and becoming attached thus increased the calculability of entities and 
thereby the likelihood of options being incorporated into the final product. This 
parallels Knight’s (1921) discussion on consolidation and grouping being 
important ways of meeting and reducing uncertainty.  
5.2.7.3.3 Exploring calculative spaces through Imagining and Prototyping 
 
Estimating take-rates and customer value of ideas was difficult in Automotive 
Company. The processes often started out as general ideas with no physical 
expression. The calculation of ideas was thought to be highly uncertain and there 
were big variations on e.g. the estimated take-rates between an idea with no 
physical expression, and when the idea had developed into an image and/or 
prototype. Making images and prototypes was part of the processes of making the 
car and the calculations more real, and calculations based on images and 
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prototypes were deemed much more real and realistic. This was illustrated in the 
lighting case where making images and prototypes was a means by which a 
relatively convergent network could convince markets of the value of the option 
with take-rates being out of sync with the general view in markets. The ability to 
predict (or rather converge on predictions) was thus perceived enhanced, as 
discussed by Knight (1921) and this finding supports Wouters and Roijmans’ 
(2011) finding that prototypes enable knowledge integration. This finding also 
adds to the target costing literature through illustrating how customer value is 
validated in organisational processes through the use of images and prototypes. 
5.2.7.3.4 Exploring calculative spaces through Packaging 
 
The general processes of calculating business cases was focused on a case-by-
case, component-by-component approach, but in some cases developers were 
successful in developing packages, combining several components into a function 
or group of components, where some components had negative returns and others 
positive returns. This way, complementarities between components could be 
maintained and project leaders and controllers would not “cherry pick”, as one 
developer called it, the profitable components (calculated via the CO2 price tag) 
while leaving out unprofitable components. This was possible through project 
leaders being briefed by developers and convinced that only the package would be 
offered as a solution. Political work supported this way of packaging. Packaging 
thus made it possible for negative business cases of single components to receive a 
positive evaluation and be part of the final product by being packaged with other 
profitable components. This is to some extent a “perverse” effect of Knight’s 
“grouping” mode of decreasing uncertainty because it decreases transparency; 
however, it facilitated the implementation of green functions and components.  
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5.2.7.3.5 Exploring calculative spaces through Consolidating and grouping to 
project the target  
 
The literature on target costing argues that the values of functions are divided into 
components based on expert engineering judgment. In Automotive Company the 
process of setting targets was different. Targets were set based on the cost of the 
preceding component minus a specific percentage. This process enabled 
objectivity and the use of targets that were trustworthy in the process. A key way 
of setting targets for the projected cost of components was a process of grouping 
and consolidating (Knight, 1921) components in a way that projections could be 
made. Components were divided into low, medium and high cost reduction 
components. Each type of component would have a percentage cost reduction as 
compared to its predecessor.  These general percentages were calculated and 
entered into calculations as facts that made the calculation of projected cost and 
profits possible. This adds to the target costing literature by illustrating how target 
cost of components may be established through historic cost and benchmarking. 
5.2.7.3.6 Exploring calculative spaces through Black boxing and solidification  
 
Calculations of specific business cases were path dependent (Dosi, 1982; Thrane, 
Blaabjerg and Møller, 2009) in the sense that new calculated technologies and 
options affected later calculations in other projects and cars. Once a new 
technology or option had been calculated and incorporated into a car, the cost 
calculations and the business case were black boxed and reused in following 
projects. This was seen in the case on lighting technology where, at first, 





These modes of creating and exploring green calculative spaces build and extend 
on Knight’s framework through adding and specifying new elements, such as 
imaging, packaging and solidifying and through illustrating how Knight’s modes 
of working with uncertainty works in social processes within a product 
development network. Furthermore, our focus differs, as we are interested in 
illustrating first, how uncertainties related to greening are met and secondly, how 
the product development succeeded in generating positive business cases. Our 
modes furthermore extends on Jørgensen and Messner’s (2010) finding that the 
pluralistic nature of new product development, the time-space distance between 
decisions and outcomes, sets limits to usefulness and applicability of accounting 
(as calculations as opposed to a mode of thinking). We do this by illustrating the 
work and modes involved in making a heterogeneous network converge on 
specific solutions through the creation and exploration of calculative spaces, 
which serve to reduce perceived uncertainties. Our findings also add meat to the 
structural bones of organisational practices of calculation in situations with 
problems with making complete performance measures (Lillis, 2002): low 
measurability (Rowe et al, 2008), subjective input (Kadous et al, 2005) and how 
these modes shape the ability to account for greening in situated practices that 
involve “skillful practical activity in context” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007, p. 24). 
 
The analysis generally illustrates how calculative process enables innovation 
(Ahrens and Chapman 2004: Wouters and Roijmans 2011). On the one hand, the 
profitability criterion applied to all decision situations at the operational level may 
potentially diminish the implementation of inventions that are unprofitable. On the 
other hand, our cases illustrate how weight targets and price tags facilitated the 
search for new solutions, how calculations and “attaching” facilitated the 
implementation of new aerodynamic features, and how calculations spurred 
processes of finding new solutions that would make the new light technology 
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profitable. In this way calculations enable innovation and may be “learning 
machines” (Chapman, 1997). 
 
Our study therefore illustrates that accounting is not just a (long or short) mediator 
aligning networks which may or may not be relevant in the calculation of 
uncertain entities such as greening. Rather, accounting and calculations were 
implicated in two steps of first, reducing perceived uncertainty through 
enumerating the physical entity to be calculated, and/or converging the network 
and thus creating the calculative space. Secondly, calculations explored the 
calculative space enabling optimisation through comparisons, projections and 
analysis which changed the physical design, composition and substance of the car. 
Calculations were both the output of a converging network and an input 
converging the network. 
 
5.2.7.4 Incommensurables and boundaries  
 
The extent to which the calculations performed in Automotive Company were 
accurate is impossible to judge. Although the quoted prices from suppliers were 
checked, Automotive Company did not systematically check the extent to which 
calculations turned out to be true. Much more important is the confidence with 
which calculations are performed, as there are “differences in the amount of 
confidence which individuals feel in their judgments when formed and in their 
powers of execution; this degree of confidence is in large measure independent of 
the "true value" of the judgments and powers themselves.” (Knight, 1921, p. 242) 
 
Due to the forward-looking nature and general uncertainties related to the 
innovation processes (e.g. demand) this would possibly be meaningless.  
However, the processes and calculations in the product development network 
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enabled the integration and convergence of the diverse knowledge sets present in 
the network. 
 
Some issues, however, were simply deemed impossible to calculate but were 
important on strategic and other grounds. Here, the board of directors or project 
leaders made decisions on negative business cases that were carried through based 
on their strategic importance. This had the effect (or advantage) of leaving the 
general calculative processes unaffected, so that a focus on calculated profits 
could continue to be the final decision parameter. Automotive Company could 
continue to have rational processes for choosing and evaluating designs and other 
types of rationalities such as value rationality (Weber, 1980), i.e. a concern for the 
environment for its own sake could drive individuals’ own motives when working 
on specific business cases, but leaving them out of the rational processes of 
improving the profits of Automotive Company by increasing customer value and 
decreasing cost. 
 
In Automotive Company, image effects were deemed very difficult to calculate at 
the operational level and sometimes cases could only be justified in relation to 
image and reputation. They were perceived to be mere estimations. We did not 
investigate how decisions on the board of managers were made, so we do not 
know whether these latter decisions weren’t calculated or just decided on, based 
on hunches and values, we doubt it, but have no evidence to support this 
supposition. However, it is certain that “just referring” to images made it much 
more difficult to justify investments, so that “image chances” were seen in 





“I don't think there are very economical chances, there are more 
reputation chances, that makes things difficult, when there is only image 
chances and no economical chances. For the electric cars I don't think 
there will be the next five years or ten years. But there will come 
economical chances.” [Manager Mobility Strategy.] 
 
Image chances were deemed more difficult to calculate and were deemed less 
important. Customers, therefore, need to be more vocal and decisive in their 
buying patterns, if they want more environmentally friendly products. If this is the 
case, Automotive Company will change the demand, take-rates and prices, and 
calculate the business case and supply whatever the customer prefers. A parallel 
point is that regulations are easy to calculate – fleet taxes on CO2 is an example – 
and the analysis in this paper therefore also points to the need for regulators to 
make regulations that enable calculation and incorporation of greening in cars and 
other products. Regulation and clear buying patterns move greening from being 
“image chances” and “estimations” that are difficult to calculate to “empirical, 
statistical probabilities” that can be handled more easily in R&D calculations.  
 
The different departments in Automotive Company felt that decisions about the 
greening of products was more a strategic matter than a calculative one:  
irrespective of all the ways in which greening and accounting is actually 
calculated in Automotive Company. This is maybe not so surprising given the 
process the Automotive Company is in the midst of. It is more interesting that 
finance/accounting significantly more than other departments feel that strategies 
are more important than calculations in relation to calculation of effects of green 
features, technologies etcetera. This was also confirmed in the cases where, e.g. 
the weight reduction measure received resistance from accounting/finance due to 
the difficulty in establishing direct links between weight and profits. Project 
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managers, therefore, calculated the weight measure/price tag individually, and 
accounting was thus not part of this process. While accounting and finance in 
general was deeply involved in forming decisions about green options, there were 
limits to the grounds on which they would perform calculations. The limit was 
when calculations were perceived to be in opposition to the norm of maximising 
profits through calculative means, and when the basis upon which calculations 
could be performed were perceived to be too uncertain. 
5.2.7.5 Rationalisation 
 
“The Puritan wanted to have a calling – we have to. As the ascetic 
lifestyle was transplanted from the monasteries to the world of work and 
began to dominate this worldly behaviour, it aided in bringing about the 
mighty cosmos of the modern economic order, related to the technical and 
economic conditions of mechanic and machine production, which today 
with overwhelming force determines the lifestyle of all who are born into 
this “machine” – not only those working directly in this machine, until the 
last kilograms of fossil energy is used55.” (Weber, 2000, p. 153) 
Much literature and public debate about CSR focus on how firms, based on values 
and responsibility to the planet, should decrease their consumption of natural 
resources and help the world become a better place. In Automotive Company, 
though there were probably many people that were driven by higher aims than 
return on investment, greening was subjected to calculations of value and cost in 
the many direct and indirect ways we have illustrated in this paper. In this sense, 
                                                 
55 „Der Puritaner wollte Berufsmensch sein - wir müssen es sein. Denn indem die Askese aus den Mönchszellen heraus in das 
Berufsleben übertragen wurde und die innerweltliche Sittlichkeit zu beherrschen begann, half sie an ihrem teile daran jenen 
mächtigen Kosmos der modernen, und die technischen und ökonomischen, Voraussetzungen mechanisch-maschineller 
Produktion gebundenen, Wirtschaftordnung erbauen, der heute den Lebensstil aller einzeln, die in dies Triebwerk hineingeboren 
werden – nicht nur der direkt ökonomischen Erwerbstätigen-, mit überwältigen Zwange bestimmt und vielleicht bestimmen 
wird, bis der letzte Zentner fossilen Brennstoffs verglüht ist.“ 
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greening was translated into numbers and could function in an organisation 
focused on reviewing all measures and options in terms of positive and negative 
business cases. In this sense, greening and environmental issues in Automotive 
Company were in the process of being made an ordinary thing; it was just one of a 
number of issues that are difficult to calculate and for which the company had to 
devise ways of translating into numbers. Therefore, CSR and greening does not 
provide a way to escape the “iron cage” of rational behaviour in Automotive 
Company. However, all the small steps taken to minimise Automotive Company´s 
environmental impact, facilitated by their innovative ways of calculating a greener 
future, may mean that Weber’s prediction, on modernity’s overwhelming drive 
towards efficiency and until the consumption of the “last kilogram of fossil 
energy” may be, if not cancelled, then delayed. Seen from a normative perspective 
of a wish for a greener future, this may not be that bad. Because once the greening 
of the industry becomes a part of firms’ normal operational processes, then we 
may be surer that things will change.  
5.2.8 Conclusion 
 
Calculating a greener future is a complex process involving the translations of 
non-economic and uncertain entities into economic entities. Calculations in this 
process are both an input and output of the networks within which calculations are 
performed, i.e. they don’t just create and converge networks but are also part of an 
output of the network and its processes. Translations may take place through 
socio-economic processes of: attaching, valorising, packaging, imaging, 
blackboxing and solidifying, and grouping/projecting and in Automotive 
Company they were always performed in order to seek to ensure that decisions 




While Automotive Company interpreted and experienced boundaries to 
calculations, especially in relation to monetary effects of improved image, many 
calculative boundaries were permeable and surpassed through the many 
calculative methods discussed in this paper. The limits to calculations within 
innovation networks discussed in the literature may, therefore, just as easily be 
caused by a lack of imagination on behalf of actors within the network who cannot 
figure out modes of translating uncertainties into numbers in a process that 
converges a heterogeneous network. 
 
Greening was an actor in Automotive Company, however, it was not an actor that 
changed fundamental beliefs about “the business of business…”, and only in some 
episodes did it alter the alignment and coordination between nodes and 
departments in the product development network. Greening, however, opened up 
new spaces for innovation and increased pressure on Automotive Company to find 
new solutions. Greening was also not an issue external to product development 
and target costing, but was deeply integrated in the product development 
processes. This transforms greening from a charitable and altruistic demand on 
firms that may decrease reputational risk, to a strategic and innovative lever, 
subject to the normal demands for profitability.  
 
Some hoping for a more fundamental, value based impact of greening on the 
functioning of firms may lament this type of development, however, making 
greening an integrated part of product development and subject to calculations and 
decisions within product development may also ensure a smoother transition to a 




5.3 Paper 3 -The translation of strategic objectives in the process of 
aesthetical design 
 
Industrial organisations are facing strategic challenges that concern 
higher customer demands, cost reductions, flexibility, and social and 
environmental performance. An important aspect of product development 
is the process of creating aesthetical design and sociocultural innovation.   
Taking place in the fuzzy front-end and being a creative endeavour, 
aesthetical design is a rather unexplored area in relation to the 
mobilisation of strategic objectives. This study focuses on the mobilisation 
of strategic objectives in aesthetical design through an ANT perspective 
on strategising. The empirical domain is a car manufacturer and 
qualitative methods were applied for the analysis- using interviews, 
internal company material and participant observation. The paper adds to 
the literature on strategising and control and innovation in that it finds 
that strategic objectives that were initially defined may shape aesthetical 
design and vice versa. Here, design is loosely coupled with strategic 
prerequisites instead of being straightjacketed by them. Aesthetical design 
may either succeed in enrolling decision makers in “non-aligned-to-
prerequisite” design, or succeed in enrolling in their “aligned-to-
prerequisite” design. Objectives are, thus, not stable goals, but emerge 
through competition and the generation of design alternatives. Therefore, 
the mobilisation of strategic objectives may not only be a “downstream 
activity” in which objectives are fixed as prerequisites but it may also be 







Design and form language with regards to consumer goods, has become more and 
more important as customer demands, on e.g. quality, individualism, but also with 
respect to social and environmental performance of products, have increased (e.g. 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997; Verganti, 1999, 2006, 2008; Wheelright and Clark, 
1992). Furthermore, studies are calling for more innovation and individualism in 
product development, through more emphasis on design and creativity, to generate 
price premiums (e.g. Adler and Chen, 2011; Dell’Era and Verganti, 2009; 
Verganti, 1999, 2006, 2008). Organisational strategies that focus on these 
demands are also coined by foci on e.g. cost, technological requirements or 
modularity.  
 
The implementation of strategies is a key issue for organisations through which its 
actions should be guided and competitive advantage gained. In recent years, 
literature on the implementation and control of strategy has analysed this issue 
through various perspectives in product development settings (e.g. Chapman, 
2005; Davila, 2005; Langfield-Smith, 2005; Miller and O’Leary, 2007); however, 
few studies have focused on the control and mobilisation of strategy in creative 
endeavours. Strategic control mechanisms are not only existent in mundane 
product development processes; in highly creative spaces, such as aesthetical 
design, control may be needed to guide creation processes towards organisational 
strategy.  
 
Through which mechanisms strategic objectives are mobilised, in creative 
endeavours, have so far not been studied in detail. Verganti (1999) discussed this 
difficulty in the early phases stating that concept generation is, on the one hand, a 
“creative endeavour”, but that it also concerns the downstream implementation 
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phases in which manufacturability and technical requirements are detailed and by 
which strategic objectives may become more apparent (Verganti, 1999, p. 364). In 
relation, the literature on the fuzzy front-end describes early stages as being more 
formed by fuzziness and creativity, while later development stages are more 
coordinated and controlled by criteria such as time or cost (e.g. Ayag, 2005; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1996; Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss, 2001; 
Reinertsen, 1999). Besides time or cost, the value of aesthetical and technological 
innovation is often not graspable. It is thus interesting, how strategic objectives are 
interacting with creative undertakings (such as aesthetical design). Especially 
aesthetical design is here interesting due to its creative and individualistic 
character. I seek to discuss how strategic objectives are translated in the 
conceptual stages and focus on how aesthetical design is interacting with strategic 
objectives within product development. The research question is: 
 
How are strategic objectives translated in the process of aesthetical design? 
 
I analyse where and when strategic objectives are mobilised in the process of 
aesthetical design. Rather than taking a sequential perspective of a stage-gate 
process (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1996; Kuczmarski, 2000; Murphy and Kumar, 
1995; Song & Montoya-Weiss, 1998) I seek to take a different perspective 
focusing on product development as an actor-network. ANT suggests moving 
from sequences to networks, and investigating the boundaries and controversies 
between the actors (e.g. Christiansen and Varnes, 2007) and how they are settled. 
The settlement is here explained by Callon (1986) by the four moments of 
translation in which problematisation leads to interessement and enrolment of 
actors which are then mobilised. Through this perspective, strategy becomes 
something that is pursued rather than just being a thing in itself. Strategic 
objectives and sub-objectives become one achievement in the process of 
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translation; they are being defined (Callon, 1991, p. 143). Literature on 
strategising or strategy-as-practice defines strategy as something that is done, 
rather than just a property of organisations (Whittington, 2003). ANT may add to 
this view in describing that strategising is not a social process done by people but 
rather a process of translation of and through different actors (e.g. Callon, 1986, 
1991; Latour, 1987).  
 
Studying the development of a car manufacturer over a period of two years I 
investigated design decisions in early stages, and the means by which these 
decisions were shaped. I focused on a number of different car development 
projects and traced the mobilisation of strategic objectives in three cases. The 
paper finds that, in the process of design, initial strategic objectives (as 
prerequisites) may translate design and vice versa. In the design process designers 
may either, succeed in enrolling the decision makers in their “non-aligned-to-
prerequisite design”, or succeed in enrolling in their “aligned-to-prerequisite” 
design. Here, initial strategic objective did not straightjacket designers; instead 
designers were loosely coupled to strategic prerequisites. The mobilisation of 
strategic objectives may not only be a “downstream activity” in which objectives 
are fixed as prerequisites but it may also be an “upstream activity” through which 
objectives are pursued by the problematisation of discussions, physical 
visualisations, or analyses (of e.g. cost, customers, or technological requirements). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss the theoretical framework on 
which the paper is structured. Secondly, the empirical study is described and 




5.3.2 Theoretical Discussion 
5.3.2.1 Coordination and creativity in product development 
 
It is a challenge for organisations to synchronise their development activities and 
flexibly address the particularities of every development stage, especially in 
environments with “pluralistic demands and high uncertainty” (e.g. Jørgensen and 
Messner, 2010). This challenge grows with the complexity of the product 
(Nooteboom, 2000). The need to, on the one hand, anticipate product development 
criteria and, on the other, to react in product development processes to enhance 
flexibility creates a dilemma for organisations (Verganti, 1999). Although 
discussed by Verganti (1999) and argued that both are not mutually exclusive, a 
problem for managers is still to identify early “constraints and opportunities” 
(ibid., p. 364), to decide on product design early and to set the direction of 
following stages, while keeping an eye on other strategic objectives, such as cost. 
This is, however, difficult, at early stages. The early stage(s) (often called fuzzy 
front-end) are argued to be difficult to manage due to uncertainty and distance to 
product launch, and due to the interactions between creativity and control; this is a 
very interesting field and one that is yet to be studied in detail with a focus on 
product design and control. 
 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978), for example, discussed innovation in early stages 
of organisations (being more entrepreneurial) and ambiguous performance criteria; 
there is uncertainty about targets and technology. In the early stages, for example, 
it is difficult for the decision maker to decide on major investments or costs 
(ibid.). Although in the literature different methodologies and measurements for 
decisions on concept design alternatives have been argued and developed (e.g. 
Smith et al., 1999; Reinertsen, 1999, Ayag, 2005), there is still the open conflict 
between systematic approaches that focus on coordination and control, and 
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approaches arguing for a focus on creativity and less on control. Although control 
has also been discussed positively in terms of innovation management (e.g. Davila 
and Wouters, 2004; Simons, 1995), while building a stable basis in uncertain 
conditions (e.g. Chapman, 1998), there is a lack of insight of the interaction 
between control mechanisms and creative processes in early stages of product 
development.  
 
Several studies have been discussing limits of control during product development 
processes. Either, management control may be perceived to hinder innovation and 
creativity, or values might not be calculated at all, since they are incommensurable 
(Espeland and Stevens, 1998). Literature argues that, for organisations, a 
separation of innovation activities might have a positive impact on the 
effectiveness of the innovation (for a comprehensive literature review please see 
Krieger, 2005, p. 81-85). Autonomy of different functions, depending on stages, is 
argued to be more successful than a complete integration and coordination of all 
functions. This is argued to be particularly valid for early stages (Krieger, 2005).  
 
However, this leaves open how strategic objectives are mobilised in creative 
accounts in which rigid control systems seems to be absent. First, there is a lack of 
research on the interrelation between strategic objectives and aesthetical product 
design in early development stages. Secondly, organisations may have difficulties 
defining and anticipating strategic objectives. Thirdly, if control mechanisms are 
present in design processes, then the analysis of the mobilisation of strategic 
objectives becomes an interesting issue. Fourthly, strategies objectives may be 
defined upfront and act on design. However, design may also act on these strategic 




I will discuss these problems from a theoretical perspective on the different 
characteristics of the early stage. Focusing on the role of strategic objectives, I 
seek to develop a perspective through which this problem can be analysed. 
 
5.3.2.2 Strategic objectives and mobilisation 
 
Product development is argued to be a strategic process that is crucial for the 
success of both the product and the organisation (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1995). In this process, strategic objectives may be defined upfront and steer the 
development process (defined strategic objectives mobilise aesthetical design), or 
they may emerge in this process (aesthetical design mobilises strategic 
objectives). I will briefly elaborate on both views in the next two sections. 
 
In the early stage of product development, strategic objectives define the 
directions of the future product. Strategic objectives are mobilised within different 
spaces and influence the decisions along the development process. Through the 
mobilisation within the development process, alternative concept designs are 
created, calculations are generated and decisions on the alternatives are taken. 
Here, decision processes are argued to play a key role in innovation as, through 
decision making, strategic objectives are balanced in and among projects and 
value is maximised (Cooper and Edgett, 1997; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
Starting off with product development, strategic objectives are defined that 
position products and that state their objectives. These objectives may be inscribed 
in documents and are guiding development processes.  From this perspective, 
objectives are defined as stable and static in the process, and are the input for the 
following processes guided by control mechanisms (e.g. Anthony, 1965). Strategic 




Rather than following a content approach and taking a look into ideal-type 
strategies and their implementation, another approach may be followed focusing 
on how actors are involved in the process of product development (e.g. Chenhall, 
2005). If strategic objectives are now inscribed into accounts, such as documents 
or visualisations, then these are anything but static or stable. These accounts are 
not just neutral but are representations, which are acted upon and that are being 
evaluated and calculated (Miller, 1990). These inscriptions allow for “governing at 
a distance”, meaning that these (e.g. documents, calculations) represent absent 
things and relations (actors) and make it possible for them to be mobilised. This, 
however, is not only true to managerial decision processes. Christiansen and 
Varnes (2007), for example, argue that the work of actors prior to decisions is of 
major importance in understanding the generation of innovation. It is thus not only 
relevant to focus on how decisions in the generation of innovation are made; 
moreover, it becomes relevant how alternatives are generated prior to decisions 
and what role strategic objectives and their representations play. The interplay of 
these elements may thus not be regarded as sequential due to their influencing 
nature on each other. Alternatives not only influence decisions but decisions may 
influence the generation of alternatives. Strategic documents are not only part of 
the decision process but accompany, interact with and are shaped by the 
generation of alternatives (Jørgensen and Messner, 2010).  Process approaches 
shed light on how processes shape strategic objectives and vice versa (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995). Formulation and implementation are simultaneous and strategy 
evolves through a process (Chenhall, 2005).  From this perspective, objectives 
emerge and are shaped in the process of design; aesthetical design mobilises 
strategic objectives. 
 
Thus, strategic objectives are, on the one hand, set and acted upon by the process 
of design yet, on the other hand, aesthetical design and the generation of 
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alternatives may shape strategic objectives. This interaction is be followed and 
analysed in this paper. 
 
5.3.2.3 Theoretical approach 
 
To analyse the previously described issue, a process perspective may be relevant 
(e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2010); however, it may not be sufficient to 
understand the interactions. A process perspective on strategy is recently 
developed as strategising or strategy-as-practice. Strategising is a process that 
focuses on actions and processes rather than on strategy itself. It is a social process 
(Whittington, 2006). As Jarzabkowski et al. (2007, p.8) defined it: 
 
 “‘[...]activity is considered strategic to the extent that it is consequential 
for the strategic outcomes, directions, survival and competitive advantage 
of the firm (Johnson et al., 2003), even where these consequences are not 
part of an intended and formally articulated strategy. [...] Strategizing’ 
refers to the ‘doing of strategy’; that is, the construction of this flow of 
activity through the actions and interactions of multiple actors and the 
practices that they draw upon.” 
 
Literature on strategising or strategy-as-practice thus defines strategy as something 
that is done by social actors rather than just a property of organisations 
(Whittington, 2003). However, this social perspective suggests that routines and 
intended practices are constructed by, either more, or less, skilled people within 
the organisation and that strategising is thus a skill that can be obtained at either 





The actor-network approach here provides a perspective for discussing how 
strategic objectives are translated in product development because strategic 
objectives in this perspective can only persist as long as they are carried by actors 
or carry actors. Callon (1986) introduced the four moments of translation, namely, 
problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. Problematisation is 
the process in which one actor becomes indispensable by determining other actors’ 
links and identities. In the process of interessement the actors’ goals and identities 
are considered; it is “the group of actions by which an entity [...] attempts to 
impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its 
problematisation.” (Callon, 1986, p. 207-208).  Here, links to other identities are 
adjusted and become displaced towards one goal. By accepting their roles the 
other actors are enrolled.  Mobilisation is the process of rendering entities “mobile 
which were not so beforehand” (Callon, 1986, p. 216). The actors are now 
displaced and assembled in the same space and time. The translation of individual 
goals of two (or more) actors results in a common goal that is different from the 
original ones (Latour, 1999, p. 179). By acting towards the composite goal, actors 
act as one unit (Callon, 1986, p. 223).  
 
From this perspective, strategising is rather a process of translation of and through 
different actors in which things are being problematised, actors are interested and 
enrolled, and in which objectives are being mobilised. Objectives are defined and 
these “definitions are inscribed in intermediaries” (Callon, 1991, p. 143). 
Following Christiansen and Varnes (2007), I argue that through an actor-network 
perspective, the analysis is facilitated in that that the decision process is displaced 
and replaced by the process of translation, and problematisation and interessement 




In a product development process there may be intermediaries carrying formally 
articulated strategy. These are translated through different actors in different times 
and spaces. Thus, we have to “follow the actors’ own ways and begin our travels 
by the traces left behind by their activity of forming and dismantling 
groups.”(Latour, 2005, p. 29). Strategising in product development networks is 
part of a network, which constitutes heterogeneous actors that interact with each 
other with a goal of providing a product or goods (Callon, 1991). Strategising is 
thus performed by various actors and, if successful, may lead to different 
convergence in networks and “the extent to which the processes of translation and 
its circulation of intermediaries leads to agreement” (Callon, 1991, p. 144).  
 
Thus, the strategising process within new product development projects faces the 
following problems in the early concept stage. First, the ambivalence of 
technological and sociocultural innovation and the issue of control are important 
factors in strategic mobilisation. Also, means to steer these processes “in everyday 
practices are not the same as those that the companies officially declare and 
describe” (Christiansen and Varnes, 2009, p. 516). Secondly, the question for the 
generation of alternatives and for the decision process is not only when and where 
they take place, but through which mechanisms they are triggered. Thirdly, 
strategising may influence different product development networks within an 
organisation. Jørgensen and Messner (2010), for example, focus on two different 
product lines. In multi-product/derivate industries, such as the automotive 
industry, many product lines are at different stages at the same time and are 
affected through different practices and forms of strategising. These networks 
impact each other as the practices of one network (or project) might affect the 
practices of the other network. The chain of these impacts may be called long-term 
practice. Long term practice is not only linked to specific projects but to the 
accumulation of things (Latour, 1987, p. 220); the unfolding of capabilities (e.g. 
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learning curves, knowledge generation, structural/processual flexibility) project-
by-project is what results from long term practice (structural flexibility, Verganti, 
1999). Fourthly, defined strategic objectives influence the process of design, 
whilst aesthetical design and the generation of alternatives in turn shape strategic 
objectives.  
 
Thus, strategic objectives and aesthetical design are being problematised in early 
stages, and in the process of strategising, actors become interested and enrolled 
through means such as calculations, visualisations or long term practice. How 
design and strategic objects interact in the process of translation is therefore of 
interest as both are acting on each other. This begs the question: 
 
How are strategic objectives translated in the process of aesthetical 
design? 
 
5.3.3 Research design 
 
The research domain is a mid-sized European car manufacturer in the premium 
sector (hereafter, Automotive Company), well known for its design and innovation 
competencies. The study was conducted over a period of two years (Figure 7). 
Within those two years, I studied three car projects (Projects 1-3) that were in their 
conceptual stage and were thus concerned with the generation and decision on 
alternative concepts. In addition, I studied former car projects through documents 
and interviews to get a deeper understanding of the product development process. 
First, I gathered company material in the form of internal documents (e.g. business 
cases, strategy papers, and design presentations) to understand the new product 
development process. The material was important to gain an understanding of the 
processes, decisions and changes that appeared in Automotive Company. 
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Furthermore, as I was employed by Automotive Company at the time of the study, 
I attended decision meetings and strategy discussions.56 The documents were 
gathered focusing on information about the stage-gate process, decisions and 
milestones and also on the three projects. Decision meetings and strategy 





Figure 7 – Organisation of empirical material 
 
Building on the gathered and analysed material, I conducted fifteen semi-
structured interviews, within a range of 30–60 minutes, of which seven were 
recorded and transcribed57 (Appendix 7). In the other eight, non-transcribed 
interview notes were carefully taken and as many quotes as possible were 
transcribed. In the interviews I focused on former and recent episodes of concept 
creation, selection and evaluation in concept design, and on likely frictions. The 
interviews were semi-structured to leave the development of episodes and 
problems to the interviewee.  
                                                 
56 Employment may lead to bias and might negatively influence the quality of the empirics (Hermanowicz, 2002). In interviews, 
bias may lead to focusing too much on developing meaning that has been build up through high engagement. First, the author 
was not engaged directly in the calculation and concept design functions in the early stages. Second, the interviews were semi-
structured, trying to focus on the theoretical developments and episodes relating to the developed focus.  
57 Design at Automotive Company is a highly confidential area. Recording interviews in that area was often impossible due to 
this fact. 
Gathering Company material - Interviews
Project 1 - Conceptual stage
Project 2 - Conceptual stage
Project 3 - Conceptual stage




I searched for the episodes of problems and dilemmas where strategising in form 
of design concepts and strategic objectives interact (Eisenhardt, 1989). The basic 
idea is to follow control mechanisms and the way they create, shape and mobilise 
objectives within organisations (e.g. Miller & O´leary, 2007). Following control 
mechanisms that mobilise objectives (Callon & Muniesa, 2005), or building 
controversies is a key point in understanding product development networks 
(Caliskan & Callon, 2009). Therefore, the empirical material is structured as 
follows; first, I focus on the defined stage-gate process in Automotive Company. 
Secondly, I discuss how aesthetical design concepts are generated and decided 
upon. Thirdly, I describe how, in three mini cases, strategic objectives were in 
aesthetical design. The mini cases were selected based on episodes of problems 
and dilemmas. In all three cases I could find emerging strategic objectives such as 
customer value (Case 1), costs (Case 2), or modularity (Case 3) which although 
being predefined became shaped by aesthetical design. The cases were selected 
based on gathered empirical material and based on interviews which pointed 
towards dilemmas of strategic mobilisation. As previously discussed, the 
translation processes in the cases are relevant. First, it is relevant how strategic 
objectives and design are problematised. Secondly, interessement and enrolment 
of actors are important moments towards the mobilisation of strategic objectives. 
The cases are structured by the moments of translation to understand the 





5.3.4 Empirical findings 
5.3.4.1 Introduction of the development and design process of Automotive 
Company 
 
To give a broader understanding of the design and development process in 
Automotive Company I will briefly describe the processes. In Automotive 
Company several projects are developed at the same time. There is a blueprint 
stage-gate process for all projects, which is only slightly adapted for individual 
problems and needs, such as slightly differing timelines. However, in the formal 




Figure 8 – The simplified stage-gate process 
  
In the strategy stage, the positioning of the car is roughly anticipated based on 
market screening. Only a few people from strategic departments are active at this 
stage where the feasibility of a car project is evaluated. The outcomes of this stage 
are strategic papers/documents in which rough technical parameters of a car 






• Generation of strategic papers
During stage:
• Development of  alternative 
Aesthetical Design Concepts
• Development of  alternative 
Technological Design Concepts
• Set of financial and technological 
targets
End of stage:
• Verification of Concept through 
Cost  Calculations
• Design and space validation
• Confirmation of Target 
Achievement (COST, Quality, 
Weight, CO2,...)
• Final development of fixed 
Design
• Prototype Production in 
Laboratory





project and customers’ preferences are described. In most cases the description of 
the configuration leaves room for interpretation and alternative concepts. Also, 
fixed prerequisites, such as norms, laws, or modularity, are set. These strategic 
documents are transferred to the conceptual stage, in which a technological project 
leader together with development teams work towards the generation of a coherent 
car concept. 
 
In the concept stage, focus is set on generating alternatives, evaluating them and 
finding the right solutions to balance market (value) and cost views. Different 
departments with different foci interpret the strategic documents. There were two 
different spaces in which these documents are mobilised and interpreted. The first 
space concerned the development of technological design concepts, in which cross 
functional teams evaluated cost and technological criteria.  The second concerned 
the development of aesthetical design concepts. Here, as discussed, I will focus on 
aesthetical concept design. Aesthetical design concerns the development of the 
inner and outer shape of the car, its proportions, and focuses on the sociocultural 
element of a car. The development takes place in a design department that is 
loosely coupled to the technological product development process. For every 
project, a “design engineer” is responsible for discussing what is technologically 
feasible and what is not. Thus, the design engineers bring certain design barriers 
into the design process. These concern, for instance manufacturability, laws or 
modularity. These are rather technological boundaries, which have to be 
considered to ensure the feasibility of a model. 
 
Within this process, designers interpret the strategic objectives differently. In the 
car design process every designer has their own interpretation of the strategic 
objectives of a car project. Designers are confronted with the strategic documents. 
Every designer creates his or her own interpretation through design sketches. 
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From these rather rough sketches, a certain number (e.g. five58) of designers is 
chosen that may develop a clay model from their sketches. The head of the design 
department makes the choice. The designers start to develop their clay models 
together with the design engineer. After the designers create their models, the 
models are presented to the executive committee. These models already look like 
real cars. In this meeting, the five models are decided down to three59. The models 
differed in either, forms concerning the size of the components, or in additional 
design elements, such as chrome rings or decoys.  
 
In these meetings, comments and discussions on the models are documented and 
give input to the designers. The designers rework their models based on the output 
of this meeting. The models become more mature and rather slight changes and 
adaptations are made. In the final decision round, the final design concept is 
chosen. This process is visualised in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9 – The generation of aesthetical design concepts 
 
                                                 
58 The exact number is confidential 
59 The exact number is confidential 
Design alternative I    Clay model
Design alternative II  Clay model
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Design alternative III Clay model
Design alternative V   Clay model
Design alternative VI Clay model
















The final design selection meeting is conducted like the first one. The generation 
of alternatives is thus based on the interpretation of single designers. Boundaries 
are of a technological nature and are discussed together with cost issues through 
the design engineer. In the selection process, the decisions are based on soft, rather 
than measurable, effects.  
 
“They [the managers] chose what they liked and what was representing 
our brand the most in terms of form-language.” [Designer] 
 
As discussed, the aesthetical design process is loosely coupled from the 
technological development process. Only design engineers are consulting the 
designers about technological feasibility. Of course, within the strategic 
documents, certain aspects, such as manufacturability, laws, or modularity are 
already fixed. How a strategic objective such as equal parts/modularity interacts 
with aesthetical design is shown in Case 3. However, in general, the 
interpretations of the chosen design model and the technological concept differ to 
some extent: 
 
“The designers created the concepts very differently as that, what we 
were doing here on paper. And in the end we were coming together and 
saw some different things. Concepts were shown to the executive 
committee and they decided without us being part of it or being asked – of 
course really cool stuff as well, without that, we wouldn’t build such cool 
cars [...] But it was separated from our process [...] because their 
creativity should not be influenced and that we did not rain on their 




The design engineers address the technological criteria, such as feasibility and 
strategic requirements, throughout the generation of aesthetical design concepts. 
However, financial information is only passively provided, in the form of cost 
deviation, in the two design selection meetings. How financial information in the 
form of cost calculations and targets interact with aesthetical design is described in 
case 2. 
 
In summary, strategic objectives are not calculated and steered towards. Rather, 
the design process is characterised through individual interpretations, and the 
selection is based on forms and aesthetics rather than on calculated criteria. In the 
next chapter I will introduce three mini cases to give deeper insights into the 
generation of aesthetical design concepts. 
 
5.3.4.2 Case 1 – Customer value as interpretative objectives 
 
Although individual designers create aesthetical design, there are, as discussed, 
initial strategic objectives inscribed in e.g. text documents that act in the 
generation of designs. In Case 1 a new car project was developed. In the strategy 
stage, strategic objectives for the new project were set. The new project to be 
developed should have specific proportions which were inscribed in the initial 
strategic project description. Thus, the proportions of the car project were already 
directed and described by strategic objectives, which directed the generation 




5.3.4.2.1 Design test - Problematisation of proportions 
 
In order to grasp customer demands and taste about proportions, a design test60 
was performed before designers started to build their clay models. These design 
tests were completed for every new model to be designed in Automotive 
Company. Particularly interesting, however, is this case due to the contradicting 
proportions. The design test was executed with target customers in two to four 
main target markets. In the design test, a model was shown that reflected the 
proportions derived from the beforehand defined strategic objectives. The model 
was presented, to a group of customers, together with four to eight other models 
from the segment, including models from Automotive Company and models of 
competitors. 
 
Exterior and interior proportions were shown and a survey (quantitatively) and 
interviews (qualitatively) were conducted. The outcome of the interviews were 
gathered in documents in the form of positive and negative quotes, which provided 
details, such as ”the position of the license plate is too low” or “the chrome 
element looks nice although it is a bit too big for my taste”. In this car project, the 
rear of the car was rated to be the “weakest view of the car”. The proportions in 
the rear were perceived as too “bulky”, “looking like a big butt” or it was stated, 
“the rear jeopardises the storyline of the car”. It was also perceived to be too close 
to the existing car in the higher segment. Both, qualitative and quantitative data 
were gathered in one document and the outcomes were compared to the 
proportions which were defined in the strategic objectives, and key concerns were 
identified by design and management. These concerned first, the overall 
perceptions, which were held to be disproportionate by the customer. Secondly, 
the rear was found to be too bulky. Thirdly, the side, in which the side windows 
                                                 
60 The design test is one of the most confidential processes and information in Automotive Company. I could not attend the 
design test due to confidentiality. The information in this paper is limited to text documents and interviews. 
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were perceived to be too small. And fourthly, the front, that was perceived to be 
too high. 
 
The proportions were thus problematised by the design test which incorporated the 
customer’s view. The proportions which were defined in strategic objectives got 
questioned through the design test and derived key concerns were put in an official 
document. With this document, the designers of the clay models that were in 
competition had new aspects to refer to. 
 
5.3.4.2.2 Customer’s view, initial proportions and design - Interessement and 
enrolment 
 
Although there were no fixed prerequisites for the generation of alternative 
designs, the outcomes of the design test were taken seriously. As one designer 
stated (from notes taken): 
 
“We have to take, of course, into consideration what the customer is 
saying. We do not follow all critique and still do our thing. But it is 
definitely influencing our work.” [Designer] 
 
In this case, the extent to which these outcomes influenced the designs is not 
measurable. However, designers and decision makers used these documents for 
discussing clays and designs. The rear was significantly adapted. One design 





“As you can see, we tested towards the A-pillar, towards the B-Pillar and 
the C-Pillar and finally the rear of the car. After the Designtest the clay 
models differed significantly from the proportion model used in the 
Designtest. The rear is really light now.” [Design manager] 
 
The outcomes of the re-modelled models were then compared to the initial 
proportion model and to the key findings of the design test. Through this 
comparison it became visible to what extent the designers adapted their models 
and to what extent it complies with the key critiques of the design test.  
 
The documents from the design test represented the potential customers’ view. 
These interested designers and management within the generation of alternative 
design models. Thus, customers’ taste is tested on previous proportion-models that 
provide directions for future designs. Strategic objectives emerged from the 
visualisations of proportional design models as they were inscribed in the 
documents and the models; common goals were created within the process of 
design.  
 
5.3.4.2.3 Mobilisation – Proportions, customers, and design models 
 
Together with the comparison, the models were presented in the design selection 
stages in which the competing models were decided down to the final model. 
Thus, deviations of the models compared to the initial proportion and to the key 
findings were displayed in the meeting. In the last selection stage all three models 
were, to a certain degree, adapted based on the findings. One model, for example, 
was mainly adapted in the rear; another model, more in the front. Though due to 
confidentiality the minutes of the meeting could not be accessed, the design 
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manager who took part in the meeting stated that the most “coherent” model was 



















      
 Problematisatiom Interessement and enrolment Mobilisation 
Figure 10 – The translation process towards the final model 
 
Figure 10 summarises the translation process. In the end, the final model 
represented initial strategic objectives, individual interpretations and the 
customer’s view. Through the design test and the documentation, design meetings 
and decisions, the customer’s voice got inscribed into design models. Design 
translated and thus defined strategic objectives, as through the design test and the 
modelling of the cars the initial proportions got re-considered.  
 
5.3.4.3 Case 2 – Resising a design element 
 
In Case 2 a specific design element61 was defined through the size and proportions 
of the predecessor model. These parameters were described in strategic 
documents, which were communicated to the designers who were designing the 
five clay models.  
                                                 


































5.3.4.3.1 Problematisation through proportions and cost 
 
As previously described, a design engineer evaluated the five clay models before 
the first selection meeting. In this case, two of the five clay models showed the 
design element about twice the size of the parameters set in the strategic 
documents. With the evaluation, design engineers provided cost estimations of the 
design element of the two cars, showing that the cost of the design element was 
twice as high as the cost of the design element of the predecessor. The cost 
estimations were performed by a specific department which was responsible for 
calculating product costs of future products. These estimations were discussed in 
cross functional teams and agreed upon by different departments, such as 
purchasing, cost engineering and accounting. The costs were provided for the size 
and proportions that were initially set in the strategic documents. For the two 
bigger design elements a surcharge was provided for the additional material, for 
higher logistic costs (due to size), as well as for higher tooling costs (because of 
the bigger size of the tools). These numbers were not generally (as well as in this 
case) contested in the project because they were agreed upon in cross functional 
teams. Based on these estimations, project management made their decisions. 
 
5.3.4.3.2 Cost deviations and design selection - Interessement and enrolment 
 
While the confrontation with cost usually (as in prior projects) happened in the 
selection stages, this time, designers were already confronted with the cost during 
clay design. Not only was this a new circumstance; both designers adjusted their 
concept towards the cost targets derived on the basis of the strategic objective. 
One of the designers stated: 
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“You see that they are killing it anyway later due to cost targets. Now I 
adjust it [the design element] upfront knowing that I won’t be able to keep 
it.” [Designer] 
 
Furthermore, in one particular meeting, one of the designers was pointing towards 
a case in which this had happened before and that they would have problems 
anyhow in holding on to the concepts. 
 
“When you design the alternatives, then you have to negotiate and argue 
with the managers because you may add cost and then you have to design 
a solution” [Designer] 
 
During their design process, the designers were not only provided a technological 
evaluation but also a cost evaluation. In this case, design engineers evaluated the 
design concept before the design selection meetings and designers knew if they 
would exceed the cost of their models that they might have a problem in the 
selection meeting. One developer commented this new situation: 
 
“No, because everything is focused on management, more precisely the 
costs; a lot of things have changed. The designers are now down to earth, 
way more down to earth. They know by now that they have to integrate 
themselves into our process.” [Development engineer] 
 
Cost estimations based on the size and definition in the strategic objectives, and 
deviations from this size, were thus important information for designers. This cost 
information problematised deviations of designs from strategic objectives and 




5.3.4.3.3 Mobilisation of cost and size as common goal 
 
Cost as strategic objective was thus mobilised in aesthetical design. Not a decision 
based on a cost calculation changed the design or concept. A cost-estimation and 
the anticipation of the designers that higher cost could cause a change in the 
design decisions changed the design. Furthermore, the design engineers compared 
the size of the part with the size of the part of the predecessor. Thus, proportions 
of the predecessor were a basis for the design process as they were incorporated 
into the discussion about the new design and into the estimation of the cost. 
Hence, the concept of the predecessor was an important element in the generation 
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Figure 11 – Translation process of the strategic objectives size and cost 
 
Referring to a case in which a design element was changed due to cost issues, the 
two designers adjusted their models in alignment with the technological concept 




















incorporated thus the strategic objectives of cost. This is summarised in Figure 11. 
Cost as strategic objectives was defined, but also emerged through the modelling 
of proportions and the predecessor proportions. Although the designers still, in 
general terms, followed their design model and didn’t steer their work towards 
target costs or calculations, some issues were present and influenced the design 
process. Thus cost, as a strategic objective, became part of the design process not 
directly through calculations and targets, but indirectly through anticipations of 
decisions. Here, the initial strategic objectives cost and size were inscribed in the 
final model, and were thus translated by design. 
 
5.3.4.4 Case 3 – Designing towards equal parts 
 
A new modularity strategy was being implemented. Inscribed in strategic 
documents, modularity became an important pillar in the development of cars with 
Automotive Company. Efficiency in development processes, and cost and product 
complexity reduction should be the long term result of using equal parts and 
modularity. Equal parts and modular components such as headlights were set, 
right after the strategic stage of a car project, by technological development teams. 
In strategic documents modular components and equal parts were thus described, 
which were provided to design. The document consisted of a list of all parts of the 
car project. The parts were described in this document by parameters such as size 
(see e.g. case 2) and whether they should be modular parts or equal/carry over 
parts. This was the blueprint for the development of the parts. How this strategic 





5.3.4.4.1 Strategic and aesthetical definitions of components – 
Problematisation 
 
Similarly to Case 2, equal parts and modular components as strategic objectives 
were communicated to design by design engineers. These objectives were 
discussed with the single designers and as they designed their clay models, 
modular components should have been taken into account and they should design 
the shapes and forms “around” the modular component: 
 
“On the one hand we should design the cars as beautiful as possible, on 
the other hand we get the prerequisite to take modular components. And 
now, now I have to design around these components, huh?! And this has 
an effect of the bordering shapes. They are thus set as well. These are 
really constraints.” [Designer] 
 
Like in case 2 it was, however, not always the case that the designers initially took 
these constraints into consideration. In this case all five clay models were initially 
individually designed and their headlights differed from each other. This was also 
the case after the first selection down to three clay models. In technological 
development, the modularity and equal parts strategy was, however, set, and the 
headlights of Project 3 should be carried over from another project to save tooling 
costs and proportional costs by economies of scale. The design engineers 
communicated this information to the designers. In the generation of alternatives 
thus, individual interpretations of design initially neglected set prerequisites and 





5.3.4.4.2 Strategic objectives or individual visualisations - Interessement and 
enrolment 
 
The design engineers communicated again the information to the designers and 
marked the headlights as not being in compliance with the strategic set of equal 
parts. In the design process the designers of the three chosen models adapted their 
headlights and put the carry over part into their clay models. Although initially the 
models were designed individually neglecting the prerequisite of equal parts, the 
designers changed their models and incorporated the technological demand for 
equal parts. Concerning the development of the designers within this process, the 
development engineer of these parts stated: 
 
“The designers are no longer the freaks they have been before. They are 
much more structured and know technological boundaries better than I 
do, although I am responsible for them. They come to me and say, ‘no, 
this is not possible, this is set as an equal part.” [Development engineer] 
 
Bringing the process of design selection “down to earth” might be seen as a 
process of handling the likely risk of being thrown out when not complying with 
technological demands. Similarly to the cost issue in case 2, the designers were in 
competition to win the final selection stage and strong deviations of technological 
demands were risky. However, this was not always the case, as one design 
engineer stated: 
 
“In the predecessor we had different headlights between the two models. 
Although there we should have already done equal parts. We had the 
same hood, see? The chosen model however convinced the executive 
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committee to go with the same hood, but not with the same headlights.” 
[Design Engineer] 
 
The chosen design model in the predecessor did not comply with the strategic 
prerequisites and could convince management through the visualised model. Here, 
it was management that got interested and enrolled in the design model through its 
visualisation.  
 
5.3.4.4.3 Mobilisation of strategic objectives or individual designs 
 
Thus, on the one hand, designers knew the prerequisite of modularity and equal 
parts, on the other, it was their own decision whether to cope with this prerequisite 
or not. They could run the risk of being thrown out of the competition due to not 
meeting the prerequisites. On the other hand, with their model they may convince 
the executive committee, the decision makers, to break with the prerequisite of 













    
       
Design 






Problematisation Interessement and enrolment Mobilisation  
 
Figure 12 – Translation process of equal parts or individual interpretations 
 
As summarised in Figure 12, strategic objectives are translated into physical 
visualisations and design models through inscription or non-inscription. When 
they are incorporated the strategic objective of equal parts mobilises design. When 
they are not incorporated the individual interpretation of the designer mobilises 
strategic objectives. In this case the designers adapted the headlights and the 
strategic objective of equal parts mobilised design. In a former project, however, 
the designers’ interpretation of the headlights mobilised the individual design as 
strategic objective. 
 
5.3.4.5 Brief summary of cases 
 
Although both, aesthetical design and technological development were separated 
and although, the models designed in aesthetical design deviated from concepts 
developed in technological development, strategic elements were present in 















and equal parts 
strategy 
Changed design models / 
adaption of headlights – 
Mobilisation of strategic 
objective 
Design models with 
individual headlights/ no 




aesthetical design mobilises strategic objectives. Adaptations of designs in 
between the selection stages, due to the mobilisation of strategic objectives, are 




 Case 1 - Project 1 Case 2 - Project 2 Case 3 - Project 3 
Stage Concept stage – before five 
clay models were generated 
Concept stage – five / three 
clay models 
Concept stage – five / three 
clay models 
Component Whole car / exterior 
 
Design element Headlights 
Description of case The car concept was contested by 
customers 
A design test of the new model 
showed that the concept of the 
rear of the car was perceived 
weak 
The clay models all showed less 
bulky design due to outcomes 
of design test 
A design element was designed 
in all five clay models 
n two of the five models, the 
design element was 
“significantly bigger” than its 
predecessor 
Estimations during the generation 
of the design element and the 
clay models indicated higher 
cost, compared to its 
predecessor  
The design element in both 
models were adjusted during 
the design stage in clay models 
because of estimations 
indicating deviation of the 
predecessor 
All five clay models were 
initially individually designed 
Headlights were carried over 
/equal part from another 
derivate due to cost 
calculations in technological 
development 
Following the selection process 
down to two models, the  
designs were changed and 
adjusted to the equal part 
Defined strategic 
objectives inscribed 
in documents for 
design 
Proportions of new  concept 
Segment 
Cost of components Modularity/Equal part 
Strategic objectives 
in design decisions/ 
selections 
Forms / Aesthetics 
Functions and costs 
Forms / Aesthetics 
Functions and costs 
Forms / Aesthetics 
Functions and costs 
Problematisation Strategic objectives were 
problematised through design 
test 
Design element was bigger as 
described in strategic 
documents 
Designers were confronted with 
cost deviation 
Headlights were individually 
designed although equal parts 
were described in strategic 
documents 




Key findings from design test 
enrolled designers 
Cost information was important 
for designers as the cost 
deviation could become an 
issue in the design selection 
Technological information was 
important for designers as 
deviations could become an 
issue in the design selection 
n other cases management could 
become interested and enrolled 
through visualisations 
Mobilisation Designers adapted their models 
based on key findings 
The customer, and individual 
designs were mobilised in the 
final model 
Designers adapted their models 
based on strategic objectives 
The strategic objective of size 
and of cost was mobilised 
Either incorporation and 
mobilisation of strategic 
objective 
Or 
ndividual interpretation of part 
and mobilisation of individual 
design 
Emerging strategic 
objectives in design 
generation 
Customer evaluation 
Forms / Aesthetics 




Forms / Aesthetics 
ndividualism of designer 
Feasibility 
Deviation or compliance with 
modularity/equal 
part/Individualistic designer 
Forms / Aesthetics 
Feasibility 
 





The controlled processes of technological concept development focused on 
measurable issues, such as material specifications (weight, cost, 
manufacturability), and functions of components (cost, customer value through 
innovation); specific forms and shapes were developed in the aesthetical concept 
development. Furthermore, sociocultural innovation, such as form-language (e.g. 
design elements, proportions) and interfaces (e.g. dashboard), were foci of 
aesthetical design. In the aesthetical design process, the creation of alternative 
concepts was very much individualistically driven, as there were different 
alternatives created by single designers. Individualism may here be defined 
through competition between clay models and the process of interessement and 
enrolment of other actors into a model. The split of both processes should provide 
more freedom from the rather target driven technological development process. In 
the three cases I showed how customer value, cost, proportions, positioning and 
equal parts, rather than being just defined and set beforehand, were an outcome of 
the process of design. I discuss how design creates value, how long term practice 
affects the generation of design and how design is rather loosely coupled with 
strategic prerequisites rather than being straightjacketed. 
 
5.3.5.1 Creation of value in design 
 
The customer was translated into design through quantitative and qualitative 
statements, which were gathered in a design test with customers. The 
documentation of this design test represented an overall customer’s point of view 
towards the shown proportion-model rather than an explicit route, which the 
designer should take account of in generating her/his proportions. Thereby, 
customer value was incorporated and created while generating alternative design 
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models, and proportions became strategic interpretations alongside the design 
process. Design translated strategic objectives as through the design test and the 
modelling of the cars the initial proportions got re-considered. Strategic 
objectives, such as form language and sociocultural innovations were thus pursued 
in the process of design and through e.g. competition within design. Innovation 
thus happens through strategising in creative spaces (e.g. Davila, 2005). 
 
 
5.3.5.2 Long term practice and the generation of alternatives 
 
Through gaining importance within technological development, cost estimations 
had an effect on the aesthetical design process. The strategic objective cost was 
translated into aesthetical design by the generation and selection of design 
alternatives. In this case, based on prior experience and the anticipation that cost 
calculations may rationalise the design in decision meetings, designers changed 
their design element towards the size of the predecessor. Both the reference to the 
predecessor and the reference towards cost were mobilised within the design 
process.  
 
The strategic objective of cost reduction entered aesthetical design through the 
“back door” by being integrated in decisions and shaping the creation process 
through this. Cost did not enter via the strategic documents or calculations directly 
in aesthetical design, but indirectly through the anticipation of likely cost issues in 
the decision process. This anticipation is related to long term practice in which 
through the accumulation of things (Latour, 1987, p. 220), capabilities unfold (e.g. 
learning curves, experiences, knowledge generation, structural/processual 
flexibility). This was shown in Case 2 where one designer pointed towards an 
experience in which a calculation influenced a decision on a particular component. 
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This feeds into the assumption that the “crafting of strategy benefits from a 
detailed understanding of financial implications of strategic choices” (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2005). 
 
The work prior to decisions is not only of importance in understanding innovation 
(see e.g. Christiansen and Varnes, 2007) but is interdependent with the decisions. 
Jørgensen and Messner (2010) stated for example, that “if the output of one 
practice enters another practice, then practitioners of the second practice have an 
interest in the specification of the first one.” But interdependencies go in both 
directions and the first practitioners also have an interest in practices of the 
second. The anticipation of cost calculations, for example, mobilised the strategic 
objective of cost reduction and displaced it into the process of generating different 
aesthetical design alternatives.  
 
5.3.5.3 Design and strategic prerequisites - loosely coupled instead of 
straightjacketed  
 
Prerequisites may be transformed in the process of design. A design engineer 
provided technological input to ensure that the design model would be feasible for 
producing a car.  Furthermore, the design engineer communicated cost and 
prerequisites such as equal parts or modularity. They created consciousness of 
strategic objectives in design through the communication of strategic documents. 
Provided by design engineers, this interactive form of control (Simons, 1995) 
loosely coupled aesthetical design with initially set strategic prerequisites and 
technological development. Although being set, modular components and equal 
parts, for example, may not be incorporated within aesthetical design as they 




Designers themselves determined whether they would accept these constraints or 
not. They may either be convinced that their design language overrules the 
technical language (e.g. form versus function/modularity), or they may be 
precautious and design their models in alignment with the set prerequisites. 
Strategic objectives in this course are encountered through the competition of 
individual designers, which may either succeed in enrolling the decision makers in 
their “non-aligned-to-prerequisite design”, or succeed in enrolling in their 
“aligned-to-prerequisite design.” Here, strategic objective did not straightjacket 
designers; instead designers were loosely coupled to strategic prerequisites. 
 
In the case of the “non-aligned-to-prerequisite design”, the visualisation of the 
design (design model) could enrol management and create a design language as 
new objective which was inscribed in the design model. In the case of the 
“aligned-to-prerequisite design”, the strategic objective was inscribed in the 
design model and was translated through enrolling the designers. Here, designers 
either shaped strategic objectives or vice versa. It is thus not only decisions that 
determine the incorporation of strategic objectives. The generation of alternatives 
as a “creative endeavour” may be impacted by management practices (Verganti, 
1999; Amabile, 1997), such as choosing from different alternatives. As Davila 
described it, “an organisation that wants to follow an aggressive innovation 
strategy needs to create the appropriate setting to generate variation, put in place 
the context to select among different alternatives” (Davila, 2005, p. 52-53).  
 
Irrespective of the control mechanism the designers behave differently. Although 
the control mechanisms stayed the same, the looseness of coupling differed. Either 
they changed set strategic objectives (“non-aligned-to-prerequisite design”) or 
they changed (their) artefacts (“aligned-to-prerequisite design”). The context that 
is created through competition and the generation of alternatives provides on the 
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one hand, a setting for “individual action”. On the other, strategic objectives are 
acting in this context as they guide the action of designers. Jørgensen and Messner 
(2010) argued that in product development networks accounting information gives 
a “general understanding” that guides the development process and its actors by 
“reminding them of the ultimate importance of financial numbers”. Similarly, in 
the generation of aesthetical designs, initial strategic objectives loosely coupled 
the designers to the control mechanisms by reminding them of the importance of 




Strategising in aesthetical concept design took place through competition and 
through the positioning of the project; strategy was not performed prior to 
organisational action, it was part of it. Defined strategic objectives were actors in 
design, which, however, had to be inscribed and carried by the process of design 
and in the design models. Through competition, individual characteristics became 
comparable and by discussing and deciding on the clay models, design strategy 
was created. Instead of just being an input for design, strategy was as well an 
outcome of that process, or more precisely, strategy was the process. Design is 
thus a process of strategising in which various elements, as strategic objectives, 
are translated, such as customers (market strategies/focus groups), modularity 
strategies, cost reduction strategies, or design language. These were all far from 
being explicit targets or measurements in the process of aesthetical design but 
were pursued throughout the design stages making it a strategising process. The 
mobilisation of strategic objectives is thus not only a downstream activity but also 
an upstream activity in which objectives are translated through the anticipation of 
customer needs, costs, or technological requirements, which are also relevant in 
decisions and control processes of further product development stages. 
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Management accountants may pursue a rational calculative approach to the 
management of cost and value; content strategists argue for the formulation of 
strategic objectives that foster competitive advantage (Chenhall, 2005, p. 13); 
however, in aesthetical design, competition may be the means for managing 
innovation and creating customer value. Actors, such as the customer were not 
present during the formulation of strategic objectives in control systems (e.g. 
Ahrens and Chapman, 2005) but through individual interpretations of designers 
and other actors. Cost became present through the focus on technological 
innovation. Value was an individual interpretation of customers, which lead to 
sociocultural and functional innovation.  
 
Thus, creativity may, not only, be enhanced through stable goals that people can 
draw on (Amabile et al. 1996). Competition and the generation of alternatives 
provide a context for “individual action”. On the other hand, strategic objectives 
are acting in this context; they are guiding then the action of designers by 
reminding them of the importance of customers, technological prerequisites or 
cost. Routines, unintended, and intended practices are thus not only shaped by 
“social” actors (e.g. Whittington, 2003, 2006; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007), but by 
actors, such as customer surveys, functional prerequisites, or calculations. 
Strategic objectives can only persist as long as they are carried by actors or carry 
actors. Hence, strategising, rather than being a social process, is a process of 
mobilisation of and through different actors. 
 
Future research and limitations 
As in Case 2, future studies could focus more on the interaction of design and 
calculations. This “more focused and selective anticipation may provide 
outstanding results.” (Verganti, 1999). Open questions are where, when and how 
calculations are undertaken to enable creativity and create space for the potential 
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of successful creativity. Furthermore, the different mechanisms in design and 
technological development could be further analysed; here, focus could be set on 
their interrelations and interactions. The mechanism of competition as a means for 
managing innovation and creating customer value may need further analysis. This 
would be especially interesting in the development stage when both become 
integrated and when compromises have to be reached. 
 
This study has some limitations. First, the study is limited to one case company. 
Future studies could provide more insight into how strategic objectives are 
mobilised and how they shape and are shaped by aesthetical design. Secondly, the 
time available for the study was limited to two years, which limits the access to 
more cases. However, internal documents could extend the insights into the case 
company. Thirdly, the author was employed by the case company, which may 




5.4 Paper 4 - Controlling, separating and converging design and 
product development 
 
Aesthetical design and technological innovation are highly interrelated. 
Designs affect the technologies, cost and functions implemented in the 
product and technological boundaries affect design opportunities. 
Therefore, it makes good sense to integrate and coordinate design and 
technological innovation. Design and technological innovation, however, 
fundamentally differ in their commensurability. Whereas design is related 
to “sociocultural” innovation and is largely incommensurable, 
technological innovation is based on technological knowledge, which is 
largely commensurable and deals with existing and developed knowledge. 
Tight integration and coordination of design and technological innovation 
may be problematic as the managerial tools and processes of 
technological innovation may destroy design’s ability to generate and 
interpret sociocultural meaning. Controlling and managing design and 
technological innovation is therefore a dilemma; they should be kept 
apart yet they need to be integrated. In this paper we investigate how this 
dilemma is managed and controlled. 
 
The paper presents an analysis of a mid-sized European car manufacturer 
renowned for its design and technological innovation. We analyze how 
design is separated from technological innovation in early design 
processes that focus on the generation of variability and selection through 
competition. Once a design has been selected, design and technological 
innovation converge in a phase controlled by cost calculations and 
compromises. In conjunction with the generally separated processes, 
design engineers worked as boundary breakers transmitting information 
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between design and technological development. These distinctions, 
mechanisms and processes constitute the papers’ main contribution to the 







“ Dear Designer, you are a small one, behind you there are 500 engineers 
that have to bring the car on the street, to check for homologation, for 
cost, that it lasts 15 years and so on...they are way more and you want to 
tell them to avoid the 2mm increase in the airbag rail? That does not 
work...” [Design Engineer] 
 
Controlling the dual processes of design and technological innovation is a big 
challenge for industrial organisations, because the uncertainty and measurability 
of design and technological development differ. Designers try to develop new 
sociocultural meaning while they, as the opening quote states, are pitted against 
the 500 engineers that calculate value, cost and technical specifications.  This 
problem has multiple effects on the value and cost of products as well as on how 
design and technological innovation can be controlled.  
 
The problem of the relationship between control of design, and control of 
technological innovation has two aspects, First, design and technological 
innovation may differ in their “measurability” or “commensurability” and 
therefore need separation. The development of design (forms) may be described as 
sociocultural innovation, defined by ergonomics, surfaces, and materials, whereas 
the development of functions may be described as technological innovation 
(Dell’Era and Verganti, 2009). The former is a highly uncertain, creative endeavor 
with a focus on the emergence of aesthetics (Verganti, 1999), whereas the latter is 
less uncertain and described through coordination and control mechanisms (e.g. 
stage-gate processes, target costing, development teams and critical success 




Secondly, because design has a huge impact on the “manufacturability” (Bramall, 
McKay, Rogers, Chapman, Cheung, and Maropoulus, 2003), cost and functions of 
the product, design and technological innovation need to be integrated to 
coordinate the different elements and phases of the design and innovation process. 
The issue is that once designs have been developed the markets in which the 
company sources its components, the production technology etc. have also been 
determined or at least affected. This is also the key message from the target 
costing literature: innovation should be controlled in the early phases so that cost 
of up to 80% of total product cost can be controlled (Ansari, Bell and Okano, 
2007; Carlsson-Wall, Kraus and Lind 2009). Thus, we would also expect that 
design and technological innovation is integrated in order to coordinate the 
different processes so that cost and value is optimised.  
 
A core dilemma for the control of product development is therefore how design 
and technological innovation may be both separated (controlled) and integrated 
(coordinated).  Given the difference in commensurability the literature would 
point to two solutions. The principal-agent based accounting and control literature 
would conceptualise the problem of control of design and innovation as a 
multitask problem and accordingly tasks should be separated in order to supply 
adequate incentives for low and high uncertainty projects respectively and 
minimise agency cost (Holmstrom, 1989; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). This 
perspective, however, pays less attention to the integration and coordination 
problem.  
 
The sociologically inspired accounting theory would suggest that the way in which 
formal control systems are used should differ. Ahrens and Chapman (2004) e.g. 
suggest that an enabling use of formal control mechanisms may “simultaneously 
support the objectives of efficiency and flexibility” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004, 
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p. 298). Similarly Jørgensen and Messner (2009) argue that a strong commitment 
to an enabling form of control enables the firm to “balance efficiency and 
flexibility”.  While these solutions would allow the use of one formal control 
system to control design and innovation processes they seem to neglect the 
opportunity of implementing control systems which are designed, fitted and 
adequate to the relevant level of commensurability, i.e. one type of control for 
design processes and a different control system for technological innovation. It 
thus seems to focus on the coordination problem while paying less attention to the 
control problem.  
 
In this paper we seek to investigate how both the control and coordination problem 
may be handled. Specifically, we want to look into the design and innovation 
processes through which the potentially divergent perspectives and demands of 
technology, aesthetics, cost and other boundaries (such as laws) are managed and 
calculated in complex product development networks, and how convergence is 
created through these processes. Our research question is therefore: How is design 
and technological innovation controlled, when both separation and integration of 
design and product development is demanded? 
 
We conducted a longitudinal study over two years in which we attended meetings, 
gathered relevant company material and conducted interviews. Theoretically we 
focused on both, first, on the general mechanisms of controlling design and 
technological innovation processes in the conceptual stage, and second on three 
cases that we followed throughout the conceptual stage. The paper thus focuses 
both on structural detailing of the control mechanisms, and secondly, on how they 
are used in, affect and coordinate processes. Here, we integrate the literature of 
mechanism design (Hurwicz, 1973) and the approach from Callon (1991) of 
techno-economic networks. The perspective therefore employs both structural 
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analysis (distal) and process focused (proximal) theorising, recognising “that the 
distal and proximal are both complementary yet different ways of looking at 
human structures” (Cooper and Law, 1995, p 238). We suggest that both distal and 
proximal perspectives are necessary if we are to understand the problem of control 
of design and technological innovation. 
 
This paper develops the following arguments and contributions. First, we 
contribute to the literature of control of innovation in design and product 
development, as we provide a comprehensive overview of the structural 
mechanisms through which design and technological innovation may be 
controlled. Secondly, we analyse where, when and how different control 
mechanisms converge and coordinate the network towards one common 
understanding and blueprint of the product.  
 
This is a contribution to the literature because, even though the general literature 
on control of innovation has achieved much depth and breadth in the 
understanding of when and how innovation should be controlled, design issues 
have largely been ignored in this literature (see e.g. Banker, Huang and Natarajan, 
2011; Davila,2003; Davila and Wouters, 2004; Davila and Forster 2005; 2007; 
Davila, Forster and Oyon, 2009; Holmstrom, 1989; Jørgensen and Messner, 2009, 
2010; Mouritsen, Hansen, and Hansen et al. 2009; Ravasi and Stigliani, 2012; 
Wouters and Roijmans, 2011; Zenger and . Lazzarini. 2004). Jørgensen and 
Messner (2010) discuss design, but do so based on a study dealing with what we 
could call technological innovation. This paper is thus the first within the literature 
on control of innovation which explicitly deals with the control of design.  
Furthermore, the connection between creative design processes and product 
development has been studied in various works of Verganti (Dell’Era and 
Verganti, 2009; Verganti, 1999, 2006, 2008). Ravasi and Stigliani (2012) have 
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discussed here the contributions of literature on the fields of design activities, 
design choices, and design results; however, there are no papers analysing control 
of design and technological innovation together as one problem; i.e. control of the 
entire processes of designing and developing (consumer products)62.  
 
We find that design phases are separated from technological innovation phases 
and that they primarily are controlled through output control focused on aesthetic 
criteria. Technological innovation, on the other hand, is mainly controlled via 
targets in decentralised calculative processes. The integration between the 
“aesthetic” and the “calculative” process occurs through design engineers 
transmitting concerns between the separated phases, and through decision making 
in the decentralised, calculative processes.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on control of 
design and product development and develop hypotheses based on the literature 
Secondly, we develop our research perspective. Thirdly, we provide an overview 
of our research methods. Fourthly, we analyse Automotor Company, focusing on 
the general processes and the three cases. Fifthly, we discuss and conclude our 
paper. 
 
5.4.2 Theoretical Discussion - Separation, integration and control of design 
and technological innovation 
 
Design and technological innovation are two fundamentally different, yet 
interdependent processes. Whereas design has to do with “product languages and 
                                                 
62 Armstrong (2002) discusses aesthetic design in relation to management control, arguing that management accounting may be 
used as a modeling technique. However, the study only provides conceptual insights on the modeling function of accounting of 
expertise and does not give deeper insights in to the particular mechanisms of control in creative design. Furthermore, in a 
literature review, Ravasi and Stigliani (2012) come to the conclusion that “we still know little about the practices, structures, 
tools and resources that underlie innovation in product form and meanings.” (p. 19). 
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meaning”, technological innovation concerns “functionalities and technologies” 
(Dell’Era and Verganti, 2009, p. 1). Therefore, in order to investigate how design 
and technological innovation is controlled we develop the two different elements 
of innovation followed by a discussion of their interrelationship. 
 
Design is related to meaning and giving form to things. Following Verganti 
(2008), we use Krippendorff’s definition: “the etymology of design goes back to 
the Latin de + signare and means making something, distinguishing it by a sign, 
giving it significance, designating its relation to other things, owners, users or 
gods. Based on this original meaning, one could say: design is making sense (of 
things)” (Krippendorff, 1989, p 440). This definition underscores design as a 
process of interpreting sociocultural trends and may be approached from two 
distinct and basic approaches to the process of giving meaning to things (Love, 
2000). First, there is the information processing approach, which focuses on how 
information (about e.g. users) is codified, selected and managed, and how 
designers can use this information to design. The approach is rationalistic and 
designers are seen as a “machine capable of rationally selecting and connecting 
elemental information to satisfy a set of constraints”. The other approach views 
design as a creative process (Amabile, 1997). The design process is seen “as 
intuitive or mysterious and is the most dominant aspect of the process” (Love, 
2000, p. 311). Within such a perspective, selection of design alternatives is based 
on feelings and it is not “possible to reduce to a set of algorithmic steps” (Love, 
2000, p. 311)63. Similarly, Verganti argues that “the vision comes first. Figures are 
essential, but they come afterwards, to support its feasibility” (Verganti, 2009, p. 
91). The two approaches differ in their relation to management where the 
information process-perspective gives primacy to management of the design 
                                                 
63 To this approach a relational perspective focusing on how firms may develop their design competencies through the building 
of relation assets and collaboration with “key interpreters” may be added (Verganti, 2009).  
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processes, whereas the creativity approach rather focuses on how design is 
unmanageable and emotional, especially in the early stages of the innovation 
process. In the information processing approach, design fits neatly with 
technological innovation, whereas the creativity approach points to contradictions 
between design and technological development. Recent literature points to the 
latter as the more likely relationship between design and technological innovation 
(Hatchuel and Weil 2009; Verganti, 2009), and this is also the dominant belief in 
the case to be studied. 
 
Technological innovation focuses on “technology” push and how new 
technologies become embedded in products. Technological innovation is generally 
conceptualised as related to strong notions of scientific knowledge. The focus is 
not just on the generation of ideas, but in managing and fostering knowledge 
translation in product development processes (Ayers et al., 2001). Precise 
directions are managed through means such as stage-gate processes and 
engineering knowledge (e.g. Cooper, 1991). So, where design is related to unique 
concepts, technological innovation is based on more explicit engineering 
knowledge. These differences are apparent in Hatchuel and Weil´s framework on 
C-K design theory (2009): where technologies belong to the “knowledge space” 
containing “all established (true) propositions”, and design to the “concept space” 
and is “undecidable”, i.e. it cannot be proven in the knowledge space. Therefore 
we would expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Design and technological innovation differ in processes and their 
perceived commensurability. 
 
Because design and technological innovation differ in relation to their 
commensurability, the ways that design and technological innovation are 
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controlled should also differ (Holmstrom, 1989; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). 
Holmstrom argues that uncertain, innovative activities should be controlled 
through more “close handed” subjective monitoring (1989). Ouchi (1977) argues 
that, dependent on the ability to measure outputs and knowledge of transformation 
processes, different types of control mechanism are and should be applied. In the 
case of technological innovation (particularly incremental technological 
innovation and development, and when compared with design) we have good 
knowledge of transformation processes, and our ability to measure outputs is 
likewise relatively high. According to Ouchi this is a good situation, giving the 
control systems designer freedom to choose either output or behavioural controls. 
In relation to design, our ability to measure outputs (i.e. customer value) before 
the product is put on the market is limited. But, since design involves forms with 
aesthetical expression, outputs from design may be evaluated. Design also 
involves more creative processes in which the individuality and knowledge of the 
designer is paramount, hence our knowledge of the transformation processes is 
limited; according to Ouchi, this should make clan control or a non-cost based 
outcome measure the chosen mechanisms. These deliberations lead us to expect 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Design and technological innovation are controlled via different 
control mechanisms. 
 
A key problem is how the technical/knowledge based space and the 
concept/design space is related, especially given a creativity perspective to design. 
The (perceived) differences in their nature render the integration of design and 
innovation problematic; if design is made with a technological focus in mind, the 
design solutions developed will be less innovative in relation to their sociocultural 
innovation element. Verganti (2009) argues, “Firms engaged in radical innovation 
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of meanings must carefully consider another central concern: they need to avoid 
being diverted by constraints emerging down-stream in development that can 
jeopardize the identity of the vision. Once they have identified the proper new 
radical meaning and language, they should not compromise its integral nature and 
personality” (p. 186). We would therefore expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Design is separated from technological innovation. 
 
Adler and Chen (2011) argue that in large-scale collaborative creativity “informal 
coordination must be supplemented by formal management control systems 
because the number of contributors is too large and their creative contributions are 
too differentiated and too closely interdependent”. Of interest in this paper is that 
when design meets technology, the number of participants in the process is 
increased tremendously. A car that did not have to drive nor have interior, for 
example, could be designed by a single creative or information processing 
designer. A car aimed at the mass market, however, needs to incorporate multiple 
technologies, be able to be produced and sourced efficiently, and must have 
adequate quality, it must also comply with regulations and costs must be curtailed. 
Furthermore, since design influences all these factors, there is a need for 
coordinating design with technological innovation and “acknowledged best 
practices in product development sometimes push in” this direction (Verganti, 
2009, p. 186). Such best practice is e.g. design for manufacturability. Therefore 
we would also expect that:  
 




Controlling and managing design and technological innovation is thus problematic 
as they differ in nature, have divergent demands and at the same time need to be 
integrated and separated.  
 
5.4.3 Theoretical approach 
 
There is no literature dealing with the element and factors, which may constitute 
control of design processes. We therefore need to develop our understanding of 
control of design from basic mechanisms. In order to do so we have chosen to 
focus on mechanism design. A focus on mechanism design means that rather than 
treating “the economic system as one of the givens. The term 'design' in the title is 
meant to stress that the structure of the economic system is to be regarded as 
unknown” (Hurwicz, 1973). This focus is helpful in our approach, given the 
limitations of previous research. We are not focusing on optimal mechanisms and 
on equilibrium criteria but on the basic concepts developed by Hurwicz (1973) as 
a means of comparing different mechanisms (ideal types) with each other.  
 
The focus in the mechanism design approach is on the mechanisms that guide 
agents “in decisions that determine the flow of resources” (Hurwicz, 1973, p. 16). 
Key mechanisms here are competition and marginal cost pricing (Hurwicz, 1973, 
p 15). The key sub elements constituting the mechanism are optimality criterion, 
environment, rules for transmitting messages, language and outcome rules. An 
“optimality criterion” is the criteria that should guide agents in their actions. The 
optimality criterion should be defined independently of the mechanism, so that 
more mechanisms may be compared. Another variable is the environment of the 
mechanism which is “the set of circumstances that cannot be changed either by the 
designer of the mechanism or by the agents (participants)”, examples are, 
technology, individual endowments and preferences. Preferences and technology 
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in innovation processes are, however, not exogenous, as the design processes 
focus on bestowing meaning onto artifacts (e.g. Verganti, 2009) and technological 
innovation and the incorporation of (new) technologies into products, so in our 
study preferences and technology are endogenous to the resource allocation 
process. 
 
In the processes of making decisions, participants exchange messages and are 
given rules as to how messages may be transmitted. The totality of messages 
permissible under a given mechanism constitutes its language. Messages may be 
“proposals of actions, bids, offers, plans of resource flow for the whole economy, 
or they may contain information about the environment” (Hurwicz, 1973, p. 17). 
Finally, an outcomes rule that “specifies what actions are taken, given the course 
of the dialogue” (Hurwicz, 1973, p. 17) needs to be specified. These elements will 
constitute the parameters within which we investigate the nature of the 
mechanisms controlling design and technological innovation.  
 
However, given our purpose of studying processes in a complex, real-life setting 
rather than calculating the optimal control mechanism for design and 
technological innovation, we needed additional methodological and conceptual 
apparatus to inform our study. Here, Callon’s techno-economic networks offers an 
interesting approach to conceptualising design and technological innovation. With 
its relational character and its focus on diversity and convergence, Callon’s 
approach helps to understand how the mechanisms interact and how they act upon 
and mediate relations and decisions.  
 
The approach consists of the following elements. A techno-economic network 
denotes a “coordinated set of heterogeneous actors which interact more or less 
successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse methods for generating 
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goods and services” (Callon, 1991, p. 133). Convergence is defined as the extent 
to which “the processes of translation and its circulation of intermediaries lead to 
agreement”. A convergent network is a network where intermediaries (here 
control mechanisms and accounting calculations) align and coordinate the techno-
economic network. Alignment means that a shared space of equivalence and 
commensuration (i.e. enumeration) has been created. Coordination has to do with 
the extent to which rules for interaction guide interaction, and about who should 
put intermediaries into circulation (Callon, 1991). 
    
The approach developed in this paper to study control of design and technological 
innovation is therefore made up of the following components: 
 
Concepts for describing the mechanism: 
 What is the optimality criterion, i.e. what is the basis upon which decisions are 
made? 
 How is the decision made, i.e. how is uncertainty reduced? 
 Who are the participants? 
 What is the language by which they interrelate and  
 What are the rules for transmitting messages? 
 
Concepts and method for analysing how the mechanisms affect development in 
the networks: 
 What are the heterogeneous structures and actors? 
 How do mechanisms (intermediaries) align and coordinate affect decisions and 
processes? 




We use the last three questions to guide our analysis of developments in the three 
embedded cases. This analysis feeds into our analysis of the mechanisms for 
controlling design and technological innovation. This analysis is structured around 
the first four questions. 
 
5.4.4 Research Methods 
 
Given our research question, we focused our data collection and analysis on the 
structure and the processes of controlling, selecting and converging design and 
product development; thus, employing both distal and proximal analysis (Cooper 
and Law, 1995). Therefore, we focused on the structure and processes of design 
and product development, the control mechanism and decision processes within 
both, and on how they converge. Furthermore, we focused on three embedded 
cases in which design and product development interacted and converged. This 
approach was chosen in order to reduce complexity and “zoom” in on the specific 
processes of controlling and converging design and technological development 
(Latour, 2005). 
 
We have selected three embedded cases, focusing on getting variety in the types of 
cases, covering various parts of design and development of cars, and in relative 
importance of design vs. other criteria such as cost. The first case concerns the 
front design of a specific car, its selection process and its issues with meeting 
product development criteria. The second case focuses on the selection of a 
dashboard design and its further development in one particular car project and the 
third case focus on door panels and their further adjustment to product 
development criteria. The first case was selected because, on the one hand, the car 
is a design icon and, on the other hand, there is huge cost pressure on the car 
model. We therefore expected that both design and technological innovation 
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would be important. The second case was selected because dashboards had 
become a main concern in design and within the organization. The third case was 
chosen because, like the dashboard, the door panels had gained importance, but 
had however, often been subject to cost reduction measures. This selection of 
cases enables us to get a more complete picture of the varying importance of 
design and technological innovation/cost. The cases were also chosen on the basis 
of availability. It was especially difficult to get access to designers as designers are 
separated from development in Automotor Company and information is restricted 
and often subject to confidentiality. 
 
Within each case, especially in relation to the development phase, we have 
focused on specific episodes where controversies existed between design and 
technological/calculative criteria. This focus is based on the theoretical framework 
and is directly relevant to the core dilemma of how separation and integration is 
impacted by control mechanisms and organisational processes. The overall 
process was highly iterative (Eisenhardt, 1989) in order to converge research 
problems, case findings and theoretical discussions.  
 
5.4.4.1 Data collection methods and analysis 
 
The data collection and analysis proceeded in the following manner. First, we 
collected internal documents (such as strategy papers, business cases, 
presentations, minutes and memos) and attended meetings, and conducted 
participant observation (design presentations, decision circles, cross functional 
teams) over a period of two years. Secondly, we conducted 2464 interviews 
(Appendix 8), of which 22 were recorded and transcribed. The other two 
                                                 
64 Four of the 24 interviews were conducted for another study. However, as they could feed into the empirical analysis of this 
paper we could use them for coding. 
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interviews could not be transcribed, due to confidentiality constraints, but notes 
were carefully taken. As the first author was employed at Automotor Company65, 
broad access and insights to relevant material was granted. The first author 
conducted eight of the 24 interviews; both authors conducted the other 16 
interviews. All interviews were coded. Our coding scheme reflected the overall 
mechanisms of design and product development, their underlying optimality 
criteria, language, decision making and rules for transmitting information 
(Hurwicz, 1973). Furthermore, we coded the interviews for the cases, and for the 
general product development processes and structures in Automotor Company. In 
addition to the interviews specifically made for this article, we have conducted a 
total of 41 interviews in Automotor Company. These other interviews have served 
as background knowledge and to sharpen our focus for the 22 interviews and 
gathering of documents.  
 
In order to increase validity and reliability of the data analysis we triangulated the 
interviews with company material and attended meetings. In general, statements in 
interviews were congruent, but in a few cases views among different actors 
differed.  A key example is the extent to which interviewees were of the opinion 
that cost should be managed in design while others argued against this. This 
disagreement is directly related to our core dilemma and is analysed in depth 
throughout the empirical analysis. 
 
                                                 
65 The employment of the first author at the case company entailed advantages and disadvantages for the research process. On 
the positive side is that we gained access to a setting, which is probably inaccessible to any outsider/researcher from academia. 
On the negative side is the potential bias and low reliability of the data collection and analysis (Hermanowicz, 2002). We have 
worked with this limitation in the following ways. Firstly, the second author also conducted interviews within the case firm, and 
secondly the second author also coded the material and reviewed all analyses.  
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5.4.5 Empirical Findings 
5.4.5.1 The design and product development process in Automotor 
Company 
 
Product development (technological innovation) and design are two separated 
areas in Automotor Company. In the early conceptual stage, product development 
is concerned with the technological development of the concept, whereas design is 
concerned with the aesthetical expression of the car concerning form, surfaces and 
ergonomic parts. Product development is heavily characterised by the mediation of 
performance criteria in the form of targets and estimations, guidelines and 
prerequisites. Teams with representatives from finance, purchasing, 
manufacturing, research and development and cost engineering develop concepts 
and alternatives based on these criteria. Teams are coordinated by a project 
manager who forms a decision circle in which the developed concepts are 
discussed and decided upon through the use of target costing (See appendix 8 for 
interviews and description of various actors). Parallel to that process, the interior 
and exterior designs of the car are selected. We specify the product development 
process and the design process a bit more in the coming sections and present 
further details in the case section. 
 
Product development in Automotor Company is divided into two characteristic 
tracks and phases. A selection and competition phase and an adjustment and 
development phase. The selection and competition phase mainly focuses on the 
selection of the final design. In design, approximately 20 designers, generating 
sketches, initiate a project. These sketches are then selected by the head of design 
for the creation of a life scale, clay model, five for the exterior and four for the 
interior66. In the second selection, the five exterior clays and the four interior clays 
                                                 
66 The exact number of generated clay models is confidential but is close to the ones specified in this paper. 
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are reduced to two through selection, and in the final selection stage, the final 
interior and exterior model is selected. The board of directors performs the 
selection of the clay models. During the selection process, the clay models become 
more and more developed and refined; either through individual ideas of the 
designers or through technological or financial criteria. These criteria include 
costs, weight, crash-ratings, space/storage, aerodynamics or driving 
characteristics. Criteria are intermediated through design engineers who connect 
product development and design, which will be discussed in cases and in the 
discussion.  
 
The adjustment and development phase is mainly described through the 
adjustment of the chosen design. In this stage, smaller modifications are made to 
the forms and surfaces. This stage is managed through the target costing system 
and focuses on reaching specified criteria and targets. Thus, technological 
innovation and development is much more focused on goals and is as such a more 
managed process. Product development may influence the final design and lead to 
smaller adjustments in form or material. The design engineers, again, accompany 
these issues. 
 
5.4.5.2 The dilemma of design and product development 
 
Designers are given design language to frame their designs. Words such as 
“lightness”, “dynamic” or “aggressive” are used for design characteristics for 
aspects such as shapes, materials or textures. A dashboard for example should 
represent more “lightness” in the successor as in the predecessor, resulting in 
thinner dashboard layers and thinner decoy elements. “Roominess”, for example, 
was achieved through creating shadows and light spots in the dashboard. 
“Presence” was furthermore used in a discussion about the rear of specific cars 
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leading to bigger perceived boot and tail lights. These language characteristics are 
translated into cars which then speak a specific design language. These give broad 
orientations for designers.  
 
Despite these broad orientations, a key issue in design is to generate variety and 
individuality and to choose among different designs. Different models in design 
reflect different interpretations of the designers. The designs are completely 
different from each other. Furthermore, the designers have different 
interpretations:  
 
“There were four interior designers with their ideas, one in the States, 
two in Asia ... And every design was nearly completely different [...] so, I 
think they try to give their own spirit for every bit.” [Manager 
Controlling] 
 
Designers come from multiple backgrounds and even though a large number of 
the designers are located at the innovation center, designers come from all over the 
world. Furthermore, designers should be visionary and create designs that will last 
for decades: 
 
“Design is specially trained for that, to make a forecast for the next ten 
years. Who can say that of themselves? [...]Therefore we have designers 
who do exactly this. What will the customer buy in five or ten years, not, 
what he wants today. Today we want white cars. We probably won’t need 
them in ten years anymore. To predict something like this is exactly the 




Designs thus have to envisage future consumer preferences, which makes design a 
very uncertain process. Design is started with strategic documents of a car with a 
specific language. Design also wants to create customer taste, rather than merely 
address it. For instance, although customer reports showed that the customer did 
not favor certain elements or concepts, Automotor Company held on to them, 
arguing for not trusting the customer and for creating the customers’ mind. This 
often results in controversial designs that split customers into two groups: 
 
“Yes. Our models are separating people; on the one hand they say ‘cool’ 
on the other hand ‘not cool’. For example a special model, there are only 
two parts of groups, one group says, ‘I like this car’, the other one, ‘I hate 
this car’, and if you compare, they are polarised.” [Manager Controlling] 
 
Thus, uncertainty lies not in the ability to predict what the customer wants but in 
whether the market could be created with the design. Simply put, designs with 
their uncertainty were pushed onto the market rather than being triggered by the 
market. This makes it impossible to objectively evaluate the value of designs, as 
consumer value and preferences emerge in the future when meeting the specific 
design.  
 
This approach leads Automotor Company to separate design from technological 
innovation. This because, firstly, product development should be more concerned 
with technical issues, rather than forms, and should take care that “the car has to 
run” and cost targets are reached. Thus, the product development process focuses 
on measures and calculable functions rather than on forms. Secondly and 
consequently, design should not be concerned with technological or financial 
constraints and should rather concentrate on forms and meanings, and design “into 
the blue sky” as one design engineer said.  
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The character of the designer is described as a rather individualistic type whose 
personal idea should be protected from being sidetracked by constraints. 
Furthermore, costs were seen as a specific constraint that should not sidetrack the 
designer from her/his “individual point of view”: 
 
“That’s what I mean, Design shouldn’t think about costs, never in the 
entire design floor.[...] because cost is not everything. If you save money 
in the wrong spot, maybe you can’t sell the car anymore successfully. [...] 
I think he shouldn’t care about costs, I think that is right, his only task 
should be creating design and if he took care of costs that would be 
uninteresting.” [Cost Engineer] 
 
This statement came just after the cost engineer had described a perfect designer 
as someone who also focuses on cost issues. It seems that the cost issue is the most 
divergence-driving issue between design and product development. Design 
affected product costs, which in turn are the focus of the product development 
process. On the one hand, cost issues are hard to address and “establish” in design 
and cause problems in realising target costs, on the other hand, design is one key 
success factor for Automotor Company and cost may “destroy” the uniqueness of 
designs. This struggle was described as “fights” between the different worlds by 
one designer. However, this was also described as daily business. From a project 
perspective, two interviewees described: 
 
“Designers want to do whatever they want to do, no matter the costs and 
we are turning every plastic part 10 times to save cents, they decide, ‘We 




“Of course, money people are really focusing on money, and the design 
people are really focused on design. That’s their personal motivation; it’s 
natural that these different interests are focused in a different way. Like I 
said, finally, at the end of the day, we need to make products that sell well, 
so we can make a lot of money.” [Designer] 
 
Thus, designers were pitted against the “money people”, i.e. engineers and 
controllers, whilst appreciating the interdependence between design and 
technological innovation.  
 
In summary, design and product development have their specific and divergent 
characteristics and in Automotor it was a general view that they should be kept 






Figure 13 – Conceptual display of the concept stage 
 
 
The figure illustrates the different processes in design and product development 
and their focus in the two stages; the selection and competition stage, and the 
adjustment and development stage. The different quadrants are in conflict as 
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design and technological selection criteria differ. We expand this conceptual 
illustration through our cases and in our discussion.  
 
In the selection and competition stage, heterogeneity among the different design 
models causes the most uncertainty about the concept. In the adjustment and 
development stage, different criteria and the adjustment of the selected design 
model need to be converged towards one final project. 
 
Having discussed the different spaces of design and product development, and the 
two different stages through which the conceptual stage may be characterised, we 
now focus on three cases in which the mechanisms and the convergence are 
described in specific examples. We structure the analysis of the embedded cases 
through this matrix and we seek to answer the questions posed in the theoretical 
section: What are the heterogeneous structures and actors? How do mechanisms 




5.4.6.1 Case 1 – The front of a design model 
 
The front of the car is one of the most contested and constrained parts of this car 
model, we therefore focus on this part of the design in the following. It was 
perceived to be “incredible to bring design into the front of a car”, as one design 
engineer stated. This was due to crash-ratings, laws, engine space, overhang, lights 
and due to the front being the most exposed and sensitive exterior area. 
299 
 
The competition starts with 20 sketches67. In this process, only the form and the 
aesthetical understanding of the designer are paramount in the project: 
 
“In principal, we are drawing without any strategy paper – very naive 
and blue eyed – doesn’t matter what the prerequisites are, just do it. 
Because reducing is easier than adding.” [Designer of the chosen design] 
 
The sketch was thus the pure interpretation and understanding of the designer of 
the model that had to be built. Furthermore, they knew about the constraints in 
general, but not in particular, because they knew they had to reduce the substance 
of their models and their ambitions towards the final model. Competition in the 
sketch stage is thus focused on pure aesthetics and design coherence.  
 
From the twenty sketches, four models were selected to be modeled in clay. The 
head of the design department selected these. This form of competition was, on the 
one hand, a motivation for designers to win, on the other hand, that they run the 
risk of never being selected for modeling or clay modeling: 
 
”I work on my own, I have designed the coolest concept, and then 
somebody comes and says, ‘let’s make a model out of it, I like it’ and then 
somebody comes and says, ‘let’s produce the car one million times and 
sell it worldwide’ That is totally absurd. Of course there is a lot of 
calculation you have to do, but in the end it is the model and the 
motivation to bring it on the street and to win the design competitions, 
that’s the most awesome thing. On the other hand, if this is not working 
out, that is hard and then you think you are a loser and this is de-
motivating.” [Designer] 
                                                 
67 The specific design language for this car was confidential and inaccessible for authors.  
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To see the materialisation of their vision is key motivation for designers. Within 
the process of becoming selected from the sketches and subsequently from the 
clay models, criteria, such as modularity and other technical and monetary 
constraints became more and more apparent. They developed over time in product 
development, which was working on these criteria: 
 
“With development, the point is that this regulation is always moving, the 
development department cannot say in the beginning of the project, 
”These are the main regulations,” they are also working on it, they are 
getting more details, they are making tests.” [Design Engineer] 
 
Criteria were present in the clay stages already; although somewhat fuzzily and as 
they became clearer they were addressed in the clay stages. The designer thus had 
to follow their design idea through the selection process; however, they should 
start to compromise on the criteria given to them: 
 
“We do not include them [the criteria] in our sketches, no, never, but this 
is getting more and more in the virtual [and clay] stages. Every week we 
are looking on that. The main issues we had with our models until the end 
were there already in the beginning, crash ratings, and all these 
restrictions were there fuzzy from the beginning.” [Designer] 
 
That these criteria were addressed did not necessarily mean that they were already 
incorporated into the clay models in the selection process, as after the design 
selection lots of criteria still had to be addressed and compromised. We touch on 




5.4.6.1.1 Constraints and compromises in the front 
 
In the beginning of the clay models stage, none of the four designers seemed to 
incorporate the criteria exactly as addressed by technological development. The 
design engineers were, as discussed, responsible for mediating these criteria into 
the clay design models. They discussed which criteria they did not meet with each 
designer. It was then up to the designer to decide whether his/her design should 
stay as it was and not meet all regulations and to see whether compromises were 
possible in the future, or if s/he would adapt his/her design towards the demanded 
criteria: 
 
“And that’s the point, that’s the way the cookie crumbles, as they say, and 
the point is that every designer has to make it much interesting and much 
new and much emotional to design, automatically, destroying our 
regulations, and we have to bring them to the cars because then you don’t 
get the laws, for example, you only have [75% crash rating], and we can 
do, if there’s an interpretation and we have the selection, then we have to 
bring one page on the wall with kind of traffic lights where we say, ‘Okay, 
this car does not meet the regulations, you have to know it [...], you have 
to know, we don’t match it’. And that is the point [...] two of the four will 
be taken out, so, in future we just can say what your model can and what 
your model can not be, and decide, ‘Well, this point is so important for my 
design, I want to keep it’” [Design Engineer] 
 
Aesthetical design and product development criteria were contradicting each 
other. In our case, as the four models were reduced to two through selection, the 
meeting of the demanded criteria was not a means for selecting these models. 
Traffic lights were presented to the management board in the selection process, 
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showing which criteria the specific design models had not met. In the selection 
process itself these were of minor interest. The criteria were then passed to the two 
winning designers with the message that they should meet them in the next round. 
In our case, neither of the two selected models met the 100% crash rating 
criteria68, which was also relevant to keep the market price of Automotor 
Company and thus the business case. The board wanted the emotions of these 
models but they had to “bring it in with 100% crash rating” as one design engineer 
stated: 
 
“Finally the members of the board decide who to select and if they think 
this machine looks really super cool and they want it, then somebody says, 
‘Yes, but we’re not too happy with the papers at the moment.’ And then 
they say, ‘Make it possible, go for it.’“ [Designer] 
 
Decisions were thus focused on aesthetical criteria and “the papers”, i.e. cost and 
technical specifications had to be solved afterwards. Some of the addressed 
criteria were implemented after the selection of the two models. However, the 
final, winning model still had not addressed the 100% crash rating as demanded 
following the first selection process, but was nonetheless selected due to aesthetics 
and the forms it communicated:  
 
“Because here we see a new Automotor Company face, it is a very good 
handling of the icons of Automotor Company, it was a very good new line 
[...], you see the sides that the other guys don’t have and one guy had, for 
example, yes, he made it like landscaping of the door [...] and these are 
the points why we choose that, for example, [...] choose one and three and 
four. [...] It comes more to emotions to this point, knowing what the 
                                                 
68 The exact rating is disguised due to confidentiality. 
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technical is. If there is, for example, we show them model A with 75%, like 
here, this emotion we want to have it but bring it to 100%.” [Design 
Engineer] 
 
Again, aesthetical criteria were key decision criterion and technical problems and 
other constraints were to be solved afterwards in development. The selection and 
competition process itself focused on selecting the “coolest” and “best” model in 
terms of aesthetics. Through the selection process, however, the board addressed 
the criteria; it was, however, still up to the designer whether s/he stayed with 
her/his form or if s/he incorporated all criteria into her/his form. In this case the 
designer stayed with his form, despite not meeting  the 100% crash criteria, and 
got selected. Designers thus took upon themselves the risk of de-selection through 
not meeting requirements and the board sanctioned these choices through their 
selection. The important intermediary aligning and coordinating the network, thus, 
was not cost issues but the visualizations of aesthetic value. In the next section we 
discuss how the two paths of form and function converged, using the examples of 
the front, and the issues of crash rating and cost. 
 
5.4.6.1.2 Adjustment and technological development phases: Convergence 
through compromising cost, design and regulations 
 
The front was heavily discussed and remodeled after the final model was chosen. 
There were lots of constraints, such as laws, crash ratings, insurance ratings and 
modularity with which the front design had to deal. Cost calculations also played a 
major role in the process of compromising between design and technology. 




One designer argued, “Between the technical constraints there is only a shell of a 
couple of millimeters in which I can design”. Figure 14 shows the most relevant 
constraints in this process69. The outer form was subject to aerodynamic demands 
and crash ratings concerning pedestrian impact, or insurance ratings. Furthermore, 
it was important to maintain a certain height, and the wheelbase and the overhang 
were fixed through the engine and chassis. Modular parts, such as a bumper 
mounting also had an impact on the “shell” in which the designer could design his 
individual front. These constraints thus resulted in limited space available for the 
designer to shape individual forms or implement individual design elements. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Constraints in the front design 
 
Aesthetics and crash ratings 
Especially the crash rating was an issue in the process. The strategy of Automotor 
Company demanded 100% crash-ratings, whereas the chosen model, until that 
time, only fulfilled 75%. 100% could be reached with a remodeled bonnet that 
would compromise the initial design. The bonnet and the shape of the bonnet had 
to be compromised, which was a major concern in Automotor Company: 
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“Everything has to be round, everything has to be with a new radius, 
everything has to be kind of curved and the hood up front in the old model 
was also like this one, a big radius. And now, this [crash-rating] lead us 
to very flat here and nobody like that. [...] And now, this regulation leads 
us to lose the design story of the model and everybody is very sensitive 
and nervous about this [...] And this is the point for us, what can we do 
then? For example, do we leave the 100%? Okay, or we make it more 
round and probably only 75%. That is the discussion.” [Design Engineer] 
 
The shape of the new car was widely debated in Automotor Company. Even the 
management board, which now got involved, could not make a direct decision (i.e. 
without further visualizations and models) regarding which bonnet to choose. A 
special cross-functional team was set up within design and product development. 
They developed two models and showed the alternatives, the model with the initial 
bonnet and the 75% crash rating, and the remodeled bonnet with the 100% crash 
rating.. 
 
“We got a job to make a hood with 75%, to make it more [a design icon]. 
And we showed it to the board, ‘look, here we have it more design-ness 
but we … we will not have 100%, and then you go to the … 100%’. And 
we currently, we don’t have the decision whether they can do it because 
the problem we have now is that we have already a lot of calculations, 
and we don’t see it at the moment.” [Design Engineer] 
 
Design criteria and crash rating criteria were in contradiction and the designer was 
not happy with the situation. He felt that his model was “destroyed” by the 
remodeled bonnet (interview with designer) and stated that the bonnet would not 
fit the model and would be too flat. The compromise was now between a 100% 
306 
 
crash rating or aesthetics, which could only be argued,not measured. In this case 
the management board had to take the decision. We could not take part in the final 
decision process due to confidentiality reasons; however, the management board 
based its decision on the crash rating criteria. So, in the development and 
adjustment process, target performance was more important than design for this 
model. In order to make the decision, models were created to visualise the 
compromises, hence both design language and criteria were important in 
informing the decision, i.e. the design and technological innovation was 
coordinated through prototypes and cost. 
 
Cost issues and design adjustments 
Another issue was the one of cost. The designer became more sensitive towards 
criteria such as cost after the selection process: 
 
“In the beginning I wanted to make the model longer, that would have 
cost 10€ more. ‘What, only so little?’ I thought. ‘That is so cool’. I fought 
and fought. But know I have learned,40 cent70 is a lot; I won’t be able to 
implement a feature like this. I have learned which role this plays. When I 
know upfront [the cost] then I won’t design it. And in the beginning I 
thought, cool, 10€, this is not so much money.” [Designer] 
 
The designer here explains how he realised the significance of small, euro or cent, 
savings on the car through the processes. The language of euros and cents per car 
did not make sense as he did not make the connection between the amount saved 
and the millions of cars sold over the lifetime of a car model, and the direct impact 
that this has on profits. This also illustrates how well separated the winning 
designer is from the language and understanding of technological innovation. 
                                                 
70 Costs are disguised due to confidentiality but are close to the ones quoted. 
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More and more issues such as modularity, which is related to cost, became 
important in the design process. These were considered smaller issues, as the final 
design model had been selected, but they still had an impact on the overall design 
coherence of the car. For example, the wiper blades were set as modularity, which 
had an impact on the form of the upper bonnet that the designer had initially 
designed. He had to change this form due to space constraints coming out of the 
modular windshield wiper: 
 
“To do modularity to save cost, for sure, but that this affects already the 
windshield-wiper, this change costs 40 cents and has a design impact on 
the hood. To win against the 40 cents with a nicer hood? I would never 
win.” [Designer] 
 
Cost in the development stage is thus more important than minor aesthetical 
design changes. 
Furthermore, cost decided over the elimination, material or size of components. 
The prerequisite for this model was that the concept should at least have the same 
concepts and components as its predecessor. However, during the process of 
finalising the chosen model, target cost came into play and smaller changes were 
made to the model, in which, for example, chrome elements were eliminated or 
conceptualised differently. Design was arguing that they lost design to save costs. 
However, throughout the process the designer of the project saw sense in dealing 
with the constraints, as cost issues were important for the organisation: 
 
“The big challenge is to say, it is not our job to design unaffordable 
things, everybody can do this. No, despite all restrictions and rules and 
constraints, and cost pressure...That the people in the end do not see what 
kind of problems you had. You cannot show the model in an auto show 
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and only defend yourself. And this is the cool stuff, although I am always 
upset when they say ‘we have to save here, this is 30 cents more...’, I 
always think, this is logic, that is the interest of the whole organization, to 
produce economically and that the car is overall very good.” [Designer] 
 
In the end the designer understood the constraints from technological innovation 
and started incorporating the view that designs also had to be produced 
economically. 
 
Case 1 illustrated the following things about control of design and product 
development. First, the competition between clay models was more characterised 
by aesthetics than by cost criteria; the winning designer did not understand the 
language of technological development and was separated from these concerns. 
This means that aesthetics were the primary design criteria for the designer. 
Furthermore, as the models selected did not comply with the criteria set by 
technological innovation, design selection is primarily based on aesthetic, outcome 
criteria. Visualisations and clay models, therefore, had immense power in the 
decision making process; they were intermediaries which aligned the network, 
whereas estimated cost/value (the crash rating equals value) issues did not affect 
final decisions, as designs not complying with criteria got selected. The 
heterogeneity in interpretations about design was converged through the 
competition mechanism. Once designs were chosen, project teams worked on 
adjusting the design to manufacturing and other relevant criteria. Here, in general, 
smaller issues such as the windshield wiper or chrome elements were solved on a 
team and project level through cost-benefit calculations. Convergence in the 
adjustment phase, which seriously impacted design, however, was escalated and 
decided upon by top management based on new clay models, which illustrates the 
interconnectedness between the phases. The overall case shows two different 
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accounts of convergence in design and technological innovation, first, through 
hierarchy and visualizations, design is converged and the main direction is set, and 
secondly, smaller adjustments are made via compromise in decentralised 
processes through cost benefit calculations. 
 
5.4.6.2 Case 2 – Dashboard 
5.4.6.2.1 Selection and competition phase 
 
The design of the dashboard is a “difficult design area” as it is central to the front 
seat passengers’ (and driver’s respectively) eye line and because it is an area with 
high management attention. Furthermore, it was described in Automotor Company 
as a design icon. The meaning of the dashboard had changed for design, and 
increased in status in Automotor Company. Previously, the Automotor Company 
dashboard was considered incoherent: 
 
“Six years ago a dashboard at Automotor Company was not really, or ten 
years ago, was not really nice. That was secondary. There we have to do 
something, image wise. The image is with the chassis and with the engine, 
but we still have to catch up with the dashboard.” [Developer Dashboard] 
 
Furthermore, since the value of the design was not measurable in market terms, 
the pressure on design had risen. With the dashboard, sketches were also turned 
into clay models and decisions were made in steps from three to two to one. In this 
process, the design freedom seemed to be rather high, as the process for the 
dashboards always started with a blank piece of paper. Other car projects or 
predecessors seemed to be no points of reference. Issues such as modularity or 
equal parts were rather neglected in the clay processes. Using equal glove box 
mechanisms or the same bumpers were not issues in the design stage: 
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“We had several decisions, where we decided pro design and against 
cost. Modularity in the fenders for example, big cost issue. There is a 
tendency of more differentiation. Here one additional part more...and 
here and there...They never keep up with our demands, although they are 
necessary in our view [...] There are few topics that leaves freedom for 
the designer.” [Developer Dashboard] 
 
Thus, product development was dependent on the design process itself and 
designers strived for more differentiation while technological innovation sought to 
limit their freedom. We followed one car project, through the process of design 
and product development, in which designs were chosen and more importantly, 
where controversies emerged between design and product development. As in the 
first cases, cost and other criteria played a rather secondary role during the 
generation of the clay models.  
 
The dashboard had been specified as a one-piece dashboard, in the specific 
project, and with the design language of “lightness”. That means that product 
development was focusing and estimating criteria, based on the specified concept. 
However, in the parallel design process two out of the three clay models showed a 
multi-layer dashboard. For the choice process of the clay models, information tags 
were provided stating that the shown multilayer concepts were more expensive. 
The two designers argued that only a multilayer concept would be adequate for 
this car project and thus argued that the more expensive solution was necessary. 
They pointed towards the car being in a segment where multilayer concepts are the 





In the decision from three to two models, the management board selected the two 
more expensive multilayered designs. With this decision, marketing had promised 
to provide an increase in the market price, arguing that the customer would pay 
more for the new design, pointing towards competitors and internal models and 
their price positioning. The price premium from the market could be used to adapt 
the already planned cost through a business case, which covered the higher price. 
 
With the decision by the management board to go from two to one, product 
development had to incorporate criteria, such as cost, geometry, complexity or 
weight into their concept. There were only marginal differences between the two 
final concepts in relation to cost or other relevant criteria however their aesthetic 
form differed.  
 
In sum, the selection stage models that did not comply with explicit criteria were 
selected. The designers going against criteria used a logic of positioning the car in 
the market. Designers were thus strategising (Jørgensen and Messner, 2010). This 
did not take place in product development as the formal processes prescribe, but 
through the interpretation of demand by designers. There was then a hierarchical 
decision from the top to go with the more expensive concepts, whilst attaining the 
market price adjustment for the positioning. In the next section we focus on the 
process following the selection, in which time and smaller design changes were 





5.4.6.2.2 Adjusting the final model 
 
The time issue with smaller changes 
One specific issue in the convergence of design and product development was the 
issue of time. After the choice process, smaller changes for product development 
occurred due to the advancing work in the design. These concerned only smaller 
changes, as the main design was chosen. Furthermore, these changes were costly 
due to the fact that the supplier was already nominated and changes needed to be 
made to their product development, and sometimes to prototype tools. The “duty” 
was, as one engineer stated, to “translate the design into a product”. So, product 
development was dependent on the final elaborated design. In this process 
however, a fixed time schedule with milestones was set, but design did not follow 
this schedule and milestones weren’t reached: 
 
“They do not hold the schedule and we get complications, more costs [...]. 
This is incredible, we do not believe in our own schedule. We make 
schedules and do not believe in them. Not only us but as well 
management, not my own bosses. Everybody knows, that there is still 
more time and afterwards still more time.” [Developer Dashboard] 
 
Design was allowed to surpass deadlines, which further accentuates how design 
processes overrule other criteria, here time. It was argued that design wanted to 
incorporate the latest trends in their design model, as this needed to last for the 
complete lifecycle of a car. 
 
Concept development, run parallel to design and design, agreed to be ready with 
their complete/finished design model within five weeks. In that time, concept 
development elaborated on the chosen design model and discovered that specific 
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layers could not be produced due to the forms, and because the dashboard didn’t 
conform to crash prerequisites, which signaled that it had to go back to design 
through meetings and discussion with the design engineer. The dashboard got 
slightly higher in certain areas and lower in others. Instead of the planned and 
fixed five weeks, this convergence process between design and product 
development took about three months. A lot of compromises had to be made 
within these three months, including several hundred minor changes. 
 
Two concrete and interesting issues arose after the final freeze of the design, 
which were minor changes on the one hand, but that, on the other hand, posed a 
challenge for product development, and are interesting to follow in the process of 
idea creation and compromise, as they illustrate how such cases, which impact the 
integration of phases, are handled. 
 
Lighting-effect Case: changing designs late in the process  
After the design was frozen, a recent trend in competitors’ designs had to be 
implemented in the studied case. A lighting-feature on the dashboard should 
enhance the design and make it more premium-like. The head of design convinced 
the project leader and they decided upon the implementation of this feature, 
although it seemed much too late in the development process already: 
 
“And then there was a meeting between the project manager and the head 
of design. ‘This topic is to be realised, doesn’t matter the cost’. Of course 
we estimated cost, but it had to be realized. ‘We want to see scenarios 
how this is feasible. Can we shift development, tools, prototypes? Can we 




The design feature should be implemented irrespective of cost. The pressure came 
from the top and there was no comprehensive cost benefit calculation for this 
feature as in the normal discussions. Together with project management, the head 
of design made the decision and it was “thrown into the development process”, as 
one Cost Engineer stated. The pressure and the risk had to be absorbed by product 
development.  
 
Surface selection  
In another case, the surface with which the dashboard should be decorated was 
highly debated. Design demanded a certain surface that had to be developed 
together with suppliers. Purchasing prices however, were very high for this surface 
and the supply was scarce because the quality was very high. Product development 
therefore suggested another surface, which was cheaper but didn’t have the same 
quality standard as the surface demanded by design. Although the suggested 
solution was also of a very high standard, the quality was “still not enough” for 
design: 
 
“It all makes sense, because you don’t see it much, we decided to have the 
cheaper supplier and now that’s still not enough, and now we have a 
meeting on Friday to decide to have the prototype a more expensive 
supplier for the entire lower part, and we, of course, together with the 
door panel because there is surface also on the door panel, and we try to 
fight against them, of course, because you have to look at the cost, and 
now we put together some figures to control design… and then it will be 
interesting who is the stronger.” [Purchasing] 
 
The two different surfaces were presented to the project with two models. The 
decision fell towards the suggested solution of product development and thus for 
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the cheaper surface. The visualisation showed only a very marginal quality 
difference and cost played the major role. Marketing also didn’t see any drawback 
for the customer in this decision. 
 
What was also interesting was that there was no strategy for surfaces among all 
car projects, thus no standardisation. This was surprising as there were strategies 
for other surfaces and trims to keep complexity and cost low, and to avoid further 
discussion like that described above. It was argued that this was because design 
was too strong and “too design oriented” in relation to the surface selection of the 
dashboard. There was thus no control over the surface design process; this is why 
product development set up a team through which standardisation should be set in 
the future. We could not follow the outcome of this team but standardisation and 
modularity were means to control design processes, as was seen with other 
projects and surfaces. This is why product development pushed the surface 
standardisation for the dashboard. 
 
The surface issue showed that smaller issues could be decided within the project, 
based on calculations and visualizations, by weighing cost and aesthetics.  
 
In summary, the case demonstrated four things about control and convergence of 
design and product development. First, designers’ interpretation of market trends 
was more important than the explicit criterion of a single layer dashboard, and 
when going from three to two, the single layered design was not selected. 
Designers’ interpretation thus overruled explicit criteria. Again, cost issues did not 
align and coordinate the network. Designers took chances through not adhering to 
criteria and were rewarded for their choice through the selection. Secondly, time 
was an issue, as design needed more time than was allowed for in the schedule. 
Development then had to cope with having less time to develop the concept. This 
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was an example of how function follows form and design being the more 
important criterion. Thirdly, smaller changes were calculated and decided on an 
operational level rather than by hierarchy, as we also saw in Case 1. However, the 
lighting design had to be decided on a hierarchical basis as it had a major impact 
on the design, time schedule and costs. Fourthly, product development was 
striving for the cost control mechanism of standardisation (modularity) to meet 
their selected criteria and to avoid future discussions about dashboard surfaces. 
 
5.4.6.3 Case 3 - Door Panel 
5.4.6.3.1 Selection and competition phase 
 
The selection process for the doors was the same as for the dashboard. The focus 
was very much set on the “meaning and feeling” of the door panel. For the 
competition from three down to two and to one, only the front doors were 
designed, as the rear doors were resulting designs with similar design patterns as 
the front door. The rear doors were then designed after the selection stage. In this 
case, we focus on the adjustment phase because the designs of the three doors did 
not differ significantly. Furthermore, we were not able to get access to material 
about the selection of the final door panels, since key persons involved in that 
stage either left the company or could not be interviewed due to confidentiality 
reasons.  
 
However, the design of the door panels was as important as the dashboard. In the 
past, the coherence of the door panel design was contested and “negative press”, in 
former car projects, had led to a greater focus on the design of door panels. The 
negative press was argued to have been caused by too strong a focus on cost in the 
adjustment and development process. Thus, in this case we focus on the door 
panel of one particular project and the adjustments that had taken place after the 
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selection. Here, two stories that had a significant impact on design and cost were 
of interest. 
 
5.4.6.3.2 Post selection - adjustments 
 
In the adjustment stage, the door panel that had been selected was subject to 
specific changes that had to deal with design elements and certain surfaces. The 
selected design initially showed a specific surface that was typically very 
expensive and hard to source. The cost engineer who calculated the cost for the 
door panel suggested, in a cross-functional team, to switch the surface to a cheaper 
one which provided the same quality standard for the customer. This seemed to be 
a minor issue for design as the decision went through the team and through project 
management rather smoothly. In the following sections we focus on two issues, 
which were highly debated and discussed in terms of implementation. First, we 
focus on the issue of equal parts between the front and the rear door, and secondly, 
we focus on a material change for the lower part of the door panel. 
 
Equal parts 
The design of the rear door commenced when the final model was selected. One 
idea was to save costs by using the same (or equal) elements from the front door, 
on the back door. This idea came from a design manager who had seen similar 
approaches in competitors’ doors. In the beginning, this was just an idea that 
would be interesting to try out. As they modeled the clay for the rear door, they 
used the equal parts (such as arm rests, decoys etc.) from the front door and 





“Together with the designer we have positioned several components to 
the rear door, where they could fit ergonomically more or less. And we 
saw there that one component was a bit too big. And then we had to find a 
compromise between both doors, in length, and in positions of the 
components and the doors.” [Design Engineer] 
 
In order to meet ergonomic requirements and cost, the initially selected design of 
the front door was changed. Furthermore, the body structure of the car had to be 
adjusted, as the door and side architecture had to be adapted for that. This was 
then discussed with design and a virtual model was created together with the 
designer’s sketches. The designer agreed to the adjusted doors after several 
discussions and he redrew the new models of the front and rear door using equal 
parts. One more feature, however, had to be compromised, as the equal parts 
situation had an impact on ergonomics. Compromising between design, 
ergonomics and cost was, however, possible: 
 
“And it is tough to generate compromises with ergonomics and with the 
colleagues. They want to have the best possible ergonomics. Then you 
have to discuss with them about costs and so on. And with the designer it 
was a fight. The differences are for a normal person only marginal, but 
they were there. The designer did not want to see this, of course you see 
this a bit when you take [a look at it], there is something different. It was 





The compromise on ergonomic criteria was worked out in the decentralised 
process. The compromised door panels were shown to the project in clay and what 
was discussed and agreed at team level through designer, developers and 
ergonomic engineers was then presented to the project. This compromise brought 
significant cost savings to the project. The compromise seemed to be so tough that 
when the first prototype car was modeled, the doors could not close because one 
of the equal parts had an impact on the hinges. However, this was a minor issue 
that could be addressed afterwards with minor changes to the hinges. Generally, 
the solutions were converged through compromises between cost, design and 
ergonomics.  
 
Material change to the lower part of the door panel 
As cost pressure became even higher in the studied project, project management 
searched for cost-down measures. This process started at a very late stage of the 
car project. The purchasing department asked the suppliers for possible concepts 
with lower costs. One of these ideas was to change the material of the lower door 
panel to a cheaper one using different technology. The quality and the surface of 
the material were, however, considerably lower than what had initially been 
designed. The initially estimated savings sum was 20-30% of the overall cost of 
the door panel. For implementing this cost measure, a significant part of the 
production concept had to be redeveloped, causing more assembly problems and 
complexity, and decreasing the initially estimated savings. However, the project 






“With the material change in the door? There were the finance guys and 
the project manager decided ”material-change, we do this now! Doesn’t 
matter, we have a reduction measure and we do this now!” [Cost 
Engineer] 
 
“We had primarily the equal parts approach in the door panel to save 
costs [...] that was our idea, but with the material change, that came on 
top.”  [Designer] 
 
The design department was unable to rule against the project as development had 
already been in progress and the project was at a very late stage. Design was very 
upset about that, as they had already compromised for cost reasons. 
 
In summary, Case 3 illustrated how compromises between design, technical issues 
and costs are realised at a team level, with the designer doing trial and error 
through visualizations. Design accepted the cost pressure, and gave in, by 
designing door panels that used equal parts together with product development. 
Cost pressure caused several design changes initiated by the financial department 
and decided by project management. These decisions were so late in the process 
that design had to accept this change. Cost, technical issues and design are 
compromised and converged at team level and cost control is achieved through 
intermediaries such as equal parts. 
 
In the following we apply the perspective of mechanism design, to structure our 
analysis and, in discussion of the hypotheses. First, we discuss the findings that 
contribute to the control mechanisms of design and technological innovation. 
Secondly, we discuss the findings that contribute to the convergence processes of 
design and technological innovation.  
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5.4.7 Discussion  
5.4.7.1 The nature of the control mechanisms of the cases 
 
In the cases, it was apparent that design interacted with technical requirements in 
several ways. However, in general, they constitute two different processes, and the 
way in which decisions are made, and processes controlled, differ. As discussed in 
the theoretical discussion, we use the framework of mechanism design to analyse 
the control mechanism in Automotor Company. In Appendix 9 we have 
summarised excerpts from interviews. Table 6 shows the findings from our 




The general mechanism for design is a process of competition. Designers compete 
with other designers on interpreting trends and the general strategic criteria for the 
car and designs are continuously deselected in the process. On the one hand, this 
process is characterised by the creation of variety through letting designers create 
their own interpretation of trends, design language and strategic criteria. The 
criteria acting on the process are more of a general understanding (see also 
Jørgensen and Messner 2010) of a certain car project than strict constraints. In 
Cases 1 and 2 we described how convergence and selection of one model is 
achieved through competition. Even though cost, value and other manufacturing 
criteria were conveyed to designers they did not, in the cases studied, significantly 
impact the choices made by the designers who won in the selection process.  
 
In technological innovation, constraints in the form of cost, manufacturability, 
law, etcetera are paramount and the final design model is subject to several 
modifications. In this stage compromising based on calculations is the way in 
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which convergence is achieved. This process is characterised through financial 
and technological calculations. These are often in conflict with design solutions 
and demand compromises. The overall mechanism in design is thus competition, 
whereas in product development it is compromise based on calculations. The 
overall mechanism in which design converges with development is a process of 
compromising in decentralised projects. We touch on that in the next section about 
convergence. 
 
5.4.7.1.2 Optimality criterion 
 
Designs, which do not meet cost and technical criteria, are selected as illustrated in 
the first two cases; so in Automotor Company the criteria that guide the actions in 
design are more related to coherence and aesthetics. Designs are not made 
commensurable but are selected through top managements’ evaluation of 
aesthetics. So, the primary criteria are aesthetics and perceived value of the design. 
Contrary, in product development, the criteria are of a commensurable nature, in 
the form of either technological or financial criteria, such as cost, feasibility, 
weight or driving characteristics.  
 
5.4.7.1.3 Language  
 
In design, the language for transmitting information is visualisations in the form of 
sketches or clay models. This language is primary in order to establish the “value” 
of the concept, which is not possible through numbers. This was very important in 
Case 1, as two different crash ratings were presented, and in Case 3, where equal 
parts in the door were demonstrated. Traffic lights are used to illustrate the ability 
of various designs to meet technical and cost requirements; however, they play a 
secondary role in the design phase.  
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In product development the language is numbers. In this process, target costing 
and technological target management are the underlying managerial technologies 
that mediate the process. Business case calculations (e.g. modularity Case 1, 
multilayer concept dashboard – Case 2, and cost target in Case 3) and 
technological (feasibility) calculations (e.g. crash ratings – Case 1) are used to 
steer the process of concept development. 
 
5.4.7.1.4 Rules for transmitting messages 
 
In design, messages had to be transmitted through the hierarchy following a 
bottom up approach. These were transmitted through visualisations and 
presentations. For the selection meetings, traffic lights, indicating compliance or 
conflicts with technological or financial criteria, were used as information for the 
selection. This could be seen in Case 1, in which the clay models deviated from 
the targeted crash rating. In product development, business cases are developed in 
a standardised way, providing financial calculations and the affected technological 
criteria. These were prepared in product development teams and were presented in 
specific decision circles with the project manager.  
 
5.4.7.1.5 Decisions  
 
Decisions made on the overall design of the interior or exterior are done by the 
board of management together with the head of design. This is a clear top down 
approach, which assigns all the power to the hierarchy. Cases 1 and 2 present 
cases in which crash ratings and the multilayer concept were decided at top level. 
In product development, by being steered through criteria and targets, decisions 
were taken or prepared in development teams, and at component level, and 
decided through product development circles with the project manager in charge. 
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This could be seen in Case 3 where equal parts and materials were discussed and 
decided upon at team, and project level. 
 
5.4.7.1.6 Uncertainty reduction 
 
In the design phase uncertainty was reduced, through the competition of various 
design models, and eliminated through selection, in a hierarchical form of decision 
making.  
A single designer eliminates uncertainty about forms. We also discussed the 
complexity of making a car work with all underlying functions and concepts that 
need to be developed by a huge amount of distributed knowledge, incorporating 
hundreds or thousands of engineers, which leads to uncertainty that needs to be 
reduced in the processes of convergence in technological development.  As one 
developer stated: 
 
“That is different in design; you have immediately a picture including 
every single detail. You look at a car and you see if you like the outer 
rear-view mirror or not. Or the trunk-lid. This is different in the 
development of concepts. You never know whether the glove-box works or 
not, whether it breaks down after two weeks, all this is uncertain. You 
cannot make a picture out of it. But in design, there you have immediately 
a picture.” [Developer] 
 
Uncertainty in design is fundamentally different than in product development. 
Design uses models to visualise solutions; whereas technical requirements are 




These circumstances furthermore suggest that while outputs and target 
achievement can be measured in technological innovation, design with creative 
processes and non-measurable output may be controlled through competition. 
Although goals may be perceived individually in the design process, competition 
and individual interpretation steer the design process towards the goal of creating 
aesthetical designs that the customer is expected to be willing to pay for. 
Furthermore, in the adjustment stage, compromising is rather an interactive 
control system (Simons, 1995), or an enabling of the use of the control system 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2004), which is used to indicate consistency with 
strategies, such as modularity and profitability, on the one hand, and for guiding 
creative search processes, on the other. Both fields are then connected in (tactical) 
decisions, in which, uncertainty about design and technological and financial 





 Design Product development 
General mechanism  Competition between drawings, clay 
models and other types of physical 
artifacts (e.g. Case 1+2) 
Output control 
Target steering: Cost calculations 
and technological feasibility studies  
Fixed prerequisites such as equal 
parts, modularity and law (e.g. Case 
1+2+3) 
Behavioral control of individual 
engineers 
Primary optimality criterion  Aesthetics and coherence in and 
among models 
Technical feasibility and estimation 
of value and cost 
Language Physical expressions, models, and 
visualisations (e.g. Case 1+2+3) 
Numbers (Cost and engineering 
calculations) (e.g. Case 1+2+3) 
Rules for transmitting 
information 
Escalation through visualisations; 
Traffic lights in selection meetings 
transmit technical criteria (e.g. Case 
1) 
Standardised forms of calculations 
from team to project level. (e.g. 
Case 3) 
Decision maker Top management, CEO (e.g. Case 
1+2) 
Decentralised in cross-function 
teams based on calculations and 
technological criteria – Final 
decisions through project manager 
(e.g. Case 3) 
Uncertainty reduction methods Uncertainty is reduced through 
creating variety through the 
competition and 
eliminating/deciding on it through 
selection. (e.g. Case 1+2) 
Reducing uncertainty through 
financial and technological 
calculations that become more solid 
over time (e.g. Case 1+2+3) 
 





The Table illustrates the mechanisms through which design and technological 
innovation were controlled in Automotor Company. The two phases are illustrated 
as separate phases and the table thus illustrates how the two differ, and how they 
are managed through different control mechanisms.  
This table also sums up our investigation of the first three hypotheses. Design 
differed from technological innovation in their perceived commensurability (1), 
where design is a non-commensurable but can be evaluated through aesthetic 
outcome criteria, and technological innovation through numbers (engineering or 
cost based). Design and technological innovation is also controlled via different 
control mechanisms (2) as illustrated in the table, where design is controlled 
through competition on aesthetic output criteria, and technological innovation is 
controlled through the achievement of targets defined in monetary or engineering 
terms.  Finally, design was partly separated from technological innovation. 
Designers did not have contact with cost engineers and cost controllers in the 
competition and the relevant calculations of their designs were illustrated as traffic 
lights. The criteria calculation from technological innovation, however, did not 
affect final decision on models, as designers not meeting criteria often won 
competitions.  
These findings add to the literature in several respects. Unlike literature which 
argues for the balancing of creativity and control in one process of product 
development and innovation (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2009), we find that 
different mechanisms may be used at the same time, separating endeavours such 
as design, based on sociocultural innovation, and technological innovation, based 
on calculations’. This dual form of control mechanism may enable both accounts 
to strive for flexibility and guidance at the same time (e.g. Davila et al, 2009), 
albeit through different means and in different places (design vs. technological 
innovation). These findings also illustrate how big firms may overcome 
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multitasking problems where difficult to measure activities, such as innovation 
activities, do not get sufficient attention (Holmstrom, 1989;  Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1994). It illustrates that “the best allocation of projects is such that the 
projects assigned to one agent are uniformly more risky than the projects assigned 
to the other” (Holmstrom, 1989 p 313); this is relevant and possible in complex 
techno-economic networks such as Automotor Company. We extend this literature 
by illustrating the specific control mechanism which may accomplish this. The 
competitive selection process seems well suited to incentivise actors to take on 
high risk, e.g. through not adhering to calculated criteria.  Our findings 
furthermore indicate that the network and organisational actors around the specific 
control mechanism influence the importance and weight of the control mechanism. 
In Automotor Company the weight and power of technological criteria was low in 
the selection and competition stage, as decision makers in this phase decided 
against criteria and rewarded designers, taking the risk of deselection, not adhering 
to technological criteria but seeking to maximise on subjective aesthetic criteria.  
 
Having discussed the first three hypotheses we have just one question to answer: 
how did design and technological innovation converge with technological 
innovation?  We briefly discuss this in the next section. 
 
5.4.7.2 Processes of convergence of design and technological innovation: 
design engineers as boundary objects 
 
The question is how compromises are achieved between design and technological 
innovation. Heterogeneous actors within the network need to be aligned and 
coordinated to converge towards a final product (Callon, 1991), which can be 
developed, sourced and produced at adequate cost and value. Though design and 
329 
 
technological innovation were separated, the two phases also interacted. 
Technological development influenced design through the design engineers who 
were also the voice of design in technological development.  
Design engineers accompany the product development process from the very 
beginning: from the generation of the first clay models until the very last design 
freeze. They are responsible for the intermediation of product development criteria 
into the design process, and for incorporating design aspects into product 
development. They are described as the advocates of both design and product 
development: 
 
“These [design] engineers go into the technical discussions and they fight 
for the designs, on the other hand, they have to be realistic and guide 
designers in this tension of finding technical solutions and pushing the 
design through.” [Design Engineer]  
 
In the selection stage, criteria are rather fuzzy and only represented by estimations.   
Communication of criteria is the responsibility of design engineers, however, their 
“identity” is mixed. A design engineer further explains: 
 
“Within design we are denounced as technicians, within technological 
development we are denounced as designers, there they say ‘ah, there is 
one again!’” [Design Engineer] 
 
Design engineers are “aliens” both within design and development. Design 
engineers in these two modes may be described as boundary objects (Briers and 
Chua, 2001). “A boundary object ties together actors with diverse goals because it 
common to multiple groups but is capable of taking on different meanings within 
each of them” (ibid., p. 241-242). They intermediated information and enabled the 
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merger of both accounts. Convergence could only be created through the decisions 
made at both ends, either at team, or top management level. 
 
We found two ways in which intermediation takes place. First, in the design 
phase, design engineers worked on/with designers to accomplish criteria (though 
designer decisions not to incorporate criteria were often not penalised because 
models that did not meet criteria, or did so to a much lesser degree than other 
models, were selected). Secondly, in the adjustment phase when designs were 
adjusted and calculated, big changes in designs where decided upon using a 
combination of the language of design (visualizations and models) and 
calculations, as well as through escalation to the board of directors. 
 
In relation to the first mode of intermediation, design engineers were paramount. 
They are responsible for illustrating and conveying restrictions and criteria of 
product development, to designers, and for showing product development the 
intentions and languages of design. Or, bringing the “blue sky” and the “down to 
earth” approach of both accounts together, as one design engineer stated. It is not 
about one dictating the other, but about initiating compromises through the 
intermediation of design language and criteria: 
 
“It is not like this:’I, as a designer, determine the form and technology 
has to come up with a solution’. That would never work. I have to tell 
them this car is there primarily for driving, so I have to drive. When I 
drive dynamically, then I need space for my knees. A designer needs to 





In this space, visualizations from design and calculations from product 
development intermediate the processes of compromise. They are coordinated 
through specific rules and guidance. In the design selection stage, design engineers 
provide the decision makers (management board) with information about how the 
design models to be selected interfere with relevant criteria, such as crash ratings, 
costs or weight. They show traffic lights to indicate a design model’s conflict or 
compliance with the criteria. In product development, calculations are discussed in 
project coordination circles, in which project management makes decisions based 
on information generated in the product development teams.  
 
In the second mode of intermediation, design engineers intermediated between 
both accounts and prepared and moderated the process of compromise. The 
compromise processes primarily weighed calculations and visualisations: 
commensurable items and non-commensurable items: 
 
“In technological development you have numbers, you can prove them 
scientifically and can convince everybody. With design it is very hard, [...] 
to say ‘the curve or form has to be like this, this has to be like this, design-
wise’. It’s not like you can prove it like with mm in space or costs, or 
whatever. This makes our work very hard in the decision meetings, to 
argue. You cannot argue this design is not good looking, management will 
not understand this. That is why we have different models. To show this 
more or less. We sometimes visualise technological innovations and 
concepts into the clay to show: This is how your idea looks like. Is this 
really what you want, are you serious, yes or no? Sometimes it is then like 





Thus, compromising between visualisations and calculations is another way to 
foster convergence. This could be at a team-based level, located in technological 
innovation or at top management level, located in design. This seemed to depend 
on the complexity and on the affected environment. After the selection of a model, 
criteria typically became more important and solutions were mainly discussed and 
handled at team and project level. This was exemplified in Case 1 with the 
windscreen wiper, in Case 2 with the surface selection and in Case 3 with the 
material change or equal parts. Furthermore, fixed prerequisites, such as 
modularity (e.g. windshield wiper in Case 1) and standardisation (e.g. surface in 
Case 2) helped in converging both accounts as they left no space for bargaining 
about certain forms or functions. However, in Case 1 and Case 2 we saw how 
some decisions concerning “bigger issues” were taken and elaborated at a higher 
level. After the selection in Case 1, the criteria of crash rating became important 
and a key decision factor. Furthermore, in Case 2, a new design feature had to be 
implemented ad hoc. Thus, convergence with bigger issues, that were highly 
affecting development time or costs, was created through providing two 
alternatives where one met the criteria, and one did not. The decision was made in 
both cases by top management, as strategic decisions and not through calculative 
processes: 
 
“Because design is also in a big focus of money and [the head of design] 
indeed himself, it’s very important for him, because he is always asked in 
the board presentation [by the CEO], ‘Are you taking care about the 
money?’ And in one example he told [the CEO], [...]’another model is 
nicer but it cost about 50 million more’, and [the CEO] said, ‘You can 
leave the car, I’m not interested in [...] I don’t want to see it. Those are 
the numbers and that’s enough for me, I’m not interested in that’ and that 
shows [the head of design], also, I can come with something very nice and 
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if I don't match the business case then there will not be interest … 
“[Design Engineer] 
 
Convergence was partly achieved through board of director decisions. Another 
means to achieve convergence was the concept of being, on the one hand, clever 
about cost, complexity and other technical criteria, and on the other, able to keep 
up with a coherent and premium design. Solutions that fit both requirements are 
then searched for in teams that are coordinated by the design engineer and through 
cross-functional development teams: 
 
“Design is the key selling factor for Automotor Company, so, we have a 
tension between the financial and the business sector, design freedom and 
here we want to find the golden rule, the golden track where we have a 
good design and good cars at the same time. That’s the key point.” 
[Design Engineer] 
 
Design engineers were mediators between the two concerns and were continually 
crossing the boundary between design and technological innovation.  In Figure 15 




Figure 15 – Summary of findings 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the design process, at the top, and how it is controlled. At the 
bottom, control of technological innovation is depicted, and in the middle we have 
the design engineers trying to mediate between the two processes.  
 
We found that first, design and technological innovation may be separated and are 
controlled through different mechanisms as discussed in the previous section. 
Secondly, we found that uncertainty may be reduced and eliminated in design, 
through visualisations and choice, and in technological innovation, reduced 
through calculations. We illustrate this in Figure 15 with the shaded area. Thirdly, 
as the project proceeds, criteria become more apparent in both accounts: in design 
and technological innovation, and the two processes merge as design and 
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adjustment and compromise stage, design engineers intermediate technological 
and financial criteria. We found that boundary objects (here design engineers) 
affect the creation of convergence through the intermediation of criteria and 
visualisations. Fourthly, the winning designers fight for their designs, while trade-
offs are made on all criteria (aesthetic, cost and engineering).  When tradeoffs 
have (too) big an impact on design, decisions are escalated to higher levels while 
in other cases compromise are made directly at the operational level, involving 
product development teams, single designers and the project manager.  
 
This conceptualisation adds complexity to ways in which multitask problems 
(Holstrom and Milgrom, 1989), demands for flexibility and control (Davila, 
2005), and the need for using formal controls in an enabling manner (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2004; Jørgensen and Messner, 2009) may be handled via concrete 
mechanisms and processes. Our analysis illustrates how partial separation, which 
enables the use of different control mechanisms for different tasks, may be 
combined with subsequent processes that coordinate and integrate without 
seriously disrupting each process. In this way each process can be incentivised 




This study is subject to many limitations. We have made use of qualitative data 
and observations within a single, complex, production network focused on design 
and within three specific cases. This restricts the generalisability of our findings, 
which would not generally be relevant for non-design orientated firms nor firms 
with low complexity in their operations. The selection of our empirical material 
was influenced by the time available for the study and we were only able to study 
this field in Automotor Company for a period of two years. We therefore suggest 
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that this stream of research needs further, qualitative and quantitative 
development, which could further substantiate and generalise the claims in this 
paper. While Automotor Company´s success indicates that processes are efficient, 
there may be many other factors explaining their success. Hence, it would, for 
example, be interesting to investigate the extent to which the separation of control 
of design and technological development is also an effective solution across 
multiple cases and firms. The relative weight put on control versus coordination, 
and design versus technological innovation could be the object of subsequent 
research. We further think it is important to generate knowledge about the viability 
and effectiveness of the intermediating hybrid – with design engineers to mediate 




Design and technological innovation are of a different nature within consumer 
goods industries. In the studied case, design was separated from product 
development and controlled through different means; design is controlled through 
a competition mechanism and technological innovation through calculations in 
decentralised processes. The need to integrate design with technological 
innovation was taken care of by design engineers who move technical 
requirements and cost issues into the final stages of design selection. However, in 
the studied case, these criteria only had the effect of deselecting very unrealistic 
projects. In general, the message was to fix technological or financial issues at the 
adjustment stage; thus, even designs with severe problems in relation to technical 
requirements and cost were selected. This integration and convergence process 
reflects a process of experimentation, as going back and forth between criteria and 
design models, relating to trial and error practices through which the best and most 
innovative concept (in sociocultural and technological terms) are selected 
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(Thomke, von Hippel, and Franke 1998; West and Iansiti, 2003). Models or 
prototypes, in conjunction with calculations and boundary objects, may enable 
knowledge integration (Wouters and Roijmans, 2011). 
 
Different control mechanism in the separated accounts of design and technological 
innovation may reflect differently perceived commensurability. In design which 
was characterised as incommensurable and as “undecidable”, competition as 
mechanism should provide maximization of aesthetic value. Not competitive 
pricing, but competitive aesthetics are responsible for the output. In technological 
innovation, as discussed, calculations were paramount and aimed at arriving at the 
best, commensurate solution. The control system was thus subdivided rather than 
merely used in an enabling manner.  
 
Controlling design and technological innovation is thus a complex process of 
separation, integration and convergence. Hence, while the saying that either 
function follows form or form follows function indicate that either of the two 
dominates the other, the approach chosen by Automotor Company focused on 
finding the right paths on this scale, through a process of maximising both ends 
through separated mechanisms, and converging them through design engineers 
mediating between the two phases. This balance and compromise occur between 
the languages of physical visualisations and numbers. The transmitters of both 
languages are boundary objects (design engineers).  
Designing and developing cars is thus subject to an intriguing control process that 
separates to allow for creative variability and selection, integrates through 
specially assigned boundary breakers in order to make convergence possible, and 
finally, brings all the criteria together in decentralised processes. So, while the 
designer confronted with 500 engineers, who calculate designs, parts and 
functions, may face challenges in getting their designs through, design freedom 
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and creativity may be achieved through the partial separation, integration and final 




6 Discussion of findings 
 
The four research papers present findings of how conflicting strategic objectives, 
control mechanisms and heterogeneous actors interact in innovative product 
development networks. Focusing on the role of control mechanisms and the way 
they relate to these conflicts and create convergent networks, the four papers 
contribute to the particular gaps recognised in Chapter 2. A brief overview of the 
papers’ foci and findings is presented in Table 7. First, the papers seek to 
understand the interdependencies, in product development and innovation, 
between control and strategic objectives, through a perspective in which control 
and calculations are actors that create contexts for creating strategy and 
innovation. Secondly, the papers recognise boundaries and barriers of control, and 
calculation processes and the ways in which these are created, explored and 
overcome. Thirdly, the papers analyse how heterogeneity in product development 
networks causes conflicts, and with what means and actors these conflicts are 
settled. Fourthly, the papers explore the two issues of product greening and 
aesthetical design, and provide deeper insights that contribute to both fields. 
 
They contribute by following an ANT approach, which sheds light on the 
interactions and relationships between control of strategy and innovation. Paper 1, 
for example, shows that although a static perspective may describe certain 
processes and their relationships, such as strategy, organisational structure, 
systems, or information flows, it does not provide sufficient insights into how 
things are in the making and how actors mobilise and are mobilised. Disruptions, 
controversies, changes, translations and convergence are thus to be traced and 




I discuss the findings in the following sections, focusing on the overall 
contributions the papers make to the field of control of strategy and innovation. In 
chapter 6.1 the findings of the four papers are generalised into one model; in 







 Mobilisation of strategic objectives 
and implementation of performance 
measurements 
 Barriers and conflicts in the process 
of mobilisation of strategic 
objectives 
Findings: 
 Attributes or accuracy are not defined through the 
most appropriate connection between strategy and 
control but through the contexts calculations 
provide for new strategic objectives  
 Links of existing calculations provide contexts for 





 Conflicts and controversies 
between strategic objectives and 
calculations 
 Means and modes of mobilisation 
 Means and modes of creating 
alignment of heterogeneous views 
Findings: 
 Strategic objectives may be mobilised and 
heterogeneous networks converged through the 
creation and exploration of calculative spaces 





 Generation of aesthetical concept 
design 
 Mobilisation of strategic objectives 
 Control mechanisms within this 
process 
Findings: 
 Strategy is not input for aesthetical design but is 
part of it 
 Control mechanisms such as visualisations and 
competition build product design networks and 




 Generation of aesthetical design 
and technological innovation 
 Mechanisms of control in both 
events 
 Convergence of technological 
innovation and aesthetical design 
Findings: 
 Calculative and non-calculative control 
mechanisms may be in place at the same time 
focusing on technological and aesthetical design 
 Both interact through boundary objects and 
converge through bargaining and compromising 
 





6.1 General discussion of findings 
 
Product development is an ambiguous task for organisations. Various actors have 
a stake in the process of product development, of which, some become more and 
more important. Customer value and cost reduction are, for example, two pillars 
for sustaining and gaining competitive advantage. Customer demands require low 
time-to-market, high-quality, individual products with high functionality, form 
language, and social and environmental performance of the product and of 
production processes. Thus, the field of product development and innovation 
concerns coping with these demands, and the addressing and creation of customer 
value. This results in the need for a creative environment in which ideas are 
generated and developed towards innovation, on the one hand, and in the need to 
direct development processes towards objectives such as cost reduction, on the 
other hand.  
 
Creative processes that form innovation are here concerned with idea generation 
and its implementation. In this process, more and more actors need to be bundled. 
Technologies need to be brought together; for example, making a head-up display 
(HUD), which displays the navigation route on car windscreens, from: projection 
technology, navigation software, GPS and a well packaged dashboard71. The first 
step is the idea, the second, and more complex, step is the process of bringing the 
heterogeneity of actors together to assemble a technology which fulfils the 
requirements and strategic objectives of an organisation. 
 
In the process of product development and innovation the thesis points to three 
important issues. The first one is the mobilisation of strategic objectives within 
product development networks. The papers disclose different means and modes 
                                                 
71 This is not a case that was studied in this thesis. The cases in the papers though concern the same problem. 
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through which strategic objectives are mobilised and shaped, and point towards 
calculative and non-calculative devices which render strategic objectives mobile. 
The second concern is about the control mechanisms in product development 
networks. The papers focus on, the mechanisms through which alignment is 
created and found, calculative and non-calculative mechanisms, and the separation 
of both in a calculative and non-calculative space. The third issue concerns the 
integration of both spaces and how alignment and coordination is formed to create 
a convergent network which results in a final product. 
 
6.1.1 Representations – Mobile strategic devices 
 
In product development networks there are calculative and non-calculative devices 
that represent entities such as customers, shareholders, or general ideas (see 
chapter 3.2.2.1). In product development there can be an unlimited number of 
entities which are represented by these devices. There may be non-calculative 
devices such as prototypes or design models, or there may be calculative devices 
such as an IRR or price tags. Do these devices represent strategic objectives? Even 
more than that, they bring strategic objectives into being. When entities become 
inscribed into these devices, they become mobile in product development 
processes and while representing these entities, they become strategic objectives 
that act and are acted upon. For example, shareholders are such entities, and are 
transformed into a calculative device. They are, for example, transformed by 
taking their expectations of the financial performance of the company into account 
(e.g. the expectation on dividends, ROCE, and so on) and by breaking them down 
to a target IRR of products. The shareholders become thus inscribed into the 
calculative device of a target IRR. Through this calculative device they become 
mobile and influence decisions in product development; shareholders become 
mobile strategic objectives. Another example would be the idea of a sports car. 
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The single idea (which is also an entity) of developing a sports car may be 
represented in text documents describing features of the car. Should it have two or 
four doors? Is the motor located in the front or the middle? Is it a hybrid sports 
car? Should it have front- or rear- wheel-drive? The text document which contains 
the information represents the idea of a sports car and, here again, the idea 
becomes mobile as a strategic objective in product development. Calculative and 
non-calculative devices are thus representing entities. Through this, strategic 
objectives become mobile in product development processes. 
 
For entities to be represented by devices they need to be transformed. There are 
different ways in which these devices are transformed. Non-calculative devices are 
transformed, through inscriptions, into visualisations of physical material 
(prototypes) or texts. These inscriptions are more interpretations than calculations; 
“mere mental interpretations” (see e.g. Mouritsen et al., 2009, p. 751) may 
transform entities into strategic objectives in product development networks. For 
example, teams may interpret ideas (such as a sports car) and inscribe their 
interpretation into documents; customers may state their individual interpretations 
of models (e.g. Paper 3) which are then inscribed into documents; designers may 
model their individual ideas into clay. The transformation of calculative devices is 
somewhat different. For calculative devices, entities are made calculable and a 
calculative space is created; then entities become transformed into numbers and 
summed up in the calculation (Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Paper 2). For example, 
entities are monetised (Paper 1; concept of “valorising” in Paper 2) to be included 
in business case calculations. Other examples are estimations of the value of 
functions or setting cost targets for single components (as discussed in Paper 2).  
 
When do the transformations take place in product development and when are the 
devices mobilised? The devices are not only becoming mobile in early, strategic 
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stages; they become mobile whenever a new entity enters the stage and is 
transformed into a device. Thus, the devices are mobilised throughout the whole 
product development process. From this perspective, strategic objectives are 
neither stable nor static. They are in the devices which are mobilised throughout 
the whole development process. This is the process of strategising; strategy is thus 
an outcome which is pursued rather than just being an input.    
 
6.1.2 Alignment and separation – Control mechanisms 
 
A control mechanism is the translation of calculative and non-calculative devices 
(such as text documents, calculations, prototypes), within a product development 
network, that leads to alignment of respective actors (see chapter 3.2.2.3, p. 44). 
The mechanisms create formal coordination; they form convergent networks 
(Callon, 1991, 1992). These control mechanisms include decisions, incentives, 
rewards or punishments. Every action that aligns and coordinates actors (and thus 
creates a convergent network) is a control action. Whether this is a decision in a 
design selection meeting, or an incentive of achieving a specific target, both are 
actions which are part of aligning and coordinating a network of actors.  
 
In product development networks there are different control mechanisms. There 
are control mechanisms which are of a calculative nature, such as business case 
calculations or break-even sensitivity analysis (e.g. Paper 2) or there are non-
calculative control mechanisms, such as competition between physical prototypes. 
Therefore, different control mechanisms and thus calculative and non-calculative 
mechanisms may take place in different spaces.  In the following I will briefly 




6.1.2.1 Calculative control mechanisms  
 
Calculations may not represent all actors, but they may provide a common 
language that links interactions of actors towards a common objective; through the 
calculation as reference, heterogeneous goals are displaced into a common one, 
and actors become aligned. Innovation in this perspective becomes a process that 
is coordinated by calculations. Although calculative boundaries and barriers still 
exist, calculations may form collectives which agree on one direction. Diverse 
knowledge, uncertainty, heterogeneous actors, and views and resulting conflicts 
are orchestrated by calculations that, instead of representing all actors, rather have 
the role of aligning them towards a durable whole (Latour, 1987, p. 122). 
 
I found that calculative boundaries are surpassed by the creation and exploration 
of calculative spaces (e.g. Paper 2), and that calculations form collectives in 
innovation networks, rather than ambiguity. Calculations may provide a common 
language and align networks without even representing all actors or objectives 
(e.g. Paper 1); they form innovations (a durable whole) out of ideas and 
inventions.  
 
6.1.2.2 Non-calculative control mechanisms  
 
Some issues, such as aesthetics, image or reputation, are deemed impossible to 
calculate. Although alternatives may be selected and shaped by calculations (Paper 
1, Paper 2), some may impose limits on calculability (Paper 3, Paper 4). Focusing 
on product development networks and the generation of innovations, other means 
as calculations may be in place. Creative endeavours (Verganti, 1999; Amabile, 
1997), for example, are shaped by physical visualisations (or prototypes) of 
sociocultural innovations. As discussed earlier, the generation of physical models 
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is part of the strategising process and of the process through which innovations are 
generated.  
 
Physical representations and “mere mental interpretations” (Mouritsen et al., 2009, 
p. 751) of forms and functions are means that align and coordinate actors; they 
create a convergent network with a common goal (Paper 3, Paper 4). I found that 
competition and mental interpretation (generation of alternatives) are inherent 
concepts that steer the development process towards the goal of creating 
innovations. Here, visualisations, in the form of physical material (prototypes), 
reduce uncertainty about values (e.g. customer value) and may lead to agreement 
of participating actors. This process helps to enrol and interest actors (Paper 3) in 
the innovation process and leads towards alignment. Here, non-measurable output, 
such as aesthetics, proportions and sociocultural innovations, may be coordinated 
through clan-like mechanisms (Ouchi, 1979). Innovation is here not only driven 
by stable objectives (e.g. Amabile et al. 1996), but by actors, such as customers or 
technological prerequisites (Paper 3), that guide processes in which alternatives 
are generated and decisions towards a final product are made. The process of the 
promotion and selection of alternatives is a process of construction, which can be 
described as a “reduction to only one type of material” through heterogeneous 
actors “entering into fabrication of some state of affairs” (Latour, 2005, p.92). 
Competition is here conceptualised as a process through which one actor is 
successful in the process of translation, in which other actors are successfully 
interested and enrolled. The process leads then to a convergent network in which 
all actors are being aligned and coordinated without necessarily agreeing. 
Opinions may still be heterogeneous and instead of becoming homogeneous, 
networks are convergent through the alignment and coordination of heterogeneous 




6.1.2.3 Separation of control mechanisms  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the development of innovation, more expertise in 
specific technological fields and more interdisciplinary work is needed to bring 
together different technologies and form innovations. Furthermore, customer 
demands, cost pressure and time to market are strategic objectives that need to be 
followed in mature industries to stay competitive. Different functions and views, 
diverse technologies and defined and emergent strategic objectives are 
heterogeneous actors which need to be aligned and coordinated to form a durable 
whole. For dispersed actors to become redistributed in innovation they have to 
become one piece: through the process of translation in which networks are 
formed. Without a convergent network there is no innovation, no product and no 
car. Dispersed actors were, and are still, heterogeneous. Alignment and 
coordination does not mean that heterogeneity is eradicated; heterogeneous actors 
become aligned and coordinated towards one goal. This process, however, is not 
just a calculative process in which one calculation or one management control 
system is an actor that forms and brings together all actors. Although calculative 
devices may be described as “strong” actors that provide a language for 
everybody, it is not the single “strong” actor that develops contexts in which other 
actors are enrolled. Visualisations of physical material, and prototypes as form 
languages, may represent and shape objectives and enrol others through visual 
communication. In a process of competition “individual” alternatives represent 
different objectives, and thus shape and generate objectives in a process of 
selection.  
 
However, one interesting finding of this research is the separation of calculative 
and non-calculative mechanisms. Incommensurable spaces, such as aesthetical 
design, and commensurable spaces, such as technological development, are of a 
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different nature. Aesthetical design may be separated from technological 
development and controlled through different mechanisms; as discussed, design 
may be controlled through non-calculative mechanisms (such as competition of 
prototypes) and technological development through calculative mechanisms. 
Instead of having one general space, a calculative and a non-calculative space may 
exist; however, both spaces have the need to be integrated to form the final 
product. How this takes place is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
6.1.3 Interaction and integration of control mechanisms 
 
I discussed the separation of calculative and non-calculative mechanisms in the 
process of innovation and product development. Both mechanisms lead to 
alignment of heterogeneous actors and are means of creating innovation. 
However, although being separated, they have to be integrated to form innovation. 
 
Both calculative and non-calculative mechanisms, which although seemingly 
separated to disconnect, (for example, technological and aesthetical design) are 
not mutually exclusive. Both run in interaction with each other and form 
something out of their interaction. Their interaction is shaped by intermediaries 
that connect both, and that are defined as boundary objects that tie together both 
mechanisms through exchanging calculative and non-calculative devices. In 
calculative spaces, texts or prototypes are brought in as actors, and in non-
calculative spaces calculative devices are mobilised. Within this process of 
interaction both mechanisms become balanced and calculative and non-calculative 
devices are compromised upon. Calculations like IRR-calculations and 
incommensurables, such as prototypes, are then mobilised together and 
compromised through decisions. The interaction forms obligatory passage points 
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which then concentrate the largest number of actors. Objectives become displaced 
and a common goal is created through compromise. 
 
Thus, balancing and compromising occur through the languages of physical 
visualisations or texts and numbers. Through the interaction of calculative control 
mechanisms and non-calculative control mechanisms, innovation and product 
development happen interactively: by creating consistency with strategy, by 
shaping and developing strategy through guiding creative search processes, and 
through converging heterogeneous actors and processes into a durable whole. 
Although uncertainty72 and heterogeneity could be the outcome of diverse control 
mechanisms, the mechanisms reduce uncertainty and align the innovation network 
to a final state of technology. 
 
  
                                                 








































































































































































































































































































Figure 16 represents the abstracted and generalised findings from the papers. In 
the figure, non-calculative and calculative spaces are (as discussed in chapter 
6.1.2) separated. In both spaces, entities are becoming transformed into either 
calculative or non-calculative devices. In the figure, the entities are displayed as 
shareholders, laws, ideas, and so on. They become part of the product 
development network by being transformed into devices. The devices are here 
shown as texts, prototypes, price tags or IRR. These devices are part of the product 
development network which consists of other heterogeneous actors, such as 
managers, designers, facilities, and so on. Through control mechanisms, the 
devices and heterogeneous actors are aligned and coordinated. I displayed here 
white cars as a symbol of temporary alignment in each space (calculative and non-
calculative). The car represents a common goal in each space. Through balancing 
and compromising (as discussed previously) both, the objective of the calculative 
space and non-calculative space become integrated. This is shown by the car in the 
middle and the black arrow. To visualise the development towards the final 
product, I chose several stages in which the middle car develops. With each stage, 
more and more actors (devices) become aligned and the model becomes stronger; 
it accumulates more and more actors. This is shown by the car becoming darker. 
Fewer and fewer actors have to be aligned towards the final model and perceived 
uncertainty decreases in each space (which is shown by the arrows). In the end, 
the final product (black car) accumulates all actors within itself (Latour, 1987, p. 





6.2 Contributions to relevant fields of literature 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, a deeper understanding of the interactions in product 
development and innovation between control mechanisms and strategic objectives 
is needed (p. 17). For the literature on strategy and control, and control and 
innovation, additional empirical evidence and detailed understanding of these 
interactions help to address the gaps recognised in chapter 2. The complex and 
conflicting field of product development needs further investigation with respect 
to the heterogeneity among strategic objectives, calculations, performance 
measurements and organisational functions. Calculative barriers and boundaries, 
for example, need further investigation focusing on the ways they are created, 
explored and overcome. Here we lack knowledge of how these limits are pursued, 
encountered created and explored and how they may be overcome (p. 27). Further 
insights into how specifically management control is productive in innovation 
(Davila, Foster, and Li, 2009, p. 327) are needed. 
 
In this chapter (6.2) I will provide a rather brief overview of the general 
contributions of this thesis, which strive to fill the gaps identified in Chapter 2. 
The specific contributions are discussed in the four papers; here I provide a 
broader generalisation of these contributions by going back to chapter 2 and by 
discussing how the conclusions contribute to the management control literature 
presented there. 
 
6.2.1 The strategic nature of management control 
 
In literature it has already been discussed that, instead of taking a static view of 
management control and strategy, control takes a more active part in strategy 
making; a focus on the relationships and interactions between strategic objectives 
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and management accounting is needed (as discussed on p. 15; see as well 
Chapman, 2005, Simons, 199073). Practice theory has been applied in a decent 
number of studies in which strategy-as-practice (strategising) is a process which is 
performed by, e.g. managers on an individual or organisational level or both (e.g. 
Denis, Langley, and Rouleau, 2007; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Whittington, 2003, 
2006). However, I found that, rather than only being practised by “social” actors 
(e.g. Whittington, 2003, 2006; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007), strategising is a process 
of mobilisation of, and through, different actors. Strategic objectives in this 
perspective can only persist as long as they are carried by actors or carry actors 
(Latour, 1987) and, thus, objectives are not stable or static, but are pursued within 
the process of convergence guided by intermediaries and mediators. These may 
be, as discussed, calculative and non-calculative mechanisms.  
 
The contexts calculations create in decision-making play an important role in the 
mobilisation of strategic objectives. Calculations are argued to enable strategic 
change and to be important to maintain or alter patterns in organisations (Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2002, 2004; Chapman, 2005; Otley, 1999; Simons, 1995). Here, I 
found that calculations provide contexts for the mobilisation of strategic objectives 
through the exploration and creation of calculative spaces.  Instead of just being 
something that people can refer to (e.g. Davila, 2005, p. 45) or being a “general 
understanding” (Jørgensen and Messner, 2011), calculations act as a common 
language into which strategic objectives may be converted through 
commensuration. Here, calculations that build organisational networks make 
strategic objectives mobile. Either, new calculations are created (e.g. Paper 1 – 
Product complexity price tag), or existing ones are explored (e.g. Paper 2 – 
Packaging of components), which mobilise strategic objectives. Through creating 
                                                 
73 “The research underscores the importance of the dynamic relationship between formal process and strategy: competitive 
strategic positioning, management control and the process of strategy-making play one upon the other as the firm evolves and 
adapts over time.” (Simons, 1990, p.140) 
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and exploring calculative spaces conflicts such as struggling with low 
measurability (Rowe et al, 2008), or subjective input (Kadous et al, 2005) may be 
smoothed. 
 
I discussed that current studies lack a more detailed perspective of the underlying 
influences, through which measurements are created, and under which they find 
application (see p. 47-48). Addressing this gap, I found that accuracy and 
attributes of calculations (as, for example, discussed in Malina and Selto, 2004; 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Lynch and Cross, 1992; Nanni et al., 1990) 
are defined not through the single most appropriate connection between strategy 
and control, but through calculative links that tie organisational networks, and 
through the creation of new calculations that create new links in the network 
(Paper 1, 2). Theorists and practitioners have to take existing actors and ties, that 
may create and provide the mobilisation of new strategic objectives, into 
consideration. Accounting calculations may not be “the single best way” 
(Jørgensen and Messner, 2010, p. 201) of evaluating organisational action; 
however, they may orchestrate different divisions and create collectives rather 
than determine single activities and individuals. 
 
This thesis furthermore investigates how strategic objectives are mobilised 
through non-calculative mechanisms. It explores grounds of control which have 
not been analysed before (see p. 45); for example, aesthetical design here provided 
an outstanding example of how strategic objectives emerge and are mobilised by 
control mechanisms other than calculations. The thesis here contributed to the 
literature on control and strategy as mechanisms, such as competition, which may 
start where calculative boundaries and barriers hinder the mobilisation of strategic 




Calculative and non-calculative (visualisations, competition) control mechanisms 
thus both provide space for the mobilisation of strategic objectives. Through these 
control mechanisms, strategic objectives can be mobilised and are shaped 
throughout the process of product development. Strategy-in-practice thus happens 
not only through decision processes (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2011) but 
through processes such as calculating or visualisation, and alternative-generation 
strategic objectives become inscribed into these alternatives (Paper 3). Therefore, 
the work prior to decisions is important to understand innovation (Christiansen 
and Varnes, 2007). Strategy is thus, an input in, and output of, the process of 
convergence; it is part of it. 
 
6.2.2 Management control in product development 
 
As discussed, calculative and non-calculative devices may make strategic 
objectives mobile. Through control mechanisms, not only are strategic objectives 
mobilised, networks are also aligned. This is especially important to investigate in 
settings with “pluralistic demands and uncertainty” (Jørgensen and Messner, 
2010) and with high product complexity, (Nooteboom, 2000) as here the 
orchestration of all relevant (and heterogeneous) actors leads to the materialisation 
of ideas and objectives (Ayers et al., 2001; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Existing 
literature argues for the flexible use of control systems that, on the one hand, 
structure the processes and give directions and, on the other, are flexible enough to 
“take advantage of unexpected opportunities” and events (Davila, Foster, and 
Oyon, 2009, p. 287; furthermore Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Bisbe and Malagueno, 
2009; Simons, 1995). An in depth analysis (provided here in this thesis) adds a 
greater insight into the interaction between controls, in interrelation to innovation 
(Davila, 2000, p. 405, see as well p. 24, 25). This thesis brings insights into the 
processes and mechanisms of product innovation and adds to the contingency 
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literature in that, for example, it describes how calculative and non-calculative 
mechanisms may link and align heterogeneous actors in innovation networks. 
Furthermore, it sheds light on the lack of knowledge we have about how limits of 
the use of accounting in innovation are encountered, created and explored, how 
they may be overcome, and whether calculations form collectives, or more 
ambiguity, among actors in product development (p. 26). 
 
Calculations are not simply mobilised as information together with strategic 
objectives (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2010, p. 185) but as representations of 
objectives. Diverse knowledge, uncertainty, heterogeneous actors, and views and 
resulting conflicts may be orchestrated by calculations that instead of representing 
all actors, rather have the role of aligning them towards a durable whole (Latour, 
1987, p. 122). Additionally, they, in turn, mobilise actors: engineers work towards 
product complexity or weight reduction, and project leaders use sensitivity 
analyses in business cases to form their decisions. Through calculations, 
“attention” is shifted towards particular strategic objectives and key success 
factors, such as weight reduction or complexity reduction, instead of being shifted 
away (Davila and Wouters, 2004). Through calculations and means such as target 
costing, there is no final boundary for the mobilisation of objectives and the 
formation of innovation. Through commensuration, objectives can be rationalised 
in product development processes, which are formed by calculations through 
exploring and creating calculative spaces in which heterogeneous or even 
contradicting objectives and actors can be aligned. Yet, it is impossible to judge 
the accuracy of calculations. What is described as “confidence” in calculations 
(e.g. Paper 2; Knight, 1921) or well-defined attributes and accuracy (Malina and 
Selto, 2004) of calculations are nothing more than the forming of collectives and 




However, new insights about the mechanisms of control in innovation could be 
revealed in this research work. This is what is coined the “creative endeavour” 
(Verganti, 1999; Amabile, 1997) and feeds into Davila (2005, p. 52), in that, 
innovation is created in contexts that provide a “setting to generate variation, put 
in place the context to select among different alternatives”. This feeds as well into 
the perspective that the work and relationships of actors prior to decisions are key 
elements in innovation (Christiansen and Varnes, 2007, see as well p. 25, 26). 
Through the selection of alternatives, all actors were aligned into one state of 
technology; a “reduction to only one type of material” (Latour, 2005, p.92). 
Creativity and innovation is thus not only enhanced through stable goals that 
people can draw on (Davila, 2005; Amabile et al. 1996), but through the 
fabrication of alternatives that inscribe objectives and actors of the product 
development network.  
 
Thus, the findings of this thesis suggest that whereas in technological 
development, outputs and target achievement is commensurable in nature, more 
creative processes and non-commensurable output may be controlled through 
competition. Differently than discussed in literature, which argues for and 
analyses control and creativity in one process of product development and 
innovation (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2009), this thesis finds that different 
control mechanisms may be used at the same time, separating certain processes or 
networks. This “dual-form” (Paper 4) of control mechanisms may enable 
flexibility and guidance at the same time (Davila, 2005) and will contribute to the 
literature of control and innovation, in that, it first, feeds into the discussion about 
“control” in general being of a flexible nature in innovation. Here, the focus is not 
only set on the conflicts of accounting calculations in innovation (e.g. Mouritsen 
et al., 2009) nor on the conflicts between management accounting and strategic 
objectives (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2010); the thesis adds to the existing 
358 
 
literature in that it displays distinct control mechanisms (calculative and non-
calculative), which may provide contexts for innovation at the same time. 
“Informal coordination” and “formal management control” are supplemented. 
(Adler and Chen, 2011, see Paper 4). Secondly, it sheds light on how convergent 
networks are created through alignment and coordination and how interaction 
happens between control mechanisms. Here, boundary objects (Briers and Chua, 
2001) tie together the mechanisms by intermediating objectives and goals. Rather 
than being “trading zones” (e.g. Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005) or mediators, they 
intermediated information and enabled the convergence of both mechanisms 
through compromising and bargaining. The intermediation of commensurables 
and incommensurables led to alignment through a process of going back and forth 
between both; through a process of experimentation (e.g. Thomke, von Hippel, 





7 Conclusion and afterthoughts 
 
With this thesis I strive to discuss different characteristics of product development 
and innovation focusing on the role of strategic objectives and control. I 
investigated how calculations and control mechanisms interact with strategic 
objectives in heterogeneous innovation networks. I focused on strategic and 
development issues, such as product greening and aesthetical design, and the 
process of convergence into a final product. Figure 16 displays the findings of this 
PhD. It abstracts the inner workings of the black box of product development and 
provides a deeper understanding of how control mechanisms create spaces for 
innovation. 
 
First, through the creation and exploration of calculative spaces, hard to calculate 
strategic objectives may be mobilised. Furthermore, within these calculative 
spaces, collectives are formed and heterogeneity among strategic objectives, 
calculations, performance measurements and organisational functions are aligned. 
Calculations provide a common language that, although may not represent 
everything (e.g. complexity price tag, Paper 1), displaces divergent objectives into 
common ones, so if it doesn’t resolve conflicts, it lessens them (Paper 2).  
 
Secondly, some objectives are incommensurable and mobilised by different means 
than calculations. Here, devices such as visualisations of physical material and 
prototypes play important roles in product development processes; through non-
calculative mechanisms these become mobilised in product development. 
Competition, mental interpretation and the generation of alternatives steer the 
development process towards the goal of creating innovations. This “creative 
endeavour” (Verganti, 1999; Amabile, 1997) provides the setting in which 
variation is created, objectives are pursued and in which common objectives are 
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created through selection (Paper 3, Paper 4). The process of the generation and 
selection of alternatives leads thus to a convergent network which creates 
innovation; creativity and innovation is here enhanced through the fabrication of 
alternatives and not only through stable goals. 
 
Thirdly, calculative and non-calculative control mechanisms interact in product 
development and both need to be aligned and coordinated. In this process, 
balancing and compromising are mechanisms (Paper 4) that form one collective, 
which is enrolled into the final product. This process is defined through control 
mechanisms, as actors become obligatory passage points when they concentrate 
“in itself the largest number of hardest associations” (Latour, 1987, p. 139). 
Whether a calculation or a prototype is able to concentrate the largest number of 
actors, and to translate the product development network towards an innovation is, 
rather than being predictable, dependant on the actors on the stage. 
 
Fourthly, I found that strategic objectives are not static and stable. Strategy is 
input and output of product development networks. Control mechanisms are active 
parts in the making of strategy. Strategising is not a process only made by “social” 
actors but by actors such as prototypes or calculations.  
 
Fifthly, this thesis contributes to the literature on product greening as it provides 
further and deeper insights into its implementation into product development. 
Product greening may become subject to calculations through the creation and 
exploration of calculative spaces. Thus, greening may enter calculative processes 
as a more strategic issue and may become an “ordinary thing” (Paper 2). Rather 
than being a “charitable and altruistic demand”, greening may become a demand 
for profitability by decreasing “reputational risk to a strategic and innovative 
lever” (Paper 2) and, thus, become an integrated part of product development and 
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subject to calculations and decisions. Rationalisation, and thus the calculation of 
product greening may be one effective solution for organisations striving towards 
sustainable actions.  
 
Sixthly, this thesis contributes to the literature on aesthetical design. While both 
the development of forms and of functions are important processes in product 
development, their integration seems to be a difficult one. Shedding light on the 
process of the generation of aesthetical design, Paper 3 and Paper 4 discussed how 
competition and visualisation are control mechanisms in this process. The 
mechanism, of integrating the generation of forms into the generation of functions 
(technological development), was the way of balancing and compromising 
between the languages of physical visualisations and numbers. Here, 
intermediaries (design engineers) enabled balancing and compromise as boundary 
objects. “Designing and developing cars is thus an intriguing process that separate 
to allow for creative variability and selection, integrated through specially 
assigned boundary breakers, in order to make convergence possible and which 
finally converges all criteria in decentralised processes” (Paper 4). 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the thesis, the cape of the four papers, reflects a 
meta-contribution which is of a rather broader nature. The cape itself provides a 
general view of the topics of control and innovation. I see this study as a starting 
point for developing research about control mechanisms in product development 
and the mobilisation of strategic objectives. Through the studies of this thesis, 
many questions arose which need more empirical work to develop a more 
comprehensive idea of how strategic objectives are mobilised through different 
means in product development processes. We need a deeper analysis of how 
strategic objectives, are affected and, affect calculations and product development, 
and how possible boundaries may be overcome.  
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However, the specific cases and episodes presented in the papers, the particular 
arguments and discussions of the papers and their individual contributions, 
provide insights into the ambiguous and complex process of product development 
with its infinite possibilities of bringing together heterogeneous actors and, thus, 
with its inexhaustible resource to produce innovations. If Schumpeter was right, 
endless economic growth could be provided with the resource of product 
development, given the fact, that in turn, collectives are formed and preserved 
rather than torn apart; this is especially relevant for the preservation and creation 
of an environment of humans and non-humans in which wealth is created, without 
being compromised for others. Innovation in these terms is not a form of creative 
destruction, but a result of heterogeneous actors that are aligned within one 
collective. May we find an innovation that enrols all actors and forms one durable 
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Appendix 1 – List of interviews 
Date   Position Duration (in h) 
   
17.02.2009 Transcribed Manager of Sustainability Strategy Department 1 
25.03.2010 Transcribed Manager of Sustainability Strategy Department 1 
23.04.2010 Transcribed Manager of Complexity Initiative 1 
07.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Performance and CO2 1 
08.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Light Technology 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Aerodynamics 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Developer 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Head of Sustainability Strategy Department 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Accounting/Finance 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Controlling of Product Development 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Controller Car Projects 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Energy-Management 1 
10.06.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer Mobility and Technology 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Planner Development Resources 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Development Sustainable Components 1 
11.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Light Technology 1 
11.06.2010 Transcribed Developer 1 
11.06.2010 Notes Taken Manager Controlling of Product Development 0,5 
11.06.2010 Notes Taken Manager Materials and Sustainability 1 
11.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Mobility Strategy (Marketing) with three co-workers 1,5 
01.07.2010 Notes Taken Manager Development Exterior Components 1 
06.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 0,5 
09.08.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer Car Components 1 
09.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 0,5 
09.08.2010 Notes Taken External Consultant KPIs 1 
11.08.2010 Transcribed Manager of Complexity Initiative 1 
13.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 1 
13.08.2010 Notes Taken Project Manager 1 
18.08.2010 Transcribed Internal Consultant KPIs 1 
29.09.2010 Transcribed External Consultant KPIs 1 
01.10.2010 Transcribed Product Manager (Marketing) 1 
14.10.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Controller Car Projects 0,5 
14.10.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer CO2 0,5 
14.10.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Weight 0,5 
15.10.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Controller CO2 0,5 
18.10.2010 Notes Taken Product Manager (Marketing) 0,5 
10.11.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Weight 1 
22.11.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer Aerodynamics 1 
04.05.2011 Transcribed Manager Design Strategy 1 
13.05.2011 Notes Taken Design Engineer 0,5 
25.05.2011 Notes Taken Manager Modularity 0,5 
30.05.2011 Transcribed Design Engineer 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Design Strategy 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Designer Exterior 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Engineer Lights 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Manager Light Strategy 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Steering Convergence of Design and Technology 0,3 
05.08.2011 Transcribed Cost Engineer 0,5 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Manager Convergence of Design and Technology 0,5 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Project Coordinator 0,5 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Project Manager Exterieur 0,5 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Cost engineer Door Panels 1 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Design Engineer 1 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Accounting/Finance 1 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Design 1,5 
14.09.2011 Transcribed Design Engineer 1,5 
14.09.2011 Transcribed Idea Creator / Ergonomics and Comfort 1,5 
14.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Design 1,5 
15.09.2011 Transcribed Cost Engineer Dashboard 1,5 
15.09.2011 Transcribed Engineer Dashboard 1 
15.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Convergence of Design and Technology 1 




Appendix 1 – List of interviews - Continued 
 
 
Date   Position Duration (in h) 
   
16.09.2011 Transcribed Cost Engineer Interior Components 1 
16.09.2011 Transcribed Design Coherence with Technology 1 
16.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Accounting/Finance 1 
19.10.2011 Notes Taken Coordinator Design Cost Convergence 0,5 
19.10.2011 Notes Taken Manager Modularity 0,5 
24.10.2011 Transcribed Controller Exterior 0,5 
24.10.2011 Transcribed Coordinator Light Strategy 1 
24.10.2011 Transcribed Designer Exterior (Front) 1 
22.11.2011 Notes Taken Product Strategy 0,5 
19.01.2012 Notes Taken Design Manager 0,5 





Appendix 2 – Uncertainty 
 
However, to briefly discuss the concept of uncertainty in relation to calculations, 
the perspective of Frank Knight might be as relevant as it is interesting. In Paper 2 
Frank Knights perspective was briefly introduced as follows: 
 
“Frank Knight (1921) analysed the problem of calculability in his work on risk, 
uncertainty and profit, arguing that “calculability” of (probability situations) 
economic situations can be divided into three groups. The first group is a priori 
probability which is absolute certainty about calculations based on “Absolutely 
homogeneous classification of instances completely identical” (III.VII.37). A 
priori probability is distinguished from the second category of calculability – 
statistical probability – through the latter’s reference to empirical datum. Knight 
illustrates this through the following example: “an illustration of the first 
probability we may take throwing a perfect die. If the die is really perfect and 
known to be so, it would be merely ridiculous to undertake to throw it a few 
hundred thousand times to ascertain the probability of its resting on one face or 
another. And even if the experiment were performed, the result of it would not be 
accepted as throwing any light on the actual probability.” (Knight, 1921, 
III.VII.25).  This first form probably cannot be found in calculations of green 
innovations, whereas the latter is dependent on knowledge and systems in place 
within the firm.  The third form consists of estimates, and here “there is no valid 
basis of any kind for classifying instances” (III.VII.37). This last form is what 
characterises true uncertainty and which in Knight’s discussion is the basis of 
profits, where the two other types of probability are risks that are relatively 





While Knight analyses the three forms of “calculability” and uncertainty and risk 
are distinct forms, he argues that uncertainty can be managed and made 
calculable through various means. The important question therefore is how firms 
move on the scale between estimates towards “statistical probability”.  Knight 
argues that there are six ways of dealing with uncertainty 1) consolidation and 
grouping, where the key issue is the homogeneity of classes 2) specialisation, in 
order to facilitate judgment 3) control of the future, e.g. through the use of 
marketing to manipulate the future 4) increased power of prediction acquiring 
better knowledge of the future through e.g. outside experts 5) diffusion of 
uncertainty and risk on more people/firms and 6) avoiding, staying out of 
uncertain business (Knight, 1921, II.VIII.10). 
 
From an ANT perspective these six ways can be described as follows. Regarding 
item 1) consolidating and grouping may not be seen as making actors 
homogeneous but aligning heterogeneous actors. “The uncertainty tends to 
disappear altogether, as the group increases in inclusiveness.”  (Knight, 1921, 
II.VIII.10). The process of grouping is thus reflected through the process of 
translation, enrolling and mobilising heterogeneous actors through means, such as 
calculations. Item 2), the specialisation can then be compared to the 
punctualisation (Latour, 1999) of an aligned network. The “men” or the actors 
have to “bear” the uncertainty altogether, which is then seen as specialisation 
(Knight, 1921, II.VIII.10)74. Items 3) and 4) are resulting ways of dealing with 
uncertainty.  
 
                                                 
74 “The second fact or set of facts making for a reduction of uncertainty is the differences among human individuals in regard to 
it. These differences are of many kinds and an enumeration of them will be undertaken presently. We may note here that there 
may be differences in the men themselves or differences in their position in relation to the problem. We may call the two 
fundamental methods of dealing with uncertainty, based respectively upon reduction by grouping and upon selection of men to 
"bear" it, "consolidation"*16 and "specialization," respectively.” (Knight, 1921, II.VIII.10) 
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Control of the future and increased power of prediction relate to the 
statement,,“the practical significance of knowledge is control, and both are closely 
identified with the general progress of civilization, the improvement of technology 
and the increase of knowledge.” (Knight, 1921, II.VIII.10). Controlling and 
creating the future, whilst predicting it through knowledge increases certainty 
about the future. In terms of a network, boundaries need to be surpassed and actors 
that may be relevant for the future are to be integrated and enrolled in the network. 
Through the identification of strategic objectives and the controlling of these 
objectives, knowledge is acquired that is mediated within networks and may shape 
the future through its outcomes, its products. Predicting the future is thus only 
possible through anticipating it based on knowledge at hand; thus, based on 
enrolled actors within the network. An electric vehicle, for example, is developed 
based on technological knowledge of engineers on the one hand, and marketing 
knowledge on the other hand, both predicting technologies and market of the 
futures through their knowledge. Through the development through these 
anticipations, the future becomes durable in a final product, the electrical vehicle. 
Uncertainty, in these cases, is thus something that is overcome through the 
knowledge of anticipation and the resulting construction of the future through the 
products that are based on this knowledge.  
 
What Knight calls diffusion in item 5) is the distribution of risk on the many 
shoulders of a collective75. This process is the translation of as many relevant 
actors into the network and thus to overcome boundaries to relevant allies. Rather 
than seeing item 6) as an input towards reducing uncertainty, it is rather an output 
of the previous five items. It is an achieved through enrolling all relevant actors, 
                                                 
75 “Other things equal, it is a gain to have an event cause a loss of a thousand dollars each to a hundred persons rather than a 
hundred thousand to one person; it is better for two men to lose one eye than for one to lose two, and a system of production 




knowledge, engineers, future markets, all held together by calculations about the 
future and thus about uncertainty. Reducing (or even “avoiding”) uncertainty is, as 
discussed, only possible through getting the relevant actors on board and not only 
steering towards the future but to conquer it. 
 
In summation, uncertainty and risk are potential translators that may act on more 
and more actors within an organisation. Thus, the role of uncertainty may be 
inscribed in product development through being actively part of it. Calculations 
are here the representation of the estimated future, which, although everyone 
knows that numbers are attached to uncertainty; nevertheless, may become 




Appendix 3 – List of interviews – Paper 1 
 
Date   Position Duration (in h) 
   
23.04.2010 Transcribed Manager of Complexity Initiative 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Controlling of Product Development 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Controller Car Projects 1 
01.07.2010 Notes Taken Manager Development Exterior Components 1 
06.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 0,5 
09.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 0,5 
09.08.2010 Notes Taken External Consultant KPIs 1 
09.08.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer Car Components 1 
11.08.2010 Transcribed Manager of Complexity Initiative 1 
13.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 1 
13.08.2010 Notes Taken Project Manager 1 
18.08.2010 Transcribed Internal Consultant KPIs 1 






Appendix 4: Product Development Network before and after the introduction of the new 




Before introduction of new strategic 
objective “reduction of complexity" 
New strategic objective “reduction of 
complexity" translated into non-
financial measure  “number of parts” 
New strategic objective “ reduction 
of complexity" translated into 
financial measure “price tag” 
  
Mission and vision - Enhance profitability and create value 
- Being segment leader 
- Clear and pure products that ensure individual mobility 
- Communication through internal and external documents and presentations 
Key success factors in new 
product development 
- Efficiency improvements, lower costs 
- Efficient design, new suppliers, enhanced processes 
- More customer value, innovation, quality, sustainability 
  
Organisation structure in 
new product development 
- Matrix organisation, car projects and units 
- Decisions within car projects / high autarky, decentralisation of management 
- Decisions outside projects were strategic top down decisions 
  
Strategies and plans in new 
product development 
- generic strategic decisions done by the 
executive committee 
- Derived plans were mediated through 
targets on project level - these were 
calculated by responsible units 
- generic strategic decisions done by the executive committee 
- Derived plans were mediated through targets on project level - these were 
calculated by responsible units 




evaluation, reward systems 
in new product 
development 
- performance measurements were 
derived based on strategic objectives / 
clear connection 
- agreement on performance 
measurements of project management 
- targets derived from experience of 
current products and strategic objectives 
- agreement of projects towards target 
achievement 
- evaluation and rewarding based on 
performance measurements 
- new strategic objective 'reduction of 
complexity' was translated into 
performance measurements/target of 
'number of parts' 
- Failed integration into decision 
process 
- new strategic objective 'reduction of 
complexity' was translated into 
performance measurement price tag 
to be incorporated into business cases 
- Integration into decision process 
- no clear connection between price 
tag and real costs 
  
Information flows - 
Systems - networks 
- Were filled bottom up -  restricted 
access based on hierarchal level 
- Intranet based 
- Were organised to provide decision 
meetings with performance 
measurements 
- Had a strong maturity - reassembled 
over and over again 
- Decision meetings were provided 
with new information:  additional 
part numbers and targets 
- System to measure and track part 
number status was set in place 
- Information was not always 
available in decision meetings 
- Decisions were still made on basis 
of the "old" performance 
measurements 
- Complexity got integrated into 
information flow and systems 
through being monetised as a price 
tag 
- Not the visualisation was altered but 
the way the calculations were made 
- Calculations (IRR) included  price 
tag 
- System and information flows thus 
were not changed 
 
  
Use of measures - performance measurements were basis 
for discussions in product development 
network in decision meetings 
- IRR calculations were used in every 
decision 
- performance measurement measured 
anticipated and estimated characteristics 
- Number of parts were additionally 
discussed - though only in some 
decisions 
- No decisions were influenced 
through this performance 
measurement 
- Information about additional 
numbers of parts was thus not "used" 
- The price tag was incorporated into 
IRR calculations and influenced 
decisions 
- Used as discussion basis 
- Price tag was already used in the 
construction of the product as it 
sensibilised engineers 
  
Change of PMS and 
performance measurements 
- Industry with defined and mature 
processes 
- Profitability and customer value as 
strategic pillar 
- Focus within product development 
network is set on IRR calculations to 
foster profitability of future products 
- Complexity reduction as new 
strategic objective 
- Additional target and measure 
represented as numbers of parts in 
product development network 
- No change in networks or systems 
- No change in decisions or in use of 
measures 
- Complexity represented in price tag 
- No change in networks or systems 
- Price tag used performance 
measurement in place (IRR) to 
change decision 
- IRR calculations had different 
outcomes due to incorporation of 
price tag 
  
Strength and coherence - Working product development 
network 
- IRR calculations linked management 
and product alternatives and generated 
decisions 
- IRR was present in every product 
decision and enabled decisions 
- Number of parts (measurement and 
target) could not link management 
and product alternatives 
- No new links 
- Price tag could link management 
and product decisions as it used the 
language IRR calculations 
- Price tag influenced decisions and 
could influence the way in which the 





Appendix 5 – List of interviews – Paper 2 
 
Date   Position Duration (in h) 
17.02.2009 Transcribed Manager of Sustainability Strategy Department 1 
25.03.2010 Transcribed Manager of Sustainability Strategy Department 1 
07.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Performance and CO2 1 
08.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Light Technology 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Aerodynamics 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Controlling of Product Development 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Head of Sustainability Strategy Department 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Development Sustainable Components 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Controller Car Projects 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Energy-Management 1 
10.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Planner Development Resources 1 
10.06.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer Mobility and Technology 1 
11.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Mobility Strategy (Marketing) with three co-workers 1,5 
11.06.2010 Notes Taken Manager Materials and Sustainability 1 
11.06.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Light Technology 1 
11.06.2010 Notes Taken Manager Controlling of Product Development 0,5 
06.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 0,5 
09.08.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Car Components 0,5 
18.08.2010 Transcribed Internal Consultant KPIs 1 
29.09.2010 Transcribed External Consultant KPIs 1 
01.10.2010 Transcribed Product Manager (Marketing) 1 
14.10.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer CO2 0,5 
14.10.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Weight 0,5 
14.10.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Controller Car Projects 0,5 
15.10.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Controller CO2 0,5 
18.10.2010 Notes Taken Product Manager (Marketing) 0,5 
10.11.2010 Transcribed Coordinating Developer Weight 1 
22.11.2010 Notes Taken Coordinating Developer Aerodynamics 1 





Appendix 6 – Descriptive statistics and results of group analyses 
 






















1 For our customer our traditional brand values are 
more important than the brand value 
sustainability and product greening.
3,95 ,62 4,47 ,62 3,94 ,24 17,259* ,002* 6,023* ,049* 12,522* ,002* 5,277 ,071
2 For our customer brand-typical technical 
specificities, such as speed, power, and 
acceleration  are more important than green 
3,16 ,37 4,71 ,47 3,82 ,39 55,932* ,000* 28,477* ,000* 19,263* ,000* 15,951* ,000*
3 For our customer the total cost (price and cost of 
ownership) are more important than the 
environmental friendliness of a car.
3,89 ,32 4,00 ,61 3,88 1,32 32,177* ,000* 4,388 ,111 15,333* ,002* 27,396* ,000*
4 For our customer the design of the car is more 
important than the environmental friendliness of a 
4,47 ,51 4,71 ,47 4,71 ,47 2,797 ,247 1,990 ,158 ,000 1,000 1,990 ,158
5 For Automotor Company it is more important to 
calculate general product decisions with business 
cases than deciding them on a strategic basis. 
4,47 ,51 3,65 ,61 3,47 1,18 25,988* ,000* 13,383* ,001* 9,543* ,023* 11,514* ,009*
6 For Automotor Company it is more important to 
calculate and decide innovation of the product 
with business cases than deciding them on a 
3,42 ,69 2,29 ,47 3,53 ,62 25,576* ,000* 17,419* ,000* 19,399* ,000* ,300 ,861
7 For Automotor Company it is more important to 
calculate and decide the greening of the product 
with business cases than deciding them on a 
2,11 1,29 2,71 ,59 2,94 1,48 26,859* ,001* 17,472* ,002* 11,193* ,024* 12,430* ,014*
* p < 0.05
Descriptive Statistics Chi-Quadrat-Test
Finance R&D Prod. Overall Finance vs. R&D R&D vs. Marketing Marketing vs. 
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Appendix 7 – List of interviews – Paper 3 
 
Date   Position Duration (in h) 
04.05.2011 Transcribed Manager Design Strategy 1 
13.05.2011 Notes Taken Design Engineer 0,5 
25.05.2011 Notes Taken Manager Modularity 0,5 
30.05.2011 Transcribed Design Engineer 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Design Strategy 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Engineer Lights 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Designer Exterieur 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Manager Light Strategy 1 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Project Coordinator 0,5 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Project Manager Exterieur 0,5 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Manager Convergence of Design and Technology 0,5 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Manager Convergence of Design and Technology 0,5 
05.08.2011 Notes Taken Project Manager Exterieur 0,5 
05.08.2011 Transcribed Cost Engineer 0,5 
19.01.2012 Notes Taken Design Manager 0,5 






Appendix 8 – List of interviews – Paper 4 
 
Date   Position Duration (in h) 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Manager Accounting/Finance 1 
09.06.2010 Transcribed Developer 1 
11.06.2010 Transcribed Developer 1 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Steering Convergence of Design and Technology 0,3 
28.07.2011 Transcribed Designer Exterior 1 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Design 1,5 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Accounting/Finance 1 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Design Engineer 1 
13.09.2011 Transcribed Cost engineer Door Panels 1 
14.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Design 1,5 
14.09.2011 Transcribed Design Engineer 1,5 
14.09.2011 Transcribed Idea Creator / Ergonomics and Comfort 1,5 
15.09.2011 Transcribed Engineer Dashboard 1 
15.09.2011 Transcribed Cost Engineer Dashboard 1,5 
15.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Convergence of Design and Technology 1 
16.09.2011 Transcribed Cost Engineer Interior Components 1 
16.09.2011 Transcribed Manager Accounting/Finance 1 
16.09.2011 Transcribed Design Coherence with Technology 1 
19.10.2011 Notes Taken Manager Modularity 0,5 
19.10.2011 Notes Taken Coordinator Design Cost Convergence 0,5 
24.10.2011 Transcribed Designer Exterior (Front) 1 
24.10.2011 Transcribed Coordinator Light Strategy 1 
24.10.2011 Transcribed Controller Exterior 0,5 
22.11.2011 Notes Taken Product Strategy 0,5 
        
 
There are different actors that are part of the product development process. Project 
leaders are responsible for a certain car project and steer the development process 
towards all relevant targets and towards the start of production by forming all 
decisions. Product development engineers are responsible for the technological 
development of certain parts of a car. They are held responsible for achieving their 
given targets and thus have to develop parts that correspond to their targets. 
Process engineers bring in their expertise of production and assembly processes 
and evaluate relevant alternatives regarding cost and feasibility. Furthermore, they 
have to implement the engineered concepts into in-house production. Designers 
draw sketches, they model clay models and provide design alternatives which may 
then be chosen as the final design model. In this process, design engineers 
communicate targets between product development and design. Marketing is 
responsible for bringing in customer demands on the product substance and 
discusses their requirements with the other actors in the product development 
network. Controllers calculate the business cases for decisions and steer the target 
cost management process. Purchasers have to find suppliers that are then 
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nominated to deliver a part or parts. They furthermore estimate the costs of certain 
alternatives. All of these actors were part of the product development network and 





Appendix 9 – Excerpts from interviews – Paper 4 
 





It is very tough with design, you may convince people with design, but it 
is hard [...] It is as well hard for our work in the projects, to argument, to 
argument that proportions are not coherent, the design is not coherent and 
so on, but the project manager won’t understand that. That is why we 
have more clay models in design. [Design Engineer] 
 
You can draw ten years long the coolest sketches, if your boss does not 
like them, you are out [...] the head of design is the boss here and he says 
“no, I don’t like that, I want to have that one and not this”. The 
management board then comes into play when the clay models are there. 
They are then more powerful than the head of design. The final model is 
decided by the management board. [Designer] 
 
The problem is in product development everything is measurable, cost, or CO2 
emissions, everybody have their own currency. Aerodynamics is the best example. 
They have their cx-value. They say to us: “If you don’t believe the numbers, we do a 
nightshift in the wind-tunnel.” And then they have the exact values and you may 
have to fight against this. [Designer]  
Language  
That is a must because they don’t know what the target picture is, so how 
to tell them what they should do. And that is an important issue again, we 
build up a car at the moment to show it to them because we always need 
to show it to them it in a perfect way, the way we will do it and we will  
have it in this package, so look, it’s possible to do it in this package and 
the next thing it will cost a sum of money for it, so there is some chance 
to get a few bits in the car realised. [Design Engineer] 
 
And this demonstrating is always a difficult thing. I did some this year 
[...], and I said, okay we should have ten different storage areas as options 
to offer. And I can’t imagine what this looked like. So we picked up a 
few cars and a few mock-ups and had it sent as a small exhibit and 
showed it to a few people and the people who saw it, said, „Okay, it looks 
nice, we can imagine that we can convince the customers with this, but on 
the other side, we need to have it more exclusive, more value on it, better 
materials on it to get a better impression on this”.  So, next we bring it 
into a real car, bring all these items and show it to the different guys and 
convince them. “It’s a very good thing and we can sell this and we can 
make profit with this.” [Design Engineer] 
 
That is different in design, you have immediately a picture including 
every single detail. You look at a car and you see if you like the outer 
rear-view mirror or not. Or the trunk-lid. This is different in the 
development of concepts. You never know whether the glove-box works 
or not, whether it breaks down after two weeks, all this is uncertain. You 
cannot make a picture out of it. But in design, there you have 
immediately a picture. [Developer] 
 
In technology you have numbers, you can prove them scientifically, you can 
convince everybody [...] you cannot proof [design] in numbers, whether it is costs, or 
package-mm, you cannot proof it. [Design Engineer] 
 
Manufacturing and all the upfront cost, also investments. And I had to calculate [...] 
development costs for the supplier and for Automotive Company. Out of these cost, 
controlling calculates the business case. And then we would make an offer to our 
project [managers] and they decide if they want to buy or order this topic in their 
development department. [...] And the business case shows that we have return on 
investment, the same or better than the system we have in the moment. [Developer] 
 
The markets say I can sell the car for 1.000€ more, because the customers pay for it. 
Then we get 400€ that we can spend and they are distributed to the components. 
They can spend 300 and the others 100, and this is how we split it and then we can 






The premise was at least the same contents as predecessor [Designer] 
 
And we considered the positioning of the car [...] The car was on mid-
segment level, and design sees it on a premium segment level. That’s why 
the demands were so high and that’s why there were such a scepsis to 
decide. [Developer] 
 
They have done studies and things, if you talk to experts, it’s the biggest 
selling factor all together. It’s not the six cylinder engine, it’s not the 350 
hp, it’s people see the new car and say, „Wow, that is so cool, I want to 
have it.“ It’s not the 19“ wheels, of course, the wheels have an influence 
but the design comes first and then there are some other things that 
follow. That can change in the hierarchies as well, many people at 




Why? Because design is the selling factor number one and the exterior 
design respectively, that’s what market research says too [Manager 
Controlling] 
 
So; we know that we sell our cars through design. That’s for sure. If it is 
interior design or exterior design and when we draw the line when the 
customer gets into the car and buys it, is hardly measurable. The image is 
the chassis and the engine, but design, that’s where we have sometimes to 
get better. [Developer] 
 
You have acceleration, you want to be top stream or have another standard. And this 
make the division where we want to be with. For example, one could be acceleration, 
best in segment. That means, okay, acceleration ... That means that the segment 
wants to 0 to 100 in about five seconds. So, this is one point, the one number for 
example, and we need loading space in the rear of about 500 litres, the next one, 500 
litres. And all requirements, you have a lot, […]  and then we have all the regulations 
and laws, because we want to sell all our cars worldwide, this means, okay, specs, 
yes, what is the requirement? What is the law in US? And this is always moving. 
Then we have the customer. The customer is expecting [crash ratings]” Hagel 
 
You normally do it with a cost benefit analysis and then you get some crazy numbers 
behind it. [Cost Engineer] 
 
Technology, it has a very high standing, but not at any cost. So technology is 
important and there were times at Automotive Company where we wanted to be 
leader in innovations, it is still like this today. But we categorise whether we want to 
be best in segment or top three or maybe some technologies are not even relevant for 
our cars. We call that prodcut configuration profile what we picture there [...] With 
the innovations it is maybe like this, we have to weigh up, to find an optmial balance 
between cost and value. So we do not bring a whole bunch of innovations into the 
car at any price. That’s what I meant before. We have to think about which 
innovation at which point in time. Maybe somebody else brings the innovation to the 
market and we may be fast follower and we say ”ok, I use what has already been 





[The head of design] makes a recommendation and usually the board is 
following the recommendation and then okay, [...] I choose one and three 
and four. [Design Engineer] 
 
The project managers are briefed regularly from the management board 
and from the head of design for escalation topics and they are grilled, you 
can say it like this. They are urged to address these topics. [...] Sure, there 
are topics which can be decided by the designer, but if the design 
language is fading away through anything, or if the designer has been told 
by the head of design ” I want that you do this, that you show lightness, 
flying forms, I want to have high perceived value.” And if a single 
designer says now ”we are going into a wrong direction” than normally 
things get escalated. [Developer] 
Yes, people don’t understand, when it is getting to expensive or if stuff 
doesn’t work. And then you change the lines and forms a bit, and they 
don’t care. But you can not measure it and you are the weakest link [...] 
you always need the highest manager, he needs to be convinced and then 
his words gain weight and he says ”do it!” and then it works. [Designer] 
The final autonomy is with the chief designer. He’s the authority of the 
design and is the spokesman to board and to management and the 
designer doesn’t have autonomy, he has very strict boarders within the 
company and is challenged. [...] Finally the members of the board decide 
who to select and if they think this machine looks really super cool and 
they want it, then somebody says, „Yes, but we’re not too happy with the 
papers at the moment.“ And then they say, „Make it possible, go for it.“ 
[Design Engineer] 
 
Yes, we have points where we have escalation levels and we have special 
circles, topics become packaged and we let them decide and if a project 
manager has a topic which is important for us and decides against it, we 
use a design-talk where the head of design and the project leader have a 
four-eyes talk. [Design-Technology Convergence] 
 
In development, we have a broad mass of decision power. [Developer] 
 
The final decision is with the project manager or management board. And there are 
topics where we try to take care that not every single project leader decides for itself 
whether they like chrome-exhausts or not. There are several topics which need to be 
not only coherent to the predecessor and to the competition but as well to our own 
car-hierarchy. [Design-Technology Convergence] 
And I think that the leaders set targets and that they really want a topic.”Sit down 
and find a solution!” And the interesting stuff is that the organisation does that quite 
well; finding solutions for things, that are more or less impossible and which nearly 
doesn’t exist. We always did it. And that is one aspect that the leadership has, I 
think. [Manager Controlling] 
And the project leader could decide qhether he increses the price. And technically it 
was a price adaption. [Development] 
The project leader decided whether we may deviate from dates or not, whether we 








Then we have to bring one page on the wall with a kind of traffic lights 
where we say, ”Okay, this car does not meet the regulations,” you have to 
know it or if you think it, you have to know, we don’t match it. And that 
is the point. [Design Engineer] 
 
Design Engineer: For example, the designers know they have to convince 
the management. 
Author: Is managament now the management of design or the 
management of the board? 
Design Engineer: It goes always up the hierarchy, the first one is head of 
design, his point of view to design … They come out with a 
recommendation and they are meeting with the management board, and 
the head of design always makes the recommendation, the whole 





And we do a business case so we check the cost part and the income and the 
development costs are big in innovations, so we try to focus on these topics by rating 
them, how is the income and profitability of this innovation, it’s the business view of 
the thing, and it is not easy because the part of the development wants to have this 
innovation and the business case is bad. [Manager Controlling] 
 
Now we have the design-technology circles, functional design and geometrical 
design. This is the meeting you have to go in before you go into the project 
manager…for example from the body in white departments they have some meetings 
there are the integration teams, you have them for aerodynamics, for safety for 
everything, and for all functional issues. [Developer] 
 
But we have to calculate a business case and but first of all we have to check 
geometrical possibility and then we have to check boundaries that we can build the 
cars and then we have to check for insurance and crash safety and insurance…and 
for that we have a test ... so these are all points we are trying to ask everybody in the 
whole process which may be the problems and how we could solve that and then we 
make a business case and all the details I made with financial departments and..with  
development because they have to build these parts and then in the end we go to the 
project manager and we said ok these are the features, are we willing to spend this 
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